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INTRODUCTION
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. is an enigma. 1 It presented the
question of whether the press had a special right of access
under the First Amendment to a jail over that of the public.
Only seven Justices participated. The lead opinion was a
mere three-Justice plurality. The Court split 3-1-(3). The
plurality concluded that “[n]either the First Amendment nor
the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information.” 2 The concurring opinion agreed
with the plurality in part and with the dissenters in part,
who would have found that “arbitrarily cutting off the flow of
information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and
of the press.” 3
But, as recounted in Part I, this was just the beginning
of the Court’s access jurisprudence. A year later, in Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, the Court reserved judgment on the
question the Houchins plurality foreclosed, namely, whether
there is a First Amendment right of access to government
information held equally by the press and the public. 4 A year
after that, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, seven
Justices agreed for the first time that the First Amendment
guarantees some level of access—in that case, to a criminal
trial. 5 And, later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
a majority of the Court held that the First Amendment
encompassed a right of access that “ensure[d] that the
individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government.” 6
These later cases seemingly displaced Houchins. Yet,
still other cases suggested that Houchins had continuing
1. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Gannett Co., Inc., v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
6. Globe Newspaper Co., v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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viability. Thus, as explained in Part II, while many federal
courts of appeals have found that Richmond Newspapers and
Globe Newspaper control claims for a right of access, just as
many have concluded that Houchins’ contrary rule controls.
In doing so, these courts have characterized Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper as mere exceptions to
Houchins’ general rule that there is no constitutionally
protected right of access.
In light of this split, Part III asks Does Houchins matter?
On its way to answering that question, it makes four
observations. First, the premises of Houchins were
exceedingly narrow, despite courts characterizing them as
quite broad. Houchins was not about the constitutionality of
total bans on access. In fact, the warden in Houchins
provided substantial access to the jailhouse at issue in that
case. Houchins also was not a case about freedom of speech;
it dealt only with the question of whether the press had a
special right of access under the Press Clause. It, thus, left
open the question of whether—generally—the First
Amendment protects an access right.
Second, Houchins lacks precedential value despite courts
of appeals’ insistence to the contrary. It was decided by a
seven-Justice Court. No single opinion garnered a majority,
even on the short Court. Nor, under the Court’s least
common denominator approach adopted in Marks v. United
States, 7 is there a controlling plurality opinion. And, as a
prudential matter, a three-Justice plurality should not have
purported to announce a new constitutional rule—let alone
an absolute one—without a full complement of Justices.
Third, the Court’s later access cases displaced Houchins;
they were not exceptions to it. Richmond Newspapers and
Globe Newspaper speak directly to the constitutionality of a
complete exclusion of the press and the public from
government information. The holdings in these cases, i.e.,
that the press and the public have a qualified, constitutional
7. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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right of access to some government information, dispel the
contrary one in Houchins. Moreover, the Court’s later access
case law, unlike Houchins, is consistent with the Court’s
contemporary understanding of the First Amendment.
Finally, the practical effect of Houchins is highly antidemocratic. Its absolutist rule cuts off all access no matter
the countervailing interests. A humanitarian crisis at the
border in Texas, like that that occurred in 2018, or in a
freezing jail in New York in 2019, are insulated from public
accountability. 8 Under Houchins, the government can carry
away Black Lives Matter protestors under the cover of
darkness outside the eye of the press, like it attempted to do
in 2020. 9 This all has little to commend it.
Having exhaustively reviewed the history of the right of
access and Houchins’ place in it, this Article concludes that
the Houchins plurality’s no-access rule should be recognized
for what it is: dicta of three Justices in a case that lacks any
precedential value or normative sense. On these bases, it
urges federal appellate courts to follow Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper instead. Unlike Houchins,
these cases speak directly to the issue, command the views
of a majority of the Court, have precedential value, and,
importantly, recognize the centrality of access to republican
self-government.

8. David Bauder, Media Fight Access Restrictions on Child Detention
Centers, PBS (Jun. 26, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/media-fightaccess-restrictions-on-child-detention-centers; Annie Correal, No Heat for Days
at a Jail in Brooklyn Where Hundreds of Inmates Are Sick and ‘Frantic’, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/nyregion/mdcbrooklyn-jail-heat.html. The government similarly denied access at the border in
2021. See, e.g., Ben Gittleson, Biden Administration Allows Access to Border
Facility – But Not Ones Over Capacity, ABC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-administration-access-border-facilitycapacity/story?id=76662203.
9. Karina Brown, Ninth Circuit Rules Federal Agents Can’t Target
Journalists at Portland Protests, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.courthousenews.com/ninth-circuit-rules-federal-agents-cant-targetjournalists-at-portland-protests.
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THE COURT’S ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE

In the wake of the Attica prison riots in the early 1970s,
courts recognized that the news media had a protected First
Amendment interest in interviewing prisoners. Implicit in
the First Amendment, they held, was a right of access to
information “antecedent to . . . [the] First Amendment right
to publish.” 10 In 1974, however, the Supreme Court decided
Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. by 5-(4)
margins. 11 In each, it rejected arguments that the
enforcement of generally applicable regulations limiting
interviews with prisoners violated press rights. Emphasizing
that the government had not limited access to conceal poor
prison conditions and that the press had substantial
alternative means of gathering information, five Justices
found that the “Constitution does not . . . require government
to accord the press special access to information not shared
by members of the public generally.” 12
The dissenters disagreed. According to Justice Lewis
Powell, “[a]t some point official restraints on access to news
sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so
undermine the function of the First Amendment that it is
both appropriate and necessary to require the government to
justify such regulations in terms more compelling than

10. Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
see also McMillan v. Carlson, 369 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D. Mass. 1973); Houston
Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Kleindienst, 364 F. Supp. 719, 731 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
11. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974).
12. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830, 834 (emphasis added). Pell was two consolidated
cases. One involved an appeal by California prison officials from an opinion
concluding that interview restrictions violated the prisoners’ First Amendment
rights. Id. at 821. The decision in that case was 6-(3) with Powell agreeing that
the prisoners lacked a “constitutional right to demand interviews with willing
reporters.” Id. at 836 (Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
second involved an appeal by members of the media from an opinion concluding
that regulations limiting prison interviews were constitutional. Id. at 829. Powell
joined the dissenters in the second appeal, making that decision 5-(4). Id. at 835
(Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2022]

DOES HOUCHINS MATTER?

1337

discretionary authority.” 13 And, as Justices William Douglas,
William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall explained, the
press sought to vindicate not its rights but “the right of the
people, the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme,
to govern in an informed manner.” 14 Thus, the interview ban
was “an unconstitutional infringement on the public’s right
to know protected by the free press guarantee of the First
Amendment.” 15
A. The Early Cases
Beginning in 1978, the Court revisited its holdings in
Pell and Saxbe, specifically, and the right of access,
generally. In quick succession in 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1982,
it heard four cases that would come to form the foundation of
the Court’s access jurisprudence. Yet, it was not until 1982
that the Court spoke in one voice, finding that the First
Amendment protected a right of access—and, even then, the
implications of its holding were unclear. As a result, today,
litigants, lawyers, and judges must resort to a hodgepodge of
majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions for
guidance.
1. Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
After a Black inmate committed suicide at a Santa Rita
jail, KQED, a San Francisco television and radio station,
requested access to and the ability to record areas of Little
Greystone—“the scene of alleged rapes, beatings, and
adverse physical conditions.” 16 Sheriff Thomas Houchins
denied the request. KQED, along with local branches of the
13. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Pell, 417 U.S. at
835 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“California’s absolute
ban against prisoner-press interviews impermissibly restrains the ability of the
press to perform its constitutionally established function of informing the people
on the conduct of their government.”).
14. Pell, 417 U.S. at 839–40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 841.
16. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 6 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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NAACP, sued and sought a preliminary injunction enforcing
access. 17 Within a month of the suit being filed, Houchins
opened the jail and Little Greystone to the public “for the
first time in three years” for monthly tours. 18 As one
journalist on the three-hour tour reported, for example, “[i]n
the men’s dorm, in a section of ‘Little Greystone,’ tour
members walked through a barracks housing newly
sentenced male prisoners.” 19 In December, Houchins
expanded the tours to semi-monthly. 20 Still, he did not
permit recording.
i. The Lower Courts’ Decisions
In November 1975, after hearing the evidence, the
district court granted KQED a preliminary injunction,
concluding that a “more flexible press policy at Santa Rita is
both desirable and attainable.” 21 The court ordered
Houchins, in addition to the semi-monthly tours, to give
journalists “access to Santa Rita ‘at reasonable times and
hours’” and to permit their use of “photographic and sound
equipment.” 22 It added, however, that he “may, at his
discretion, deny access to news media during periods of jail
tension when such access would be dangerous.” 23
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In an opinion by Judge
Harry Pregerson, it found that “the First Amendment grants
the news media a constitutionally protected right to gather

17. Station Barred From Jail, KQED, NAACP Sue Sheriff, THE ARGUS, Jun.
20, 1975, at 5.
18. Mike Lucas, Public Allowed to Inspect Santa Rita Jail, THE ARGUS, July
16, 1975, at 8.
19. Id.
20. Santa Rita Tours, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 1975, at 19.
21. Tom Hall, Court Orders News Access at Prison, THE SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Nov. 21, 1975, at 7.
22. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 438 U.S.
1 (1978).
23. Newsmen Win Round Over Santa Rita Jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 22,
1975, at 4.
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news.” 24 This right was “indispensable” especially where “the
information sought concerns governmental institutions,
including prisons.” 25 But, under Pell, the “news media’s
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates is
co-extensive with the public’s right.” 26 Nevertheless, it
construed the lower court’s opinion as “finding that the First
Amendment rights of both the public and the news media
were infringed by appellant’s restrictive policy.” 27
Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the lower court “applied the proper
test to determine whether these rights [of access] were
infringed.” 28 That test was well-established: “a governmental
restriction on First Amendment rights can be upheld only if
the restriction furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to suppressing speech and
the restriction is the least drastic means of furthering that
governmental interest.” 29 The injunction walked that line
because “while protecting First Amendment rights,” it also
satisfied “the governmental interests in security of the jail
and privacy of inmates.” 30
The court then turned to the problem of Pell in light of
the injunction’s command that Houchins provide greater
access to the press than to the public generally: “Pell v.
Procunier does not stand for the proposition that the
correlative constitutional rights of the public and the news
media to visit a prison must be implemented identically.”31
The “access needs” of each might differ: “[m]edia access, on
24. KQED, Inc., 546 F.2d at 285 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
681–707 (1972); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974)).
25. Id. (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
26. Id. at 285–86.
27. Id. at 286.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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reasonable notice, may be desirable in the wake of a
newsworthy event, while the interest of the public in
observing jail conditions may be satisfied by formal,
scheduled tours.” 32
Judges Ben Duniway and Shirley Hufstedler both
concurred. Duniway wrote to express his “serious doubts
about the result,” though he did not think it “wrong in
principle.” 33 Still, he had “great difficulties in reconciling the
result with Pell and Saxbe” because the injunction granted
“KQED and other media greater access to the Santa Rita Jail
than is granted to the public.” 34 He went on to explain:
I happen to believe that, as to most issues of public importance, and
assuming that one accepts the media-created notion that there is
such an animal as a constitutionally protected “public’s right to
know” and further assuming that the media somehow embody that
“right,” then the media have a protected preferred right to access to
information about the public’s business. This is based on the
proposition that, in our modern, urban, overpopulated, complex and
somewhat intimidating and alienated society, only the media, as
distinguished from the submerged, often alienated, and often
frightened, individual, can be counted on to dig out and disseminate
the facts about the public’s business. Witness “Watergate” and its
remarkable consequences. 35

While Duniway could not “reconcile these notions with
the express basis for the decisions in Pell,” he “would like to
assume that those decisions are not to be taken literally.” 36
But even of that he was not sure. Pell seemed to “expressly
disregard” different “access needs” and different
administrative burdens of the press and the public. 37 Thus,
he “express[ed] doubt, not because I think that I ought to, but
because I think that the Supreme Court’s decisions require
32. Id.
33. Id. at 294 (Duniway, J., concurring).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 294–95.
37. Id. at 295.
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it.” 38
Hufstedler concurred to explain that the holdings of Pell
and Saxbe were “not directly involved on this appeal.” 39
Rather, she saw the “thorny question” to be “the
interpretation of the broad statement in Pell that ‘newsmen
have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded to the general public.’” 40 On
that question, she believed that Pell and Saxbe stood for the
proposition that “the First Amendment does not give news
media any special right of access to prisons or to prisoners
and none that is not reasonably necessary to serve the public
interest in being informed about prisons and prisoners.” 41
This followed from the issues at stake in those cases. Neither
concerned “the application of regulations imposing the same
standards on news media personnel and members of the
general public.” 42 Rather, in each “the press had greater
latitude than the general public.” 43 As such, the Court had
not addressed “the question whether news media could be
confined constitutionally to regulations controlling access to
prisons or to prisoners that govern group tours by the general
public.” 44
For Hufstedler, the observation in Pell and Saxbe that
“the news media’s constitutional right of access to prisons or
their inmates is co-extensive with the public’s right” could
not be given effect “in absence of any description of what the
public’s right is or how the right is to be vindicated.” 45 A court
had to ask: what kind of information does the public have a
right to know?; and what kind of limitations could be
38. Id.
39. Id. (Hufstedler, J., concurring specially).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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imposed on “the means by which the information to which
the public is entitled can be gathered?” 46 Finding that the
public had a “very extensive” right to know about the
conditions of its prisons, Hufstedler saw no constitutional
problem in differentiating between “public tours and media
access” because the media’s “mission” was “different in
degree, though not in kind, from the display to a tour
group.” 47 For example, the public had a right to know how
food is prepared in its prisons, but it would have been
impractical to fill the kitchen with members of the public. 48
A member of the media, however, could observe the kitchen
and inform the public about information that it had a right
to know.
ii. At the Supreme Court
Houchins applied to then-Justice William Rehnquist for
a stay of the injunction pending the filing of a petition for a
writ of certiorari. 49 The dispute, Rehnquist said, was limited
to a question of law: “the interpretation of [the Court’s]
opinion in Pell” and whether Houchins was, like Saxbe,
“constitutionally indistinguishable” from Pell. 50 Or, whether
Houchins’ regulations were, as the Court had observed might
matter in Pell, “‘an attempt by the State to conceal the
conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press’
investigation and reporting of those conditions.’” 51
Acknowledging that the access allowed by Houchins was less
than in Pell and Saxbe, Rehnquist distilled what he believed
to be the issue in the case:
If the “no greater access” doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to this

46. Id.
47. Id. at 295–96.
48. Id. at 296.
49. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 429 U.S. 1341, 1342 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers).
50. Id. at 1342–43.
51. Id. at 1343 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
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case, the Court of Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and
the injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other hand, the
holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly limited to the situation
where there already existed substantial press and public access to
the prison, then Pell and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and
review by this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of
those cases, would be appropriate although not necessary. 52

Rehnquist, believing that four Justices would grant
certiorari to resolve that issue, granted the stay. 53 And, in
May of 1977, Justices Rehnquist, Byron White, and Potter
Stewart, along with Chief Justice Warren Burger, voted in
favor of granting review. 54 Marshall took no part in the
consideration of the petition in light of the NAACP’s
involvement in the case. 55
The Court held oral argument on November 29, 1977.
Justice Harry Blackmun, who had just had surgery, was
absent. 56 Kelvin Booty, Jr., counsel for Houchins, explained
that the “question presented in this case is, must the sheriff
give greater access to his county jail facility to the media
than he gives to the public?” 57 Justice John Paul Stevens
interrupted. He wanted to know whether the Court should
consider the limited access at the time the lawsuit was filed
or the access, like the public tours, instituted after. 58 Booty
demurred, pointing out that even before the tours the public
could learn of prison conditions by mail and phone. He added
that Houchins contemplated public tours prior to the lawsuit
52. Id. at 1344.
53. Id. at 1344–45.
54. Conference Notes (May 12, 1977), in POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED,
INC. at 9, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1638
&context=casefiles; see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 431 U.S. 928 (1977).
55. Houchins, 431 U.S. at 928.

56. Warren Weaver Jr., Supreme Court Roundup, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 1977),
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/29/archives/supreme-court-roundup-testpilot-dismissed-as-overage-at-52-wins.html.
57. Oral Argument at 0:45, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (No.
76-1310), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310.
58. Id. at 1:34.
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too. Houchins was also willing to organize in the future
special tours for the press with cameras. 59
What the district court did, Booty said, was to require
Houchins also to “permit random interviews on the tours and
to permit the use of cameras and tapes and plainly not on the
schedule tour, but on a demand tour.” 60 The court did so
without making “any finding of any intention to conceal
conditions in the jail,” which Pell suggested might be
important. 61 The errors did not end there. The district court
also treated the case as raising a question of what special
rights were owed to the press without in any way, address
the “public’s rights” of access. 62 This approach, Booty argued,
was contrary to Pell and Saxbe’s teaching that the press and
the public had the same access rights.
The mention of the public’s right prompted Rehnquist to
interject, “When you say the public right, are you talking
about some term that has meaning in constitutional law?” 63
To which Booty said, “Yes, I think I am. I think the public
does have some rights of access.” 64 Booty said he did not read
Pell as holding that “the public access is zero.” 65 “That
[question] is not resolved in any decision of this Court that I
am aware of.” 66
Stevens then interjected, “[Y]ou do not seriously contend
that the whole problem could be solved by having zero access
to public and press both?” 67 “Certainly not,” Booty

59. Id. at 2:07.
60. Id. at 11:25.
61. Id. at 11:09.
62. Id. at 12:09.
63. Id. at 12:16.
64. Id. at 12:27.
65. Id. at 14:12.
66. Id. at 14:16.
67. Id. at 14:25.
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responded. 68 Pressing the point, Stevens said, “[Y]ou would
not urge the Court to take that extreme position, would
you?” 69 Again, Booty demurred: “No, I am not urging that.” 70
Booty, apparently not willing to assume the votes on that
point were in his favor, emphasized that the whole issue of a
general right of access under the First Amendment was
irrelevant to the matter before the Court where access was
already being provided: “[W]ith respect, that is not before
you.” 71 Nor was it raised below: “KQED’s position in the
District Court which the District Court adopted was that, we
have to have special things for the media, we tried it as a
media access case, not a public access case.” 72
William Bennett Turner argued the case on behalf of
KQED. As soon as he began, Burger asked whether access
was a matter of prison administration or of a constitutional
dimension. 73 Turner responded, “A constitutional question
arises when as in this case the Sheriff limits access by
reporters either to zero as before this case was filed or to
these antiseptic guided tours that he initiated right after we
filed suit.” 74 While Turner thought it would “trivialize” the
First Amendment to say that it required a specific number of
tours, or photographs, or interviews, “[w]hat the First
Amendment does is prohibit a government official from
unjustifiably interfering with the acquisition of information
for the publication.” 75 Whether certain interference was
justifiable, he said, was a question for the courts. In some
cases, press exclusion would easily be justifiable because the

68. Id. at 14:33.
69. Id. at 15:39.
70. Id. at 15:43.
71. Id. at 15:49.
72. Id. at 16:15.
73. Id. at 23:49.
74. Id. at 25:40.
75. Id. at 26:45.
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information at issue had “some claim to confidentiality.”76
But there could be no claim of confidentiality to prison
conditions.
Turner then turned to the problem of Pell and Saxbe to
argue that counsel for Houchins misread the import of those
cases: “Now the Sheriff in answering why should not
reporters be allowed to do their job . . . points to the Court’s
decisions in Pell and Saxbe and his core position is that all
that he needs to do is provide equality of access, not access,
but equality.” 77 When Burger asked Turner how he read
those cases, Turner responded, “We think that the whole
assumption of the Pell and Saxbe decisions is that there be
reasonably sufficient access to prevent concealment of
conditions.” 78 “If there is that, then equality is fine,” he
added. 79 But equality in complete exclusion is not.
Stewart then pressed Turner on that point, asking what
happens where no access at all is provided? 80 As Stewart
explained, the Oval Office was not open to the public, nor was
the CIA, nor the war room at the Pentagon. Could the press
seek access to each? No, Turner said, because there were two
key differences between those places and the jail at issue.
First, there was no claim of confidentiality to jail conditions,
unlike deliberations at the White House, CIA, or Pentagon. 81
Second, a jail is “an institution whose purpose is the
76. Id. at 28:20.
77. Id. at 35:25.
78. Id. at 35:56.
79. Id. at 36:08.
80. Id. at 38:36. Before Houchins, Stewart took an interest in access cases. In
1974, he said in an address to Yale Law School, “The press is free to do battle
against secrecy and deception in government.” Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975). But “the press cannot expect from the Constitution
any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access
to particular government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy.” Id. Instead, “[t]he public’s interest in knowing about its
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is
indirect.” Id.
81. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 40:40.
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involuntary confinement of people, with an opportunity for
overreaching of liberties of the people who are involuntarily
confined and very little opportunity for that to come to public
knowledge unless reporters are permitted in.” 82
Stewart and, later, Rehnquist continued to pepper
Turner about the logical end to his argument. Could the
Court force the President to sit down with the press? A
senator? A representative?83 As Rehnquist asked, “How do
you know what should be properly made public and what has
no claim to confidentiality under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments?” 84 Exasperated, Turner responded, “We are
not trying to use the First Amendment as a Freedom of
Information Act.” 85 “We are not,” he said, “saying the Sheriff
has to come out and meet the press or open his files or tell us
when anything happened.” 86 What he was saying was that
Houchins “just cannot shut the door to us on the ground that
all that is required is equality, even if that equality is zero.” 87
iii. The Court Votes to Affirm
Three days after the argument, the Court—with
Marshall voting despite having suggested he would not do
so—affirmed the Ninth Circuit. 88 Powell wrote himself a
note, “Affirm 5-3.” 89 Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell,
and Stevens made the five; Burger and Rehnquist dissented,
and White reserved his views while expressing doubt as to
KQED’s position. 90 Blackmun remained absent.
82. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 44:47.
83. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 48:00.
84. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 41:10.
85. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 48:12.
86. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 48:16.
87. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 48:23.
88. Conference Notes (Dec. 2, 1977), in POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED,
INC., supra note 54, at 30.
89. Id. at 1–3.
90. Id. at 1.
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Burger spoke first, saying that the Ninth Circuit
“misread” or “ignored” Pell and Saxbe. 91 Brennan voted to
affirm, but offered no reasoning. 92 Stewart spoke at length.
He said that the First Amendment did not confer a “greater
right of access on press than on public,” nor did it create a
“right on [the] part of [the] public to know.” 93 But, he said,
“equal access to which press is entitled may require different
arrangements (opportunities) from the public.” 94 “Equality,”
he said, was “not served simply by allowing [the] press to
march through with gen[eral] public.” 95 In some cases, he
believed, the First Amendment may require the press be
given preferential treatment because it “represents broader
public.” 96
White was ready to vote to reverse. According to him,
there was “no right of access by anybody if prison authorities
chose to keep everyone out.” 97 And he expressed his
frustration with Stewart: “[I]f there is no right of public
generally, [I] can’t understand [Stewart’s] position.” 98
Marshall then voted to affirm, without discussion as well—
despite not voting on the original petition and not asking any
questions at argument. 99 Powell too voted to affirm and said
he “agree[d] with” Stewart “if I understand him.” 100
Rehnquist voted to reverse, and Stevens, the junior justice,
voted to affirm, saying that the Court should decide the case
based on the near-complete lack of access prior to KQED

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 3.
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filing the lawsuit. 101 That limited access, he said, violated the
First Amendment because a prison’s interest is “in
‘security’”—”not in ‘confidentiality.’” 102
Brennan, the senior Justice in the majority, then made a
fatal error: he assigned the opinion to Stevens. In doing so,
he violated the unwritten rule that it is best to give the most
reticent Justice the pen in close cases to ensure they stay
with the majority. 103 Four months later, Stevens circulated a
draft opinion for the Court equally as bullish as his
comments at conference, stating that “[i]t is not sufficient . . .
that the channels of communication be free of governmental
restraints.” He believed that “[w]ithout some protection for
the acquisition of information about the operation of public
institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers
would be stripped of its substance.”“ 104 If joined by a majority
of the Court, as Powell’s clerk observed in a memo to the
Justice, it would be a “landmark precedent.” 105 But, the clerk
presciently added, “I would be a little surprised if he can get
a majority to join his opinion, since other Members of the
Court may not be eager to announce what may come to be a
general ‘right of access to information’ under the First
Amendment.” 106
There was another problem too. Stevens already lost a
vote as his draft opinion noted: “Mr. Justice Marshall . . .
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.” 107
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY JUSTICE WILLIAM
J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 295
(2014).
104. John Paul Stevens, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (Mar. 15, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 47.
105. Memorandum from Jim Alt (Mar. 17, 1978), in POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS
supra note 54, at 58.

V. KQED, INC.,

106. Id. at 61.
107. John Paul Stevens, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (Mar. 15, 1978), in
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According to Powell’s notes, at conference Marshall voted in
favor of affirming the Ninth Circuit, and there is no
correspondence from December to March showing that he
would drop out of the case. The only correspondence on that
point is a June 13, 1978, letter to the conference reminding
it that he would not be participating. 108 Whenever Marshall
dropped out, the import would have, or at least should have,
been clear to Stevens: he could not afford to lose a single vote.
Stevens, however, did not write an opinion to save a
majority. Instead, he began by explaining, at the time the
lawsuit was filed, Houchins’ policy was one “of virtually total
exclusion of both the public and the press from those areas
within the Santa Rita Jail where the inmates were
confined.” 109 As such, he believed that the case posed a broad
question never decided in Pell: whether “a nondiscriminatory
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press
from access to information about prison conditions would
avoid constitutional scrutiny.” 110
In Pell, Stevens explained, the Court did not simply ask
whether the right to interview specific inmates was one also
held by the public. On the contrary, it “canvassed the
opportunities already available for both the public and the
press to acquire information” and concluded that there was
no effort to conceal prison conditions. 111 The narrow issue in
Pell was thus a demand for additional access for the press
where it had already been “‘accorded full opportunities to

POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 54.
108. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Warren Burger (Jun. 13, 1978), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC. at 24,
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1977/76-1310.pdf.
That day, Blackmun did the same. Letter from Harry Blackmun to Warren
Burger (Jun. 13, 1978), in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE:
HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra, at 25.
109. John Paul Stevens, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (Mar. 15, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 41.
110. Id. at 42.
111. Id. at 43.
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observe prison conditions.’” 112 As a result, Pell did not “imply
that a state policy of concealing prison conditions from the
press . . . could have been justified simply by pointing to like
concealment from . . . the general public.” 113
Having distinguished Pell, Stevens went to work on the
general principle. Citing the “full and free flow of information
to the general public” as a “core objective of the First
Amendment,” 114 he wrote that it was for that “reason that
the First Amendment protects not only the dissemination of
information but also the receipt of information and ideas.” 115
The right to receive information extended beyond simply the
right of one individual to communicate to another; rather,
the right “serves an essential societal function.” 116 It was not
enough that the government be prohibited from limiting
speech: “[w]ithout some protection for the acquisition of
information about the operation of public institutions such
as prisons by the public at large, the process of selfgovernance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped
of its substance.” 117
This was not a right of the press, however. On the
contrary, Stevens wrote, the right existed “to insure that the
citizens are fully informed regarding matters of public
interest and importance.” 118 That the right of access was one
held by the public generally—as opposed to the press

112. Id.
113. Id. at 43–44.
114. Id. at 45 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976); Garrison v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266–70 (1964); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250
(1936); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n. 2 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
115. Id. (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 756; Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)).
116. Id. at 46.
117. Id. at 46–47.
118. Id. at 47.
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specially—was also consistent with Pell’s doctrine that
“‘newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.’” 119
But, unlike Pell, where it was “unnecessary to consider the
extent of the public’s right of access” in light of the
substantial public access to the prison in that case, that
question had to be considered in Houchins because the presuit restrictions imposed by Houchins “cut off the flow of
information at its source.” 120
Stevens then explained that the constitutional question
was not the degree of access that must be allowed, though.
Such questions, “generally must be resolved by the political
branches of government.” 121 And he recognized that there
were some government proceedings, like grand juries,
conferences among judges, or government meetings held in
executive session, that must be held in secret. 122 Prison
conditions, however, were “wholly without claim to
confidentiality.” 123 And no one claimed “that there is any
legitimate, penological justification for concealing from
citizens the conditions in which their fellow citizens are
being confined.” 124 KQED simply sought an end to Houchins’
“policy of concealing prison conditions from the public.” 125
Turning to the facts of the case, Stevens pointed out that

119. Id. at 48 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)).
120. Id. at 49.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 50. The access right applied with special force to prisons, Stevens
wrote. Prisons, were “public institutions, financed with public funds and
administered by public servants.” Id. They were “an integral component of the
criminal justice system.” Id. The Constitution itself recognized the importance of
a “public trial” in the Sixth Amendment, Stevens noted, and “[t]hat public
interest survive[d] the judgment of conviction and appropriately carrie[d] over to
an interest in how the convicted person is treated during his period of
punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation.” Id. at 51.
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the record demonstrated that “the public and the press had
been consistently denied any access to the inner portions of
the Santa Rita jail,” “that there had been excessive
censorship of inmate correspondence,” and “that there was
no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow of
information.” 126 In other words, an “affirmative answer to
the question whether [KQED] established a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits did not depend . . . on any right of
the press to special treatment beyond that accorded the
public at large.” 127 Instead, “the probable existence of a
constitutional violation rested upon the special importance
of allowing a democratic community access to knowledge
about how its servants were treating some of its members
who have been committed to their custody.” 128
Stevens thus weaved together existing ideas about the
First Amendment and its relationship to self-governance on
the way to recognizing a new First Amendment right: a right
of access to information antecedent to the right to speak. He
stitched together prior observations in the Court’s
jurisprudence that “informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints on misgovernment,” that “news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”
and that the First Amendment protects the receipt of
information. 129 Together, these cases stood for the
proposition that the “preservation of a full and free flow of
information to the general public has long been recognized
as a core objective of the First Amendment to the
Constitution.” 130 And where the government sought to
interrupt this flow, it had to do so consistently with the First
Amendment.

126. Id. at 52.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 45–48 & n.20 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 45.
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iv. Stewart Switches Sides
Within hours, Brennan wrote to Stevens, copying the
conference: “I agree.” 131 A few days later, Powell expressed
his “special interest and admiration” of the draft. 132 Adopting
his clerk’s views, he wrote: “If your draft becomes the opinion
of the Court, as I hope, it will be a landmark prece[de]nt.” 133
“It will be the first time,” he said, “that the Court has held
that both the press and the public share a First Amendment
right of access to information in the government’s hands,
subject to appropriate safeguards.” 134
Powell also added a point of caution. Citing issues with
the Freedom of Information Act, he feared the opinion’s
administrative burdens and threat to “forthright candor” by
government officials stemming from a fear of disclosure. 135
So he suggested qualifying language that the right would not
intrude on “confidentiality and secrecy where these are
necessary to the proper functioning of government.” 136
Stevens responded the next day, saying that he was “most
gratified” by Powell’s letter, and he proposed changes to
address Powell’s concerns. 137 After Powell agreed to the
proposed changes, Stevens circulated a new draft on March
23. 138 Powell joined Stevens’ draft the same day. 139
131. Letter from William Brennan to John Paul Stevens (Mar. 16, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 56.
132. Letter from Lewis Powell to John Paul Stevens (Mar. 20, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 62.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1–2.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Letter from John Paul Stevens to Lewis Powell (Mar. 21, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 68.
138. Id.; Letter from Lewis Powell to John Paul Stevens (Mar. 16, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 71; John Paul
Stevens, Majority Opinion, 2nd Draft (Mar. 16, 1978), in POWELL PAPERS:
HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 74.
139. Letter from Lewis Powell to John Paul Stevens (Mar. 23, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 97.
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But Stevens’ opinion had its detractors. As Blackmun
wrote to himself, the opinion was “awkward” and cited “too
many dissents.” 140 Burger then wrote to the conference: “I
will be writing in this case. If my position does not cover the
views of Byron and Bill Rehnquist, they, too, may have
something to say.” 141 The silence from Stewart, the lynchpin
vote, must have concerned Stevens. But apparently, Stevens
did not attempt to politic. Then, nearly a month later, on
April 24, Stewart wrote to the conference:
Try as I may, I cannot bring myself to agree that a county sheriff is
constitutionally required to open up a jail that he runs to the press
and the public. Accordingly, I shall not be able to subscribe to the
opinion you have circulated, affirming the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. My tentative view, which may not stand up, is that it
would be permissible in this case to issue an injunction assuring
press access equivalent to existing public access, but not the much
broader injunction actually issued by the District Court. I shall in
due course circulate an expression of these views. 142

Stevens had lost his majority. Burger, seeking to
capitalize on the development, quickly wrote to the
conference to report that he had “devoted a substantial
amount of time on a dissent in this case with some emphasis
on systems of citizen oversight procedures which exist in
many states.” 143 Some of these systems that dated back to
the Founding had “fallen into disuse.” 144 But, he thought
them preferential to “pushy TV people interested directly in
the sensational.” 145 He concluded, “I agree with Potter’s view
that media have a right of access but not beyond that of the
140. Notes of Harry Blackmun (Houchins v. KQED, Inc.) (Mar. 15, 1978) (on
file with the author).
141. Letter from Warren Burger to John Paul Stevens (Mar. 28, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 98.
142. Letter from Potter Stewart to John Paul Stevens (Apr. 24, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 99.
143. Letter from Warren Burger to the Conference (Apr. 25, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 100.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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public generally.” 146
v. The Court Votes to Reverse
On May 19, Burger circulated an “alternative”
opinion. 147 He signaled that it was “in less than final form,”
and he was committed to refinements if “there is enough
support for this result.” 148 In that opinion, Burger accepted
that prisons were “clearly matters ‘of great public
concern.’” 149 And, in lines that would not survive the editing
process, he agreed that without “information, the public
cannot participate intelligently in political decisions” and
that “the media is a powerful force, contributing to the
function of an open society.” 150
These amorphous principles, though, did not translate
into a constitutional right of access. Much like Stevens’ broad
opinion in favor of access, Burger went on to write a broad
opinion against it. He posed the question presented not as
one of the media’s special right of access, but as “whether the
First Amendment gives the news media the right of access to
a county jail” at all. 151 The short answer: No. A right of
access, he wrote, “was not essential to guarantee the freedom
to communicate or publish.” 152 He then put a fine point on it:
“We hold that the First Amendment does not provide a right
of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.” 153 If any
access was to be provided, it must come from the political

146. Id.
147. Letter from Warren Burger to Conference (May 19, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 101.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 107.
150. Id. at 108.
151. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft at 1 (Houchins v. KQED, Inc.)
(May 19, 1978) (on file with author).
152. Id. at 12.
153. Id. at 16.
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process, not the courts. 154
Despite Burger’s attempt, Stewart did not join him.
Three days after Burger circulated his opinion, Stewart
circulated an opinion concurring in judgment only. 155 He
agreed with Burger that the “First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to
information generated or controlled by government.” 156 Yet,
he parted company when it came to “applying these
abstractions to the facts of this case.” 157 Unlike the plurality,
Stewart believed “the concept of equal access must be
accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate the
practical distinctions between the press and the general
public.” 158 Thus, he said that, while not required to provide
access, once a government official does, the media may well
be entitled to accommodations above and beyond the public.
The next day, Burger wrote to Stewart, copying the
conference, to let him know that he would “add some
thoughts” in response to his opinion. 159 Burger raised the
problem, as he saw it, of what to do with non-journalists, like
professors, penologists, and writers: “I’m sure you will agree
they have the same rights as a TV reporter doing a
‘documentary.’ Can they have greater First Amendment
rights than these others whose form and certainty of
communications is not so fixed?” 160 He added: “This, of
course, goes to the ‘debate’ on the ‘special’ status of those who
regularly or semi-regularly use newspapers or broadcast

154. Id. at 15.
155. Potter Stewart, Concurring in Judgment, 1st Draft (May 22, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 102.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Letter from Warren Burger to Conference (May 23, 1978), in THE BURGER
COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 108, at
104.
160. Id.
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facilities and reach a larger audience.” 161
As the conference waited for Burger’s revised opinion,
there was a relative lull with only Rehnquist joining Burger’s
opinion. 162 Meanwhile, White’s clerk wrote to White that the
“Chief’s recent circulation claiming that physical access to
prisons is without any First Amendment protection
whatsoever” was not “analytically defensible on the basis of
the Court’s prior First Amendment decisions.” 163 The clerk
pointed to, among other things, the Court’s decision in
Procunier v. Martinez where it had found that “the public has
a First Amendment interest in receiving information about
prison conditions from prisoners.” 164 Moreover, while the
clerk was “no fan of criminals,” he doubted that the political
process was likely to be as effective as Burger believed: “If
First Amendment protection is to depend on the extent to
which the political process is cognizant of a group’s
legitimate grievances, prisoners probably need more
protection than most groups.” 165
Although there is no evidence of a conversation between
White and Burger along the lines outlined by his clerk, it
seems possible that White, who had not yet joined Burger,
advocated that he pull back on some of his language. Equally
possible is that Burger decided to do so on his own, sitting at
the edge of summer with only Rehnquist having joined.
Whatever the case, on June 9, Burger wrote to the
conference, explaining that, in the Court’s “common effort to
‘clear the docket,’” he was making “another effort to dispose

161. Id.
162. Letter from William Rehnquist to Warren Burger (May 24, 1978), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note
108, at 105.
163. Letter from Jeffrey Glekel to Byron White (Houchins v. KQED, Inc.)
(undated) (on file with author).
164. Id. (citing 416 U.S. 396 (1974)).
165. Id.
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of this case.” 166 Foreshadowing a more conciliatory opinion,
he wrote: “As a legislator I would vote for a reasonably
orderly access to prisons, etc., by media, because it would be
useful. But that is not the issue.” Instead, he explained: “The
question is whether special access rights are constitutionally
compelled.” 167
In Burger’s new draft, the question presented no longer
was whether there was a right of access at all to government
information. It was whether the press had a right of access
“over and above that of other persons,” i.e., a special right of
access. 168 Similarly, no longer was the holding about whether
the First Amendment provided a right of access to
government information generally. Instead, Burger’s
proposed holding was “that the First Amendment does not
provide a right of access . . . different from or greater than
that of the public generally.” 169 And, consistent with White’s
clerk’s thoughts, Burger expanded the discussion of
Procunier v. Martinez and limited some of the discussion of
legislative substitutes. 170
With those changes, three days later, White wrote to
Burger to join the opinion and expressed his “hope” that the
draft “commands a majority.” 171 White added: “If the First
Amendment requires a government to turn over information
about its prisons on the demand of the press or to open its
files and properties not only to routine inspections but for
filming and public display, it would be difficult to contain

166. Letter from Warren Burger to Conference (Jun. 9, 1978), in THE BURGER
COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 108, at
7.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 2d Draft at 1 (Houchins v. KQED, Inc.)
(Jun. 9, 1978) (on file with author).
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 14–16.
171. Letter from Byron White to Warren Burger (Jun. 12, 1978), in POWELL
PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 107.
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such an unprecedented principle.” 172 All sorts of government
processes “are as important for the public to know about as
prisons.” 173 While he believed that access was important, he
would “resist taking over what is essentially a legislative
task and by reinterpreting the First Amendment assigning
to ourselves and other courts the duty of determining
whether the state and Federal Governments are making
adequate disclosures to the press.” 174
Rehnquist was less pleased with Burger’s more
conciliatory opinion. Writing the same day as White, he told
Burger that he was “a solid join with respect to your earlier
draft,” but that the new draft left him “much less
convinced.” 175 Rehnquist did not appreciate a new paragraph
about alternative forms of access to information about the
jail that were, unlike physical access, constitutionally
required, nor did he believe it was wise to add in an
observation about the privacy rights of inmates.
Nevertheless, he said he would “certainly not jump ship” but
“would be happy to offer any suggestions that might both
satisfy me and accomplish your goal of getting a Court.” 176
Burger’s changes still did not convince Stewart, who, on
June 12, circulated a second draft opinion concurring only in
judgment. 177 In the newest draft, Stewart added an
introductory paragraph summarizing his disagreement with
the plurality: “I agree that the preliminary injunction issued
against the petitioner was unwarranted, and therefore
concur in the judgment. In my view, however, KQED was

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Letter from William Rehnquist to Warren Burger (Jun. 12, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 106.
176. Id.
177. Potter Stewart, Concurring in Judgment, 2d Draft (Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.) (Jun. 12, 1978) (on file with author).
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entitled to injunctive relief of a more limited scope.” 178
Stewart also expanded on his logic, explaining that the
media was not touring the prison for their own sake but to
inform the public about matters of public affairs. 179 Courts
should thus recognize that, in some cases, the media should
be treated differently than the public by, for example,
allowing audio/visual recording. 180
Finally, on June 14, Burger, defeated in marshalling a
majority too, circulated his final draft opinion with further
refinements. 181 Evidencing his defeat, no longer did Burger
conclude with a “hold[ing] that the First Amendment does
not provide a right of access.” 182 Rather, he concluded only
that “[t]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is . . . reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.” 183 Then, on June 15, Stevens circulated a
repurposed majority opinion as a dissent. 184 Stewart, who
would have held that although there was no First
Amendment right to access there was a First Amendment
interest in the terms of access once access was provided,
stood alone. 185
vi. The Court Announces its Opinion
On June 26, 1978, the Court announced its opinion.
Reflecting the internal tumult, Burger, Stewart, and Stevens
each explained their positions orally from the bench, largely
178. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 3.
181. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 3d Draft (Houchins v. KQED, Inc.)
(Jun 14, 1978) (on file with author).
182. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 2d Draft, supra note 168, at 16
(emphasis added).
183. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 3d Draft, supra note 181, at 16.
184. John Paul Stevens, Dissenting Opinion, 1st Draft (Jun. 15, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 109.
185. See Media Right of Access, 92 HARV. L. REV. 174, 178 (1978) (noting that
Stewart’s position in Houchins is “difficult to grasp”).
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tracking their written opinions. 186 Burger, writing for
himself, White, and Rehnquist, posed the question narrowly:
“whether the news media have a constitutional right of
access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons,
to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and
photographs for publication and broadcasting by
newspapers, radio, and television.” 187 Echoing the exchange
at oral argument, he explained that, on the one hand,
Houchins invoked the holding of Pell that the news media
has no special right of access above that of the public and
further that “the District Court had departed from Pell and
abused its discretion because it had ordered that [Houchins]
give the media greater access to the jail than he gave to the
general public.” 188 On the other hand, KQED argued that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision “flow[ed] logically” from the Court’s
earlier decisions, including Pell: “From the right to gather
news and the right to receive information, [KQED] argue[d]
for an implied special right of access to governmentcontrolled sources of information.” 189
While not as full-throated as his earlier drafts, Burger
began his opinion agreeing with many of KQED’s points:
prison conditions were matters of public interest. The more
information the public has the better its decision-making
may be, and the important role of the media in informing the
public was “[b]eyond question.” 190 Still, the media was not
“an adjunct of the government” and was “‘ill-equipped’ to deal
with problems of prison administration.” 191 Nor could “public
importance” of prisons or “the media’s role of providing
information” serve as a “basis for reading into the

186. See Opinion Announcement, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 435 U.S. 1 (1978)
(No. 76-1310), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310.
187. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 7.
189. Id. at 7–8.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Id.
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Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these
institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes.” 192 The
Court had “never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of
a right of access to all sources of information within
government control.” 193
He also rejected KQED’s authority as irrelevant. Neither
Grosjean v. American Press Co. nor Alabama v. Mills
concerned access to information; rather, those cases were
about “the freedom of the media to communicate information
once it is obtained.” 194 On similar grounds Burger
distinguished the Court’s observation in Branzburg v. Hayes
that “‘news gathering is not without its First Amendment
protections.’” 195 None of these cases, he wrote, “implied a
special privilege of access to information” for the media. 196
He also distinguished cases concerning the right to receive
information. Citing Zemel v. Rusk, 197 Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 198 Procunier v.
Martinez, 199 and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 200 he explained that
Houchins did not put in issue “[t]he right to receive ideas and
information.” 201 The issue in Houchins was the “claimed
special privilege of access which the Court rejected in Pell
and Saxbe, a right which is not essential to guarantee the
freedom to communicate or publish.” 202
Burger devoted the rest of his opinion to the other flaw
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 10 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 11 (citing 381 U.S. 1 (1965)).
198. Id. at 12 (citing 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
199. Id. (citing 416 U.S. 416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974)).
200. Id. (citing 408 U.S. 753 (1972)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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in KQED’s case: it invited “the Court to involve itself in what
is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to
the political processes.” 203 This was especially so where there
were a number of alternatives to monitoring by the press,
including citizen task forces, grand juries, prosecutors,
judges, and legislatures—all of which could serve as checks
on prison conditions. 204
Based on all of these flaws, Burger concluded: “Neither
the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government’s control.” 205
And, he added, “Under our holdings in Pell . . . and Saxbe
. . . , until the political branches decree otherwise, as they are
free to do, the media have no special right of access to the
Alameda County Jail different from or greater than that
accorded the public generally.” 206
Stewart’s opinion concurring in judgment was similar to
his final draft. He agreed with Burger that there was no First
Amendment “right of access to information generated or
controlled by government.” Nor did the First Amendment
“guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to
that of the public generally.” 207 Stewart “part[ed] company”
with the plurality, however, in applying those principles to
the present case. 208 As he said in announcing his opinion
from the bench, “I agree that the preliminary injunction
issued . . . was unwarranted and therefore I concur the
judgment, but in my view KQED which is a television station
was clearly entitled to injunctive relief of somewhat more
limited scope than that granted by the District Court.” 209
203. Id.
204. Id. at 13.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 15–16.
207. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
208. Id.
209. See Opinion Announcement at 7:17, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 435 U.S. 1
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News organizations unlike private citizens, he wrote, did
not tour jails for their own “edification.” 210 They were “there
to gather information to be passed on to others, and this
mission is protected by the Constitution for very specific
reasons.” 211 The press “awaken[ed] public interest in
governmental affairs, expos[ed] corruption among public
officers and employees and generally inform[ed] the citizenry
of public events and occurrences.” 212 Because of the
importance of these functions, the Constitution required
“sensitivity to that role, and to the special needs of the press
in performing it effectively.” 213 As such, Stewart would have
ordered audio/visual access because the First Amendment
required prison administration “to give members of the press
effective access.” 214
Stevens, along with Brennan and Powell, observed in
dissent that, despite Pell, “the Court has never intimated
that a nondiscriminatory policy of excluding entirely both the
public and the press from access to information about prison
conditions would avoid constitutional scrutiny.” 215 Pell did
not “imply that a state policy of concealing prison conditions
from the press . . . could have been justified simply by
pointing to like concealment from . . . the general public.” 216
Indeed, in Pell, there were substantial avenues to public
access beyond the interviews at issue. As Stevens said in
announcing his opinion, “This Court has never squarely
answered the question, whether a state may pursue a policy
of entirely excluding both the public and the press from any
(1978) (No. 76-1310), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310.
210. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 27–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 29; see also id. (“If that were not true, there would have been no
need to emphasize the substantial press and public access reflected in the record
of that case.”).
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access to information about prison conditions.” 217 Yet, in case
before the Court, he wrote, “broad restraints on access to
information” existed prior to the lawsuit. 218 These restraints
offended the “core objective” of the First Amendment to
preserve “the full and free flow of information to the general
public.” 219 This was vital to a “system of self-government”:
“Without some protection for the acquisition of information
about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by
the public at large, the process of self-governance
contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of its
substance.” 220
This logic applied with special force to prisons. Prisons
are “public institutions, financed with public funds and
administered by public servants” and are an “integral
component of the criminal justice system.” 221 As Madison
said, “‘A popular Government, without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both.’” 222 Further, Stevens argued, the
Constitution recognized the importance of a transparent
justice system. The Sixth Amendment required a public trial,
and the public interest in monitoring the government
survived “the judgment of conviction and appropriately
carrie[d] over to an interest in how the convicted person is
treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for
rehabilitation.” 223 Prisons also were home to pretrial
detainees in whom society had “a special interest in assuring
that unconvicted citizens are treated in accord with their

217. See Opinion Announcement at 11:06, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 435 U.S. 1
(1978) (No. 76-1310), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310.
218. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 30.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 31–32.
221. Id. at 36.
222. Id. at 31–32 (quoting 9 WRITINGS
1910)).
223. Id. at 36–37.
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status.” 224
On remand, there would be no additional opinions in the
lower federal courts testing the import of the plurality
decision. Instead, KQED settled with Houchins, who, in a
stroke of irony, wanted to continue the public tours all along.
According to Turner, who acted as KQED’s counsel,
Houchins saw the tours as an opportunity for good publicity
and agreed to allow television cameras into the prison
pursuant to Stewart’s demand that press access be
“effective.” At the end of the day then, Stewart’s opinion for
himself was, practically speaking, the controlling one.
2. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale
Before the dust settled on Houchins, the Court granted
certiorari in another right of access case, Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale. 225 That case concerned the exclusion of the
press and the public from a pre-trial criminal suppression
hearing, including a Gannett reporter. 226 Contesting the
reporter’s exclusion, Gannett argued that the trial court’s
order ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment’s public trial
guarantee, as well as the First Amendment’s implicit
protection of a right of access. While the Court decided the
case on Sixth Amendment grounds, it reserved judgment on
whether, despite Houchins, the First Amendment
independently protected a right of access to government
information.
i. The Lower Courts’ Rulings
In Seneca County, New York, two individuals were
charged with murder, robbery, and larceny, after they
dumped their fishing partner into a lake. 227 Authorities
caught up with them in Michigan and sent them to New York
224. Id. at 37–38.
225. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
226. 443 U.S. 368, 375 (1979).
227. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 108 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1976).
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to stand trial. 228 The prosecution was said to be “unique”
because no body was found. 229 At a pre-trial hearing, the
defendants made a motion to suppress statements they made
on their trip back to New York and requested that Judge
Daniel DePasquale clear the courtroom of the press and
public. 230 He agreed. The concern, he said, was the potential
prejudice to the defendants if what might ultimately be
suppressed was reported in the newspapers. 231 Gannett later
objected, but DePasquale overruled it. 232
On appeal, the intermediate appellate court said the case
presented “a basic conflict between [Gannett’s] First and
Sixth Amendment right to attend criminal proceedings and
publish information with regard thereto and the
constitutional right of the defendants to receive a fair trial
before an impartial jury.” 233 Here, the balance tipped in favor
of Gannett. First, the Sixth Amendment public trial right did
“not inure to the benefit of the accused alone” but to the
public as well. 234 And the trial judge failed to cite any
“compelling factual circumstances” overcoming the public’s
right. 235 Second, the order infringed Gannett’s “First
Amendment rights in that it constituted a violation of the
right of the press to publish free from unlawful governmental
interference.” 236 The order restricted “media access to
information ordinarily made available to the general public,”
and, by doing so, it “effectively prevent[ed] the publication of
testimony.” 237
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 109.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 110.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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New York’s Court of Appeals modified that judgment. In
an ambiguous opinion, it admitted that criminal trials were
presumptively public, apparently under the Sixth
Amendment. 238 But the right to public trials was “primarily
that of the accused.” 239 Thus, courts must be sensitive to
prejudice flowing from openness. 240 The court also
questioned the lower court’s First Amendment finding. The
tension between the fair trial rights in the Sixth Amendment
and free speech rights in the First is “the greatest” when “a
restraint is imposed to prevent commentary on known facts
about a pending criminal case.” 241 But the order only
restricted reporting of as-of-yet-unknown facts.
ii. At the Supreme Court
The Court held oral argument in November 1978, about
five months after it issued its opinion in Houchins.
Questioning Robert Bernius, Gannett’s lawyer, Powell
asked, “Do you place your argument principally on one
amendment as against the other or on both?” 242 Bernius said
that he believed their “argument is based first on the First
Amendment, secondly on the public trial clause of the Sixth
Amendment.” 243 Powell pressed, “Which do you prefer?” 244
Bernius demurred, “I prefer neither Your Honor. I think
they’re both—both equally important.” 245
Burger then asked Bernius whether the Sixth
Amendment public trial right had any application at all to

238. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547 (N.Y. 1977) (citing
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 548.
241. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
242. Oral Argument at 00:35, Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979) (No. 77-1301), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1301.
243. Id. at 00:43.
244. Id. at 00:54.
245. Id. at 00:56.
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Gannett’s application as it sought access to a pre-trial
suppression proceeding, not a public trial under the Sixth
Amendment. 246 Bernius said that it did because the
suppression hearing was “an important stage in the
process.” 247 It might be the “critical stage” of the prosecution
that results in the charges being dropped or the defendants
pleading guilty. 248 Pushed further, Bernius said, “I don’t
think the fact that a jury is selected is a mystical concept that
precludes the public’s right to attend and to observe and be
aware of the entire gamut of the proceedings.” 249
When Bernius made the argument that both the
defendant and the public had interests in a public trial,
Rehnquist joined in. “Why then did the Framers cast the
language of the Sixth Amendment in saying the accused
shall enjoy the right of a public trial?,” he asked. 250 And,
“Why didn’t they say the press shall have access to the
trial?” 251 Bernius argued that although not explicit the
public right was “inherent” in the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee and that history demonstrated that, at common
law, there was “no indication that . . . a public trial accrued
to the defendant at all.” 252
Brennan then stepped in and asked, “Mr. Bernius, you
argue anyway, don’t you, that independently of the Sixth
Amendment public trial that the press at least has the First
Amendment right to be present?” 253 Bernius responded that
he did and that he claimed only a right of access owed to the
public generally, aiming to head off attacks based on Pell,

246. Id. at 10:35.
247. Id. at 10:42.
248. Id. at 11:33.
249. Id. at 12:30.
250. Id. at 14:47.
251. Id. at 14:54.
252. Id. at 15:38.
253. Id. at 17:09.
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Saxbe, and Houchins. 254 When asked for authority for the
right of access generally, Bernius pointed to the Court’s
statement in Branzburg v. Hayes that newsgathering is not
without First Amendment protection:
I know that the right to gather information is not without
limits but I would submit that if there is any sort of right to
gather information it must exist at trials. It must exist in the
streets and other public forums, and I think that for the
purposes of the right to gather information the public forum
test which . . . gives very pertinent guidance. 255
The public forum analogy was useful, Bernius argued,
because it also operated as a limiting principle on the access
right. In other words, the right of access was better described
as a “right to be present” in a public forum “to exercise [other]
First Amendment freedoms.” 256
Bernard Kobroff, counsel defending DePasquale’s order,
dodged the constitutional questions. Instead, the lion’s share
of his argument was tied up in the potential prejudice to the
defendants. One exception, however, was a question from
Rehnquist when he asked whether the New York legislature
could adopt a statute mandating closure of trials unless a
defendant wants a public trial. 257 Kobroff thought that would
pose a constitutional issue: “Public is the ultimate sovereign.
The public has a right to know.” 258 Still that was not this
case, he argued: “Petitioner’s error is in equating a
temporary denial of public access to potentially inadmissible
evidence where the Court ordered direct restraint on
publication.” 259

254. Id. at 17:35.
255. Id. at 18:24.
256. Id. at 18:16.
257. Id. at 50:26.
258. Id. at 51:12.
259. Id. at 57:29.
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iii. Drafting the Opinion
At conference, Burger voted to affirm. He said that
neither the First nor the Sixth Amendment supported
Gannett’s position. The Sixth Amendment’s public trial right
was irrelevant because the suppression hearing was not part
of a trial; the First Amendment argument, he said, was just
wrong. 260 Stewart largely agreed. As to the First
Amendment, he said, “I don’t think the First Amendment
claim is valid, since the press has no greater rights than the
public.” 261 Rehnquist and Stevens fell in line too—Stevens
being concerned about demands that “electronic media” be
allowed access to courtrooms if they found a right of access
in this case. 262
But an affirmance lacked a fifth vote. Brennan, Powell,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun were all in favor of
reversal. 263 Brennan, White, and Marshall all agreed that
the “suppression hearing was part of the trial.” 264 As
Marshall put it, the public had a right of access “because, if
the accused is done dirt, the public interest is hurt. The
public is entitled to know what happens, when it
happens.” 265 Blackmun said that he liked “the Sixth
Amendment approach” too, explaining that the public
“indirectly had an interest in preventing the abuse of public
business.” 266 Powell also said that the case was about the
Sixth Amendment—although his view was tentative.
Brennan assigned Blackmun to write the opinion. His
draft opinion was a “broadside rejection of the decision
below” that read a “broad right of public and press access to
260. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
415 (Oxford University Press) (1988).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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all criminal proceedings into the Sixth Amendment’s public
trial guaranty.” 267 Foreshadowing an analysis employed in
future cases, Blackmun’s opinion bolstered its recognition of
a Sixth Amendment right of access by pointing to the long
history of access to criminal trials and recognizing that
access advanced the public’s interest in monitoring the trial
process. 268
Blackmun, however, rejected the First Amendment
challenge. While Gannett argued that the First Amendment
protected “the free flow of information about judicial
proceedings,” the draft majority did “not agree.” 269 The case,
Blackmun wrote, did not involve a “restraint upon
publication” nor did it involve a restraint “upon comment
about information already in the possession of the public or
the press.” 270 Rather, it involved only “an issue of access to a
judicial proceeding.” 271 At any rate, in light of the Sixth
Amendment’s protection of the public’s access to a trial,
Blackmun said the Court “need not reach the issue of First
Amendment access.” 272
As in Houchins, the original draft majority was destined
to be a dissent. After Blackmun circulated it in early April
1979, Brennan wrote to him to say that he was “delighted to
join this particularly fine opinion.” 273 That same day,
however, Stewart said he would circulate a dissent. 274 White

267. Id. at 416.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 462.
270. Id. at 463.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Letter from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (Apr. 5, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE at 9,
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1978/77-1301.pdf.
274. Letter from Potter Stewart to Harry Blackmun (Apr. 5, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, id., at
12.
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then said he would “await the dissent.” 275 In a spot of good
news, Marshall joined Blackmun’s opinion a few days
later. 276
On April 18, Stewart circulated his dissent, arguing that
there was no public right of access inherent in the Sixth
Amendment.
But—importantly—his
draft
reserved
judgment on the question of whether there was a First
Amendment right of access, finding that any such right had
been given all due deference in the case. 277 It did so despite
the plurality in Houchins seemingly closing that very door.
The same day, Stevens joined that opinion. 278 The following
day, Blackmun told his colleagues that the dissent merited
only “a mild response,” which he distributed that day, after
which White joined the majority. 279 Powell remained quiet.
On May 9, Powell broke his silence. In a letter to
Blackmun, he wrote that at the conference he had “expressed
agreement with some of what was said by Potter, Byron and
you.” 280 But “there were differences. Indeed, I do not think a
majority of the Court agreed as to exactly how the competing
interests in this case should be resolved.” 281 The more he had
275. Letter from Byron White to Harry Blackmun (Apr. 5, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, id., at
21.
276. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (Apr. 9, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, id., at
23.
277. SCHWARTZ, supra note 260, at 465–81.
278. Letter from John Paul Stevens to Potter Stewart (Apr. 18, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
note 273, at 48.
279. Letter from Harry Blackmun, J. to Conference (Apr. 19, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
note 273, at 26; Letter from Byron White to Harry Blackmun (Apr. 20, 1979), in
THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE,
supra note 273, at 22.
280. Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (May 9, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
note 273, at 34.
281. Id.
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thought about it the more he was “inclined to view it as being
closer to presenting the classic First Amendment issue of fair
trial/free press, although the Sixth Amendment also is
implicated in light of defendant’s right to a public trial.”282
He said these views remained “tentative” and that he would
have to “write something out.” 283 What was certain was that
he found the case to be “difficult.” 284
While Blackmun waited on further word from Powell,
Rehnquist wrote to the conference to join Stewart’s
dissent. 285 And, a week later, Powell again wrote to
Blackmun to say that his views were no longer tentative: “I
was inclined to view this case as presenting primarily a First
Amendment rather than a Sixth Amendment issue. This
thinking goes back to my dissent in Saxbe, and to my join in
John’s dissent last year in Houchins.” 286 After writing out a
dissent, Powell said, he was persuaded that his “views as to
the Sixth Amendment coincide[d] substantially with those
expressed” by Stewart, but he “would not rest the case on
that Amendment alone.” 287 As Powell explained, Stewart
appropriately recognized “the possible relevance of the First
Amendment claim” too. 288 Powell’s switch to Stewart’s
opinion would also allow him to turn his dissent into a
concurring opinion where he could address “the First
Amendment issue” in greater detail. 289 “I am sorry to end up

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Letter from William Rehnquist to Potter Stewart (May 23, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
note 273, at 40.
286. Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (May 31, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
note 273, at 36.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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being the ‘swing vote,’” he concluded. 290
Upon hearing the news of Powell’s defection, Burger
quickly reassigned the opinion much as he had when Stewart
defected in Houchins. This time, Burger assigned the opinion
to Stewart, with whom he already knew Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens agreed. 291 While some cleanup remained—
including the drafting of a number of concurring opinions,
the lineup of the Court would not change. To add insult to
injury, in turning the dissent into a majority opinion,
Stewart “unabashedly plagiarized” the recitation of the facts
Powell had drafted for his original majority opinion. 292
iv. The Court Issues its Opinion
On July 2, 1979, the Court issued its opinion rejecting
Gannett’s arguments and affirming the New York Court of
Appeals. Powell and Rehnquist concurred. Blackmun
concurred in part (as to whether the case was moot) and
dissented in part (on the substance). Brennan, White, and
Marshall all joined him. On the Sixth Amendment, the Court
concluded that the “Constitution nowhere mentions any
right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its
guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the
accused.” 293
On the First Amendment, the Court observed that Pell,
Saxbe, and Houchins all upheld “prison regulations that
denied to members of the press access to prisons superior to
that afforded to the public generally.” 294 It then explained,
however, that in Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Houchins,
290. Id.
291. Letter from Warren Burger J. to Conference (Jun. 1, 1979), in THE BURGER
COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra note 273,
at 4.
292. Letter from Potter Stewart J. to Conference (Jun. 7, 1979), in THE BURGER
COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra note 273,
at 17.
293. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1979).
294. Id. at 391.
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Powell’s dissenting opinion in Saxbe, and Stewart’s
concurring opinion in Houchins, some “Members of the Court
. . . took the position . . . that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do guarantee to the public in general, or the
press in particular, a right of access that precludes their
complete exclusion in the absence of a significant
governmental interest.” 295 Thus, despite Houchins, the
Court suggested that the question of a First Amendment
right of access remained open. But, it added, it was
unnecessary to answer it because even assuming a First
Amendment right of access, it was “given all appropriate
deference” by the trial court. 296
Powell, as promised, concurred and took the opportunity
to address the First Amendment question that the Court
reserved. 297 “I would hold explicitly,” Powell wrote, “that
petitioner’s reporter had an interest protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial
suppression hearing.” 298 For Powell, it was “the importance
of the public’s having accurate information concerning the
operation of its criminal justice system” that meant that it
must also have “an interest protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial
suppression hearing.” 299 Harkening back to his dissenting
opinion in Saxbe, Powell wrote that “this constitutional
protection derives, not from any special status of members of
the press as such, but rather because ‘[i]n seeking out the
news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at large.’” 300
Powell then advocated for a “flexible accommodation”
between the public’s First Amendment access right and the

295. Id.
296. Id. at 392.
297. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 397–98.
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defendant’s Sixth Amendment fair trial right. 301 He
suggested that “where a defendant requests the trial court to
exclude the public,” a court “should consider whether there
are alternative means reasonably available by which the
fairness of the trial might be preserved without interfering
substantially with the public’s interest in prompt access to
information.” 302 Nor should an exclusion be broader than
necessary to “achieve the goals” of ensuring a fair trial. 303
And, the press must be “given an opportunity to be heard on
the question of their exclusion.” 304 Yet, because the trial
court generally honored these principles, closure in the case
was proper.
Rehnquist also wrote a concurrence “to address the First
Amendment issue that the Court appears to reserve.” 305 In
it, he criticized the Court’s “reservation of the question
whether the First Amendment guarantees the public a right
of access to pretrial proceedings.” 306 Citing Pell, Saxbe, and
Houchins, Rehnquist wrote that it was “clear that this Court
repeatedly has held that there is no First Amendment right
of access in the public or the press to judicial or other
governmental proceedings.” 307 The Court had been
“emphatic” on this point, he said. Thus, because itnow held
that there was also no Sixth Amendment public right of
access, Rehnquist believed there were “no constitutional
constraint[s]” on courts excluding the press and the public. 308
This caused Powell to take a “jab” at Rehnquist. 309 By
301. Id. at 400.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, concurring).
306. Id. at 404.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 405.
309. Letter from William Rehnquist to Lewis Powell (Jun. 25, 1979), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GANNETT CO. V. DEPASQUALE, supra
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way of a footnote, Powell wrote, “Contrary to Mr. Justice
REHNQUIST’s suggestion, lower courts cannot assume after
today’s decision that they are ‘free to determine for
themselves the question whether to open or close the
proceeding’ free from all constitutional constraint.” 310 As
Powell explained, “For although I disagree with my four
dissenting Brethren concerning the origin and the scope of
the constitutional limitations on the closing of pretrial
proceedings, I agree with their conclusion that there are
limitations and that they require the careful attention of
trial courts before closure can be ordered.” 311
Blackmun dissented on behalf of himself, Brennan,
White, and Marshall, in his repurposed majority opinion. 312
He argued that the Court reached “for a strict and flat result”
and that it ignored “the important antecedents and
significant
developmental
features
of
the
Sixth
Amendment.” 313 Blackmun believed that the Sixth
Amendment prohibited “the States from excluding the public
from a proceeding within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee without affording full and fair
consideration to the public’s interests in maintaining an open
proceeding.” 314 As to the First Amendment issue, Blackmun
noted only that “this Court heretofore has not found, and
does not today find, any First Amendment right of access to
judicial or other governmental proceedings.” 315
In the aftermath of the Court’s decision, Stevens, in a
public speech, presciently said that the majority’s decision to
reserve judgment on the First Amendment question was the
note 273, at 43.
310. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 398 n.2 (Powell, concurring).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, dissenting).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 433.
315. Id. at 411 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
608–10 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)).
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most important aspect of the case. By doing so, it placed the
Court’s then-extant “general rule” that there was no First
Amendment right of access “on the firing line.” 316 This “rule,”
Stevens said, drew a “sharp distinction between the
dissemination of information or ideas, on the one hand, and
the acquisition of newsworthy matter on the other.” 317 While
the Court had “accorded virtually absolute protection to the
former,” it had “never squarely held that the latter is entitled
to any constitutional protection whatsoever.” 318 After
Gannett, the open questions were numerous:
Is there indeed an unequivocal general rule that will
require rejection of every attempt to find constitutional
protection for a right of access to information? Or is this the
kind of general rule that . . . may not mean exactly what it
seems to imply in every conceivable situation? Are there
situations in which a rule denying access to information
about how the Government is serving its master is so plainly
unsupported by any legitimate interests that it may be fairly
characterized as an abridgment of free speech? 319
In this regard, Stevens said, the Court’s progression from
Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins to its reservation of the First
Amendment question in Gannett was “worthy of note.” 320
Reflecting the consternation among the Justices,
Stevens was not the only one to opine on Gannett that
summer. Burger, Blackmun, and Powell also did so, and each
disagreed as to what it meant. 321 Blackmun said that
Gannett allowed courts all over the country to close entire

316. John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts about a General Rule, 21 ARIZ. L. REV.
599, 602 (1979).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 604–05.
320. Id. at 601.
321. Law: Confusion in the Courts, TIME (Sept. 17, 1979),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,920672-1,00.html.
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trials without concern. 322 Powell said that it was
“premature” to read too much into the case, especially
because of the outstanding First Amendment question. 323
Burger simply said any confusion over Gannett’s meaning
was the fault of the media’s coverage of the opinion. 324
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
Gannett kept “everyone guessing.” 325 Within a month,
judges approved half the requests to close courtrooms, others
excluded just the press but not the public, and still others
construed the case as applicable only to pre-trial criminal
proceedings like that in Gannett. 326 To stem the confusion, in
late 1979, the Court docketed another case challenging
closure. That case, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,
presented the question squarely: “Do the First, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, singly or in combination, give members of the public
a judicially enforceable right of access to criminal trials that
can be asserted independently of the participants in the
litigation?” 327
i. The Lower Courts’ Decisions
Virginia tried to convict John Stevenson for murder on
three occasions; each time the verdict was vacated or a
mistrial declared. 328 At his fourth trial, the defense counsel
made a motion to close the courtroom, which the court
granted. 329 Richmond Newspapers then made a motion to

322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Brief of Appellants at 3, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 1979 WL
199910 (U.S.) (1979) (No. 79-243).
328. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559 (plurality opinion).
329. Id. at 559–60.
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vacate the order, arguing that the court failed to make
required evidentiary findings and failed to consider
alternatives to complete closure. 330 The court denied that
motion. 331 After the defendant was found not guilty,
Richmond Newspapers sought appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court. 332 That court denied review, however,
writing that there was “no reversible error” under
Gannett. 333
ii. At the Supreme Court
In early 1980, the Court heard oral argument. Lawrence
Tribe appeared on behalf of Richmond Newspapers.
Mirroring Powell’s first question in Gannett, Stewart asked
him “what provision of the Constitution” he thought the
Virginia statute violated. 334 Tribe responded that it violated
the Sixth Amendment and the First. 335 Stewart rejected the
Sixth Amendment out of hand, telling Tribe that Gannett
had “disposed of” that possibility. And for the next several
minutes, Tribe tried, unsuccessfully, to resuscitate that
argument. 336
Stevens then stepped in to say that he hoped Tribe would
turn to his First Amendment argument. 337 Tribe relented,
saying that he thought it was his “stronger argument.” 338
Anticipating a Houchins problem, Tribe explained that it
was “quite clear that the First Amendment is not a sunshine

330. Id. at 560.
331. Id. at 561.
332. Id. at 562.
333. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 1979 Va. LEXIS 307, 5
Media L. Rep. 1545 (1979) (No. 78-1598).
334. Oral Argument at 16:09, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) (No. 79-243), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-243.
335. Id. at 16:13.
336. Id. at 16:17.
337. Id. at 20:47.
338. Id. at 20:48.
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law; that material in the unilateral control of government,
generated by government, internal to government
deliberation, is not automatically accessible to people who
invoke the First Amendment.” 339 He also said it did not
matter that his clients were reporters: “I’m making nothing
special of their status as members of the press.” 340
Rehnquist then started pressing Tribe on the logical end
to his argument. Tribe tried to head off that too,
distinguishing a trial at issue from other government
proceedings. As he explained, “[When] you’re dealing with a
context which is truly internal to government, in which
government has unilateral control to begin with, then the
First Amendment is far harder to apply.” 341 In that context,
“you don’t have the government exercising control over the
flow of information, which is in the public domain.” 342 Tribe
said that the First Amendment right he contemplated was
more limited because it was in reference to the Sixth
Amendment: “This information was of that [public] character
by the express command of the Sixth Amendment.” 343
Marshall Coleman, the Virginia Attorney General,
argued for Virginia. Coleman failed to engage, and in
response to repeated questioning about what constitutional
issues were presented by the closure of a trial, he refused to
acknowledge any. Gannett had decided there was no Sixth
Amendment right, he said. And, as to the First Amendment,
he said, he would “not concede that the First Amendment
would [be implicated by closure].” 344 Unmoved, Burger asked
whether the Court could, right then and there, dismiss
everyone from the courtroom. Coleman saw no constitutional
issue with that:
339. Id. at 21:14.
340. Id. at 21:57.
341. Id. at 27:57.
342. Id. at 28:09.
343. Id. at 28:16.
344. Id. at 36:56.
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I think if you opened the First Amendment application
to the Sixth Amendment it becomes an unending proposition.
How do you cut any governmental functioning or operation
off from the public’s right to observe it once you enter into
that thicket? It seems to me that the idea of a right to know
being founded in the Constitution is not legally or
historically correct. 345
On rebuttal, Tribe weaponized the breadth of Coleman’s
argument, noting that a defendant could simply waive his
right to a public trial and with the judge’s agreement or even
indifference prevent public access altogether. While the case
before the Court did not present such a situation, Tribe
persuasively implored, “This Court should articulate what
the Constitution has traditionally meant, and it has
traditionally meant what was perhaps too obvious to put in
so many words that criminal trials are to be public.” 346 He
added, “The First Amendment provides a perfect textual
home for that principle, due process would do as well.” 347
Stewart then interrupted to ask, “And the reason you say
the First Amendment provides an appropriate home for that
concept is that this case is distinguishable from such cases
as Saxbe.” 348 To which Tribe said, “Pell and even
Houchins.” 349 Stewart pressed, “By reason of the fact that
somebody [i.e., the defendant] has a right to open up these
proceedings?” 350 “Exactly,” Tribe responded. 351 Before sitting
down, Stewart then asked if the argument would apply to
civil proceedings. Wary to be knocked off the tracks so close
to the station, Tribe demurred: “That would be much broader
and one would have to know more than I have discovered
345. Id. at 39:26.
346. Id. at 57:35.
347. Id. at 57:40.
348. Id. at 57:53.
349. Id. at 58:06.
350. Id. at 58:08.
351. Id. at 58:12.
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about the tradition in civil cases to be absolutely sure, but
the Court needn’t decide that in this case.” 352
iii. Drafting the Opinion
In late May, Burger, who had assigned the lead opinion
to himself after the conference voted in favor of reversing,
distributed his first opinion “of the Court” overturning the
trial court order. 353 That opinion reflected Burger’s
admission at conference that he believed there was a right of
access to criminal trials but lacked an answer to the
question, “What’s the constitutional handle?” 354 Burger told
the others, “I’m not persuaded it’s in the First Amendment
. . . as an access right or an associational right.” 355 Instead,
he thought he would rely on the historical provenance of the
right, that “it was part of judicial procedure before adoption
of the Bill of Rights.” 356 “The Ninth Amendment,” he said, “is
as good a handle as any.” 357
Burger ended up grabbing all the handles. According to
his draft, “The question presented in this case is whether the
right to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the
Constitution.” 358 To answer that question, he turned first to
the historical record relating to open trials. 359 As he
explained, “[W]hat is significant for present purposes is that
throughout its evolution, the [criminal] trial has been open

352. Id. at 1:01:23.
353. Warren Burger, J., Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (May 27, 1980), in POWELL
PAPERS:
RICHMOND
NEWSPAPERS,
INC.
V.
VIRGINIA
at
21,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context
=casefiles.
354. SCHWARTZ, supra note 260, at 486.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Warren Burger, J., Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (May 27, 1980), in POWELL
PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 21.
359. Id. at 27.

1386

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

to all who cared to observe.” 360 Switching gears, he observed
that this was not a “quirk of history.” Instead, openness was
long considered “an indispensable attribute of an AngloAmerican trial.” 361 It “gave assurance that the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based
on secret bias or partiality.” 362 Moreover, these public trials
delivered a “significant community therapeutic value.” 363 He
added, “People in an open society do not demand infallibility
from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing.” 364
Nearly twenty pages in, Burger finally invoked the First
Amendment in response to Virginia’s argument that nothing
in the Constitution explicitly provided for public attendance
at trial. 365 While Burger had just explained that the press
attended trials as surrogates for the public, he did not anchor
the access right in the press clause alone. Rather, he said
that the case also implicated the First Amendment’s right of
assembly. 366 The assembly right included the right to
assemble to “listen, observe, and learn” and was an
“independent right which is not merely cumulative” of the
speech and press rights. 367 Burger ended with a flourish,
invoking speech, press, and assembly, which together he
called the “amalgam of First Amendment guarantees.” 368
Burger finally turned to the Ninth Amendment. That
Amendment “was intended to function as a sort of

360. Id.
361. Id. at 31.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 33.
364. Id. at 34.
365. See id. at 37.
366. See id.
367. Id. at 38.
368. Id. at 41.
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constitutional ‘saving clause.’” 369 The Court, he said, had
long recognized “certain unarticulated rights are implicit in
enumerated guarantees.” 370 Like the right of privacy, the
right to a presumption of innocence, and the right to travel,
the right of access was an “unarticulated right[]” that shared
“constitutional protection in common with explicit
guarantees.” 371 Through the Ninth Amendment, the Court
has recognized that such “fundamental rights” were
“indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly
defined.” 372
In the end, Burger’s opinion was shockingly
progressive—a remarkable endorsement of the Ninth
Amendment. It was also cumbersome. While Powell had
recused himself, upon receiving the opinion, he told his
assistant to open a file on the case. On his copy of Burger’s
draft opinion, he mocked it, marking the draft with question
marks and marginalia like “Bull!” and “I said this in Saxbe”
and “I’ll be surprised if this commands a Court w/o
substantial changes.” 373 Powell turned out to be right.
A day after Burger circulated his opinion, Brennan,
possibly sensing an opening, circulated an opinion
concurring in judgment. 374 Richmond Newspapers, he wrote,
presented “the question whether the First Amendment, of its
own force and as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, secures the public an independent
right of access to trial proceedings.” 375 The Court, he wrote,
broadly protected speech from suppression. But, it had not
viewed the First Amendment “in all settings as providing an
369. Id. at 42.
370. Id. at 43.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 34, 36, 21.
374. See William Brennan J., Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (May 28, 1980), in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 49.
375. Id.
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equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of
access to information.” 376 In making that observation,
Brennan cited Burger’s plurality opinion and Stewart’s
opinion concurring in judgment in Houchins as well as cases
like Pell, Saxbe, and Gannett. 377 Citing the dissenters as well
in these cases, Brennan hastened to add that he did not think
these cases foreclosed a First Amendment right of access:
Yet, the Court has not ruled out a public access
component to the First Amendment in every circumstance.
Read with care and in context, our decisions must therefore
be understood as holding only that any privilege of access to
governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint
dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing
interests in security or confidentiality. 378
These cases, Brennan said, reflected only “the special
nature of a claim of First Amendment right to gather
information.” 379 Certainly, the First Amendment made prior
restraints “almost insurmountable,” but stopping there
ignored that it embodied “more than a commitment to free
expression and communicative interchange for their own
sakes.” 380 Instead, it had a “structural role to play in securing
and fostering our republican system of self-government.” 381
And, “[i]mplicit in this structural role” was “the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate—as well as other
civic behavior—must be informed.” 382 In other words, the
scope of the First Amendment’s protections is defined by the

376. Id. at 50.
377. See id. He also noted that “a conceptually separate, yet related, question
is whether the media should enjoy greater access rights than the general public.”
Id. at n.2. That issue was not presented in Richmond Newspapers, however. See
id.
378. Id. at 50–51.
379. Id. at 51.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 51–52.
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Amendment’s purpose, namely, ensuring “communication
necessary for a democracy to survive,” which may require
protecting “not only the communication itself” but the
“indispensable conditions” for such communication to be
“meaningful.” 383
Brennan recognized, however, that a right of access in
service of First Amendment values could be “endless.” 384
After all, there “are few restrictions on action which could
not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of
decreased data flow.” 385 As such, a constitutional access right
“must be invoked with discrimination and temperance.” 386
Accordingly, the scope of the right of access must “be assayed
by considering the information sought and the opposing
interests invaded.” 387 This task, he wrote, “is as much a
matter of sensitivity to practical necessities as it is of
abstract reasoning.” 388
But, agreeing with Burger, Brennan described “two
helpful principles” to reference in determining when an
access right existed. 389 First, “the case for a right of access
has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital
tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or
information.” 390 Indeed, the Constitution carried with it “the
gloss of history.” 391 Second, courts must ask “whether access
to a particular government process is important in terms of
that very process.” 392 Thus, courts “must consult historical
and current practice” and then “weigh the importance of
383. Id. at 52.
384. Id.
385. Id. (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965)).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 53.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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public access to the trial process itself.” 393
Within the week of the circulation of Burger’s and
Brennan’s opinions, White wrote to the conference to express
his frustration that the Court could not decide the case on
the Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, White said he would
join Burger’s opinion “and would expect to stay hitched if
three or more Justices in addition.” 394 He added, however,
that Burger’s “invocation of the Ninth Amendment is
unnecessary, and in any event, it may be that I shall
disassociate myself from that portion of the opinion.” 395
Marshall, a few days later, circulated a letter noting that he
would join Brennan’s opinion. 396 The count was 2-2.
A few days later, Stevens circulated a concurring opinion
praising the Court’s judgment. 397 In a cover letter, he said he
“may end up joining another opinion after the dust has
settled” but “thought it best” to go ahead and circulate his
position. 398 The case was, he wrote in the concurrence, a
“watershed.” 399 Houchins “implied that any governmental
restriction on access to information, no matter how severe
and no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally
acceptable, so long as it did not single out the press.” 400 But,
because neither Marshall nor Blackmun were able to sit for

393. Id.
394. Letter from Byron White to Warren Burger (Jun. 2, 1980) in POWELL
PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 63.
395. Id.
396. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William Brennan (June 6, 1980) in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 78.
397. See John Paul Stevens, J., Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (May 28, 1980),
in POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at
95.
398. Memorandum from John Paul Stevens, J. to the Conference (June 9,
1980), in POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note
353, at 94.
399. John Paul Stevens, J., Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (May 28, 1980), in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 95.
400. Id.
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the case a “majority of the Court neither accepted nor
rejected that conclusion or the contrary conclusion.” 401
In Richmond Newspapers though, Stevens saw a new
beginning: “for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds
that an arbitrary interference with access to important
information is an abridgment of freedom of speech protection
by the First Amendment.” 402 Under the impression that
Richmond Newspapers upended the prior regime, he
explained that, based on his Houchins opinion, he agreed
that “the First Amendment protects the public and the press
from abridgment of their rights of access to information
about the operation of their government, including the
Judicial Branch.” 403
Hearing nothing else, on June 11, Burger circulated a
new draft, saying that it was prompted by “reaction to the
typed draft.” 404 Taking a cue from White, he trimmed back
the Ninth Amendment discussion. 405 He did the same with
the assembly clause. 406 Meanwhile, borrowing from
Brennan, he added that the First Amendment’s speech and
press clauses “must be taken as a command of the broadest
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty
loving society, will allow.” 407 For the first time, he also dealt
with the prison access cases: “[Pell] and Saxbe are
distinguishable in the sense that they were concerned with
penal institutions which, by definition, are not ‘open’ or
public places. Penal institutions do not share the long
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 96.
404. Memorandum from Warren Burger, J. to the Conference (June 11, 1980)
in THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC.
V. VIRGINIA at 5, http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1979/
79-243.pdf.
405. See Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (June 11, 1980) in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 37.
406. See id. at 39.
407. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
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tradition of openness, although traditionally there have been
visiting committees of citizens, and there is no doubt that
legislative committees could exercise plenary oversight and
‘visitation rights.’” Saxbe noted that “limitation on
visitations is justified by what the Court of Appeals
acknowledged as ‘the truism that prisons are institutions
where public access is generally limited.’ . . . See Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) [jails].’ See also Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases).” 408
The revisions did not have the effect he hoped. Five days
later, Stewart circulated a concurring opinion. With it, he
sent the conference a letter, explaining, “If it turns out that
there is no possibility of a Court opinion in this case, I shall
change the last paragraph [of the attached opinion] so as to
join only the judgment.” 409 Stewart referred back to his
opinion in Gannett and noted that “the Court explicitly left
open the question whether such a right of access may be
guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution.” 410
Whatever the answer may have been in the context of the
suppression hearing at issue in Gannett, Stewart believed
that there was a First Amendment right of access to the trial
in Richmond Newspapers. 411
Unconvinced by the other circulated opinions, on June
17, the day after Stewart circulated his opinion, Stevens
wrote to Burger to confirm that he would be joining Burger’s
opinion. 412 That gave Burger three votes: himself, White, and

408. See Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (June 11, 1980) in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 116.
409. Letter from Potter Stewart, J. to the Conference (June 16, 1980) in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V.
VIRGINIA, supra note 404, at 17.
410. See John Paul Stewart, Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (June 24, 1980) in
THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V.
VIRGINIA, supra note 404, at 18.
411. See id.
412. See Letter from Stevens, J. to the Conference (June 9, 1980) in POWELL
PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 94.
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Stevens. Two days later, Burger wrote to Stevens, and copied
Blackmun and Stewart—two outstanding votes, letting him
know that he adopted certain of his suggestions. 413 Then, on
June 19, Rehnquist circulated a dissenting opinion, arguing
that there was no “prohibition in the First, Sixth, Ninth, or
any other Amendments” against excluding the press and
public from trial. 414
While it is unclear when Blackmun told the conference
that he would only join the judgment of the Court, on June
23, Burger circulated a letter explaining additional changes
to his opinion. 415 But the real purpose was to chastise his
colleagues. He wrote that it was “most unfortunate that,
although seven of us are of one mind on the essentials of this
case—the openness of criminal trials—we fail, apparently, to
clarify the confusion that followed in the wake of Gannett.” 416
He added, “I think we fall short if the present lack of a ‘Court’
prevails.” 417 Besides Rehnquist’s opinion, he had seen no
other opinion that was “so at odds with the assigned opinion
that the author of that separate writing could not also join
the assigned opinion.” 418 If differences existed they should be
raised and accommodated because an “unnecessarily
‘fractionated’ Court serves no good purpose; it causes those
reading our opinions to find differences of substance which
are not actually there.” 419
It did not work. On June 24, Blackmun circulated an
413. See Letter from Warren Burger to John Paul Stevens (June 19, 1980) in
THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V.
VIRGINIA, supra note 404, at 7.
414. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
415. See Letter from Burger, J. to the Conference (Jun. 23, 1980) in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V.
VIRGINIA, supra note 404, at 8.
416. Id. at 10.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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opinion concurring only in judgment. 420 Blackmun called the
resolution of the case “gratifying for two reasons.” 421 First,
he appreciated that the Court had relied on history as a
reference point, as Blackmun had in his Gannett dissent. 422
Second, Blackmun thought that Richmond Newspapers had
“wash[ed] away at least some of the graffiti that marred the
prevailing opinions in Gannett.” 423 While he remained
convinced that the Sixth Amendment was the better
approach, he admitted that the Court had “eschewed that
approach.” 424 Instead, it had turned “to other possible
constitutional sources,” invoking “a veritable potpourri of
them—the speech clause of the First Amendment, the press
clause, the assembly clause, the . . . Ninth Amendment, and
a cluster of penumbral guarantees recognized in past
decisions.” 425 Blackmun noted that this course was pocked
with “uncertainty,” but since this was the path it had chosen,
he was forced to admit it as a “secondary proposition.” 426
iv. The Court Issues its Opinions
Burger never got his majority, and the fallout spanned
fifty some pages. While seven Justices found that closure was
improper, Burger announced only the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion for himself, White, and Stevens.
White also filed a concurring opinion, as did Stevens.
Brennan filed an opinion concurring in judgment, in which
Marshall joined. Stewart and Blackmun filed opinions
concurring in judgment too. Rehnquist was the lone
dissenter. Powell remained sidelined.

420. See Harry Blackmun, J., Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (June 24, 1980) in
POWELL PAPERS: RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. V. VIRGINIA, supra note 353, at 180.
421. Id.
422. See id.
423. Id. at 181.
424. Id. at 182.
425. Id. at 183.
426. Id. at 182.
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It is true, as Stewart observed, that Burger’s and
Brennan’s opinions shared similarities. They focused on
whether trials had historically been open to the public and
on the logic of openness. 427 But the similarities stopped
there. Brennan established a republican theory of access
constrained by reference to the historical openness of the
proceeding and whether that openness played a positive role.
Burger’s opinion recognized a limited right of access to
criminal trials based on the “unbroken, uncontradicted
history [of access to trials], supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past.” 428
For Burger, what he began his opinion with—the
historical openness of trials—was most important. So, it is
not surprising that his theoretical grounding was muddled.
Burger made no apologies for this, as he wrote that he did
not believe it was “crucial” to describe the access right in
reference to any specific part of the First Amendment. 429
Instead, he broadly invoked speech and press, and wrote that
assembly “is not without relevance” either. 430 It was this last
right he invoked apparently to limit future right of access
claims to already public places: as with streets, sidewalks,
and parks, a “trial courtroom also is a public place where the
people generally—and representatives of the media—have a
right to be present.” 431
Brennan, on the other hand, declared that the First
Amendment had “a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government.” 432
“Implicit in this structural role” was “not only ‘the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
427. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599 (1980)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
428. Id. at 573 (Burger, J.).
429. Id. at 576.
430. Id. at 577.
431. Id. at 578.
432. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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and wide-open,’ but also the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate . . . must be informed.” 433 This model
linked “the First Amendment to that process of
communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and
thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but
also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.” 434 For Brennan, history and logic were
simply “two helpful principles” to constrain the
“‘theoretically endless’” stretch of the access right. 435
Nor did the other Justices resolve the friction between
the two. Stevens read Burger’s opinion broadly as a
“watershed” that protected “the public and the press from
abridgment of their rights of access to information about the
operation of their government.” 436 White, however, thought
the opinion was very narrow. 437 Stewart was of a similar
mind, distinguishing attempts to other government
proceedings and places. 438 And, Blackmun suggested a
similar limitation, characterizing the right of access as “right
to know about the administration of justice in general.” 439
While Richmond Newspapers was, then, historic insofar
as it recognized for the first time some kind of right of access,
it suffered as had Houchins and Gannett before it from
considerable indeterminacy. As one commentator observed
the year the case was handed down, “[T]he several opinions
in the case leave the existence of a general right of access to
governmental information an open question.” 440 The
lingering question: “Toward what ultimate constitutional
433. Id.
434. Id. at 588.
435. Id. at 588−89.
436. Id. at 584–84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
437. Id. at 581–82 (White, J., concurring).
438. Id. at 599–600 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
439. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
440. Public Right of Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 149 (1980).
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objective is the instrumental value of this access right
directed?” 441 Would Burger’s doctrinally agnostic view or
Brennan’s doctrinally broad view of a right of access win out?
4. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
As Richmond Newspapers had followed quickly on the
heels of Gannett, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
followed quickly on Richmond Newspapers. The case arrived
at the Court in 1981, just a year later. The question
presented was whether a Massachusetts statute requiring
exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom when a
minor victim of sexual assault was constitutional. 442
i. Lower Courts’ Decisions
In April 1979, the Globe Newspaper Company
challenged an order closing the courtroom in a rape
prosecution. 443 It failed. In February 1980, some five months
before the Court published its decision in Richmond
Newspapers, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
dismissed the appeal as moot because the underlying
prosecution had concluded. 444 That court refused to reach the
constitutionality of the statute requiring closure, noting that
Richmond Newspapers was pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court and it would be improvident to do so. 445 After Globe
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court

441. Id. at 153. There were three potential outcomes. First, a “narrow reading
of the case would limit the reach of access rights rather strictly to contexts in
which access is sought to an institution traditionally open to public scrutiny.” Id.
at 157. Second, a “less tradition-bound approach along structural lines might
limit access rights to information (or forums) with respect to which the
government could claim no interest requiring exclusivity of control.” Id. at 157–
58. And, finally, an “even more liberal theory would adopt an ad hoc balancing
approach, asking in each case whether access is compatible with the functioning
of the institution to which access is sought.” Id. at 158.
442. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 598 (1982).
443. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 401 N.E.2d 360, 362 (Mass. 1980).
444. Id. at 372.
445. Id. at 366.
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vacated the Massachusetts judgment and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of Richmond
Newspapers. 446
On remand, the Massachusetts high court concluded
that the statute was constitutional under Richmond
Newspapers. 447 That case, the court said, “recognized for the
first time that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees a right of public access to criminal
trials.” 448 Nevertheless, the court said that the basis for the
decision Richmond Newspapers was “somewhat unclear.” 449
Still, it wrote, “[a]lthough there was no majority opinion, two
themes were stressed by all.” 450 The first was the history of
access to criminal trials; the second was that closure might
be appropriate in certain circumstances. 451
Considering these themes, the court saw no infirmity in
the statute. There was a notable exception to the history of
open trials: “cases involving sexual assaults.” 452 And, the
court found that the Commonwealth’s “special solicitousness
for the interests of minors” outweighed any corresponding
rights of the press. 453 In short, although there was “some
temporary diminution of information,” the court could not
“say that Richmond Newspapers requires the invalidation of
the requirement, given the statute’s narrow scope in an area
of traditional sensitivity to the needs of victims.” 454
ii. At the Supreme Court
Globe again sought review in the Supreme Court, and, at
446. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
447. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 423 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Mass. 1981).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 776, n.6.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 776–77.
452. Id. at 778.
453. Id. at 781.
454. Id.
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a November 1981 conference, Brennan, White, Blackmun,
Stevens, and the newly seated Sandra Day O’Connor (who
replaced Stewart) noted probable jurisdiction. 455 That left
Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and Marshall voting against.
While Powell viewed the Massachusetts statute as
“worrisome,” he also thought the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court was a “strong one” and upheld the statute
twice, including once after remand. 456
The Court heard argument in March 1982. Unlike prior
ones, it was not focused on whether the right of access
existed. That much had been decided. Instead, it proceeded
uneventfully with a focus on whether the mandatory closure
requirement in the Massachusetts statute was constitutional
under Richmond Newspapers. Burger and Rehnquist
dominated questioning when Globe’s counsel James McHugh
argued, and Marshall did the same when Mitchell Sikora,
the assistant attorney general for Massachusetts, argued.
The most illuminating part came from Sikora and was
aimed at Brennan. “I would like to stress just one more
point,” he said, “and that is a mode of analysis which Mr.
Justice Brennan introduced in the Richmond Newspapers
case, when he suggested that we should test statutes of this
kind by inspection as to whether they interfere seriously
with the flow of information to citizens about their courts or
about their political institutions more generally.” 457 Based on
the narrow reading of the statute given to it by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he argued that the
statute did not interfere with that flow of information. As he
explained, “[a]ll pre and post-trial proceedings remain open,
presumptively open,” and, almost all of the trial, except for
455. Lewis Powell, Preliminary Memo (Nov. 5, 1981), in POWELL PAPERS:
GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK at 2,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1377&context
=casefiles.
456. Id.
457. Oral Argument at 53:46, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S.
596 (1982) (No. 81-611), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-611.
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the testimony of the minor victim, was also presumptively
open. 458
At the conference, Burger voted to affirm. He told his
colleagues that there was a substantial “public interest in
protecting minors and encourage victims” to report crimes
that openness would “frustrate.” 459 Brennan, then the next
most senior justice, voted to reverse, explaining that the
statute’s mandatory closure requirement made it
unconstitutional: “there must be circumstances where press
need not be excluded.” 460 He would leave “courts free to
decide on [a] case-by-case basis.” 461 Both White and Marshall
fell in line with Brennan, as did Blackmun. 462 Then came
Powell who said he would go along with Brennan, but on one
condition: if the Court made “clear that the trial judge may
determine, in each case, whether the interests of the victim—
and of the public—requires closure during testimony of
victim.” 463
The rest was a mix bag. Rehnquist said that he agreed
with Burger. 464 Stevens thought the case should be
dismissed because the trial was over and, thus, there was no
case or controversy. 465 The Court, he said, was “being asked
for an advisory opinion”—a strange position for Stevens who
had, in Houchins, maintained the opposite position. 466 If he
was forced to decide though, he suggested that he would go
with Brennan. 467 Finally, O’Connor said that Richmond
458. Id. at 54:28.
459. Conference Notes (Nov. 5, 1981), in POWELL PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER
CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 455, at 16.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 16–17.
463. Id. at 17.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
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Newspapers controlled. 468
iii. Drafting the Opinion
Brennan assigned himself the opinion. He wrote that
Richmond Newspapers “firmly established . . . that the press
and general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials.” 469 Despite no majority, in Richmond
Newspapers, “seven Justices recognized that this right of
access is embodied in the First Amendment.” 470 True enough,
he said, the access right “is not explicitly mentioned in terms
in the First Amendment,” but the Court had “long eschewed
any ‘narrow, literal conception’ of the Amendment’s
terms.” 471 This made sense as the Founders “were concerned
with broad principles, and wrote against a background of
shared values and practices.” 472 The Amendment was “thus
broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the
Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of
other First Amendment rights or are implicit in the very
structure of self-government established by the
Constitution.” 473
On this point, after citing the plurality opinion and his
own in Richmond Newspapers, Brennan dropped Footnote
13. That Footnote, which will prove important, approvingly
cited large swaths of Stevens’ dissent in Houchins and
Powell’s dissent in Saxbe. 474 Invoking themes from those
468. Id.
469. William Brennan, J., Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (May 24, 1982), in
POWELL PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF
NORFOLK, supra note 455, at 19.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at n.13. The footnote read: “See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.
S. 1, 30–38 (1978) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U. S. 843, 861-864 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).”
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opinions, he wrote that the right of access was not simply a
question of access to criminal trials. 475 Rather, “[u]nderlying
the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the
common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.’” 476 By protecting the access right, the
Amendment “ensure[d] that the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican
system of self-government.” 477 Invoking his Richmond
Newspapers theory, he wrote that to the extent “the First
Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it
is to ensure that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of
governmental affairs’ is an informed one.” 478
Expanding on the point, Brennan explained that in
Richmond Newspapers the “various opinions” cited “[t]wo
features of the criminal justice system” that showed “why a
right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly
afforded protection by the First Amendment.” 479 First was
the history of openness to criminal trials. Second was that
access to criminal trials played “a particularly significant
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole.” 480 Hammering this theme, he
added, “in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials
permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
the judicial process—an essential component in our
structure of self-government.” 481
Brennan then turned to the showing necessary to

475. Id.
476. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
477. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1980); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
478. Id. at 8.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 9.
481. Id.

2022]

DOES HOUCHINS MATTER?

1403

overcome the access right. Departing from Burger’s view in
Richmond Newspapers, he wrote that the access right could
only be overcome in “limited” circumstances where it could
“be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest” and that closure was “narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.” 482 He concluded that the
statute did not pass the test because it mandated closure in
all cases. While safeguarding the “physical and psychological
well-being of a minor” was compelling, it was “clear that the
circumstances of the particular case may affect the
significance of the interest.” 483
The opinion caused a flurry of correspondence. Burger
sent a letter saying he would “circulate a dissent,” 484 and
Marshall sent a letter joining Brennan. 485 The next day,
Powell joined too. 486 White also responded, telling Brenan
that he “satisfied” with the opinion. 487 But, he said he could
not join “the words ‘or are implicit in the very structure of
self-government established by the Constitution.’” 488 If
White had his way, the opinion would read only that the First
Amendment was “broad enough to encompass those rights
that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms
of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the

482. Id. at 10.
483. Id. at 11.
484. Letter from Warren Burger, J. to Conference (May 24, 1982), in POWELL
PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK,
supra note 455, at 33.
485. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William Brennan Warren (May 24,
1982), in POWELL PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE
COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 455, at 34.
486. Letter from Lewis Powell to William Brennan (May 25, 1982), in POWELL
PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK,
supra note 455, at 37.
487. Letter from Byron White to William Brennan (May 25, 1982), in POWELL
PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK,
supra note 455, at 36.
488. Id.
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enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.” 489 White also
said he could not join Footnote 13 that approvingly cited the
Houchins dissenters. 490 “Perhaps,” he wrote, “these items are
not critical to your opinion.” 491 He added, “[i]f they are, I shall
indicate my disagreement.” 492
Brennan had three solid votes to join, and a fourth
conditional vote from White. Knowing the ill-fated history of
draft opinions in Houchins, Gannett, and Richmond
Newspapers, he must have been concerned about his own.
Then, more bad news came. He would not get any help from
Stevens or O’Connor. On June 8, Stevens circulated a
dissenting opinion despite his comments to the contrary at
conference that he would go along with Brennan. 493 And on
June 17, O’Connor circulated an opinion concurring in
judgment only, criticizing the breadth of some of the
language in Brennan’s opinion—some of the same language
attacked by White. 494 By that time, Burger had also
circulated his promised dissent, which Rehnquist joined. 495
That left only Blackmun’s vote. The same day O’Connor
circulated her opinion, Blackmun wrote to Brennan, “Dear

489. William Brennan, J., Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (May 24, 1982), in
POWELL PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF
NORFOLK, supra note 455, at 25.
490. Letter from Byron White to William Brennan (May 25, 1982), in POWELL
PAPERS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK,
supra note 455, at 36.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. John Paul Stevens, J., Dissenting Opinion, 1st Draft (Jun. 8, 1982), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT,
COUNTY
OF
NORFOLK
at
20,
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1981/81-611.pdf.
494. Sandra Day O’Connor, Concurring Opinion, 1st Draft (Jun. 17, 1982), in
THE BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V.
SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 493, at 22.
495. Letter from William Rehnquist to Warren Burger (Jun. 9, 1982), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT, COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 493, at 19.
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Bill, Please join me. I hope you will be able to give
sympathetic consideration to the points Byron raises in his
note of May 25. I agree with him that footnote 13 is perhaps
not critical to the opinion.” 496 In light of Blackmun’s letter,
Brennan had little choice as to what to do to secure a
majority.
That same day, Brennan promptly distributed a revised
draft of his opinion sympathetic to White and Blackmun’s
views. 497 He removed Footnote 13 that had endorsed the
dissenters in Houchins and Saxbe. He also removed his note
about the First Amendment protecting rights that were
implicit in the structure of self-government established by
the Constitution. With that, while not speaking as
emphatically as he may have liked, Brennan did what no
Justice had done before: wrote a majority opinion upholding
a constitutional right of access.
iv. The Court’s Opinion
In Globe Newspaper, the Court largely distanced itself
from Burger’s approach in Richmond Newspapers. In its
place, it adopted Brennan’s republican understanding:
“Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials is the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of
that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.’” 498 And by “offering such protection,
the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual
citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our
republican system of self-government.” 499 Thus, “to the

496. Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan (Jun. 17, 1982), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT, COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 493, at 17.
497. William Brennan, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft (May 24, 1982), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT, COUNTY OF NORFOLK, supra note 493, at 11.
498. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
499. Id.
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extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access
to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally
protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an informed
one.” 500 Access, as such, empowers “the public to participate
in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an
essential component in our structure of self-government.” 501
Although Brennan did not need her vote for the majority,
O’Connor questioned the implications of the republican
theory of access. 502 Unlike the majority, she did not interpret
Richmond Newspapers as “shelter[ing] every right that is
‘necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights.’” 503 Instead, she said the plurality in Richmond
Newspapers rested its decision on “our long history of open
criminal trials and the special value, for both public and
accused, of that openness.” 504 She thus did not interpret that
case or the Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper as carrying
“any implications outside the context of criminal trials.” 505
Yet, because Globe Newspaper was a criminal case, she was
forced to concur with the majority. 506
Burger also questioned the majority’s approach, calling
it an “expansive interpretation of Richmond Newspapers”
and criticizing its “cavalier rejection” of Massachusetts’
interest in protecting minor sex victims. 507 Richmond
Newspapers, he wrote, did not establish a “right of access to
all aspects of all criminal trials under all circumstances.” 508
On the contrary, because there was no uniform history of
500. Id. at 604–05 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
501. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
502. Id. at 611 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
503. Id. (quoting id. at 604).
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
508. Id.
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access to the testimony of minor sex victims, he believed that
considerations present in Richmond Newspapers were
absent. 509 Even if the right attached, he disagreed with the
standard adopted to overcome the access right. 510 The
Court’s compelling interest standard, he wrote, was too
“rigid,” especially where the purpose of the law was not “to
deny the press or public access to information.” 511
Stevens mostly stayed out of the fight. 512 Anticipating an
issue that would find its way to the Court again, Stevens
argued in dissent that Globe essentially mounted a facial
attack on the statute. 513 But, Stevens suggested that facial
attacks on statutes denying access were inappropriate
because “statutes that bear on this right of access do not
deter protected activity in the way that other laws sometimes
interfere with the right of expression.” 514 In other words, “the
right of access is plainly not coextensive with the right of
expression.” 515 Still, his broad understanding of the access
right as evidenced by his concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers remained on display. For example, he noted that
the Court had “only recently recognized the First
Amendment right of access” not just to trials but “to
newsworthy matter.” 516
The next day, the New York Times reported that Globe
Newspaper “erased any doubts about the durability” of
Richmond Newspapers, while providing “a firmer
constitutional basis for the result.” 517 In one of the first
509. Id. at 614.
510. Id. at 616.
511. Id. at 615–16.
512. See id. at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
513. See id. at 621.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
517. Supreme Court Reaffirms Public’s Right of Access to Criminal Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, at D21 (Jun. 24, 1982).
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scholarly assessments, one commentator noted that, while
“initial attempts to extend the right to receive information to
a right of access to public institutions were unsuccessful,”
Globe Newspaper breathed “new life into the quest for an
affirmative view of the first amendment.” 518 It reflected “a
first amendment theory incorporating the values of access
and self-government.” 519 And Globe Newspaper “reiterate[d]
and extend[ed] the Richmond Newspapers analysis.” 520 The
implications of Brennan’s victory were clear: “although both
Richmond Newspapers and Globe are concerned with
courtroom access, the rationales underlying [them] can be
extended to many other situations as well.” 521 Indeed, “[j]ust
as the press and public require courtroom access in order to
make informed self-governing decisions, so too they require
statements of reasons in order to evaluate and react to
governmental decisions.” 522
B. The Later Cases
In the end, the Court never took a case to test the
implications of the republican theory of the First
Amendment it adopted in Globe Newspaper. In fact, it
assiduously avoided doing so. While it decided two additional
cases—the Press-Enterprise Cases—in short succession in
1984 and 1986, these cases only raised issues relating to
access to criminal proceedings. 523 In 1993, it issued a short
per curiam opinion again addressing access to criminal
proceedings. 524 The Court would never again grant a petition
518. Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 297, 314 (1982).
519. Id.
520. Id. at 315.
521. Id. at 315–16.
522. Id. at 316.
523. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
524. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
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for writ of certiorari to delineate the First Amendment right
of access to government proceedings or information. Instead,
it would offer only dicta about the access right in related
cases.
1. Press-Enterprise I (1984)
In January 1983, the Court granted certiorari in PressEnterprise, Co. v. Superior Court. 525 At issue was whether
the right of access applied to voir dire in a criminal trial. 526
Burger, writing for the unanimous majority, returned to his
roots: as he had in Richmond Newspapers, he focused on
whether voir dire was traditionally open and whether
openness played a beneficial role in the process of voir dire
itself. 527 Thus, the Court largely ignored—but left
unchallenged—the structural theory it adopted in Globe
Newspaper.
As to history, the Court first concluded that voir dire had
long took place in public. 528 On the second prong, consistent
with the theoretical indifference of Richmond Newspapers,
Burger wrote that how the Court “allocate[d] the ‘right’ to
openness as between the accused and the public” or whether
it was viewed “as a component inherent in the system
benefiting both” was “not crucial.” 529 And while he noted in a
footnote that “the question we address . . . focuses on First
. . . Amendment values,” he failed to mention the First
Amendment in the body of the Court’s opinion. 530 Instead, he
listed the procedural benefits of openness: openness ensures
that individuals unable to attend trials would have
“confidence that standards of fairness” were observed and
525. 459 U.S. 1169 (1983). Press-Enterprise had sought certiorari a year
earlier, but the petition was denied. Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor would
have granted it. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
526. Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 503.
527. Id. at 505–10.
528. Id. at 507.
529. Id. at 508.
530. Id. at 509 n.8.
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that they ensured that the community knows “that offenders
are being brought to account.” 531
Turning to the standard to overcome the right, in the
Court’s lone citation to Globe Newspaper, it applied the
compelling interest standard adopted in that case.
Specifically, it found that “[c]losed proceedings, although not
absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown
that outweighs the value of openness.” 532 The interest in
favor of closure must be “‘weighty’” and supported by
“findings specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order was properly
entered.” 533 While the lower court identified the fair trial
right and privacy interests of jurors as interests to be served
by closure, that conclusion, Burger said, was “unsupported
by findings showing that an open proceeding in fact
threatened those interests.” 534 Even if the trial court made
such a finding, it failed to “consider whether alternatives
were available to protect the interests of the prospective
jurors that the trial court’s orders sought to guard.” 535
Stevens concurred to point out “that this is a First
Amendment case.” 536 The issue before the Court was not
“simply . . . how a criminal trial is most efficaciously
conducted,” nor how “effective judicial administration”
should be handled. 537 On the contrary, “the First
Amendment’s concerns are much broader.” 538 Its mission
was to secure “meaningful public control over the process of
governance.” 539 Pointing to the various opinions of Richmond
531. Id. at 509.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 509–10 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07).
534. Id. at 510–11.
535. Id. at 511.
536. Id. at 529 (Stevens, J., concurring).
537. Id. at 516–17.
538. Id. at 517.
539. Id. at 519.
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Newspapers, Stevens explained that the access right
implicated the “‘common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government.’” 540 The Court “endorsed” this position in Globe
Newspaper. 541 A right of access then “cannot succeed unless
access makes a positive contribution to this process of selfgovernance.” 542 Because access to voir dire “cannot help but
improve public understanding” of that process and enable
“critical examination of its workings to take place,” Stevens
concluded that the access right attached. 543
2. Press-Enterprise II (1986)
In October 1985, the Court again granted certiorari in a
petition brought by Press-Enterprise. 544 Burger would again
assign the opinion to himself. The dispute arose from a
murder prosecution of a nurse accused of killing twelve
patients. 545 At the preliminary hearing, the defendant made
a motion to exclude the public pursuant to a California
statute that allowed closure to protect a defendant’s fair trial
right. 546 That hearing lasted over a month. 547 After it
concluded, Press-Enterprise made a motion to unseal the
transcript, which was denied. 548 It then appealed without
success, after which it sought and the Court granted a writ
540. Id. at 517 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
575 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
541. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982)).
542. Id. at 518.
543. Id. Marshall concurred in judgment to make clear that “the constitutional
rights of the public and press to access to all aspects of criminal trials are not
diminished in cases in which ‘deeply personal matters’ are likely to be elicited in
voir dire proceedings.” Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring). Blackmun concurred
too, emphasizing that the Court was not passing on a juror’s right of privacy. Id.
at 513–14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
544. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 474 U.S. 899 (1985).
545. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986).
546. Id. at 4.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 5.
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of certiorari. 549
The question presented was whether Press-Enterprise
had a “right of access to the transcript of a preliminary
hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution.” 550 The Court
found that it did. It observed that the “right to an open public
trial is a shared right of the accused and the public.” 551 While
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial might raise
different issues, the First Amendment’s right of access
“cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e.,
‘trial’ or otherwise.” 552 Instead, Burger returned again to the
“two complimentary considerations” of history and logic. 553
Unlike Press-Enterprise I, however, Burger did mention
the First Amendment. And, in parts, he suggested, as the
Court had in Globe Newspaper, that the right of access was
a generally applicable one: “These considerations of
experience and logic are, of course, related, for history and
experience shape the functioning of governmental processes.
If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of
experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of
public access attaches.” 554 Rather than ignore Globe
Newspaper, he invoked it: “The considerations that led the
Court to apply the First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers and Globe and the
selection of jurors in Press-Enterprise I lead us to conclude
that the right of access applies to preliminary hearings as
conducted in California.” 555
Having found the right of access to apply, the Court then
pivoted to the question of whether the right of access had

549. Id.
550. Id. at 3.
551. Id. at 7.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 8.
554. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
555. Id.
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been overcome. It found that it did not. The California
Supreme Court concluded that the courtroom could be closed
so long as there was a “reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice.” 556 This standard, however, “placed a lesser
burden” on the party seeking closure than the compelling
interest test outlined in Globe Newspaper and PressEnterprise I. 557 As such, Burger rejected it and reaffirmed
the test requiring a showing “that ‘closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.’” 558
While Brennan did not write separately, he worked in
the background to protect his majority opinion in Globe
Newspaper and its endorsement of a republican theory of the
First Amendment. After Burger circulated a first draft,
Brennan wrote to Burger asking if he would consider “two
small suggestions.” 559 Burger adopted both. One was a
request for an additional sentence: “These considerations of
experience and logic are, of course, related to one another, for
historical practice and experience shapes the functioning of
governmental processes.” 560 Next, Brennan suggested that in
discussing the standard that must be overcome to justify
closure that Burger add in a cite to Globe Newspaper. 561

556. Id. at 14 (marks and citation omitted).
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Letter from William Brennan to Warren Burger (Jun. 4, 1986), in THE
BURGER COURT OPINION WRITING DATABASE: PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. V. SUPERIOR
COURT
OF
CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY
OF
RIVERSIDE,
at
5,
http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1985/84-1560.pdf.
Blackmun also tried to influence the outcome with less success. Letter from
Harry Blackmun to Warren Burger (Jun. 5, 1984) in POWELL PAPERS: PRESSENTERPRISE CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,
at
58,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1589
&context=casefiles. Burger ignored his request asking for certain changes in
language to make the majority opinion “somewhat truer to the holding in Globe
Newspapers.” Id.
560. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1,9 (1986) (emphasis added).
561. Id.
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Stevens, joined in part by Rehnquist, dissented. He
emphasized that he had “long believed that a proper
construction of the First Amendment embraces a right of
access to information about the conduct of public affairs.” 562
He thus continued to believe that government officials could
not “abridge the free flow of information simply to protect
their own activities from public scrutiny.” 563 Rather, they
had to identify “some legitimate justification that serves the
interest of the public office.” 564 But, for Stevens, the devil was
in the details. It had “always been apparent that the freedom
to obtain information that the government has a legitimate
interest in not disclosing is far narrower than the freedom to
disseminate information.” 565 Thus, as in Pell, where there
were legitimate penological reasons for limiting access, in
the present case, there was another legitimate reason: “the
risk of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” 566
3. El Vocero v. Puerto Rico (1993)
In 1993, the Court issued a short per curiam opinion in
El Vocero v. Puerto Rico. 567 El Vocero, as Press-Enterprise II
before it, concerned a preliminary hearing, this time in
Puerto Rico. 568 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found that
no access right attached to the Territory’s preliminary
hearings based on, in part, “the unique history and traditions
of the Commonwealth, which display a special concern for
the honor and reputation of the citizenry.” 569
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that conclusion
“irreconcilable with Press-Enterprise[] for precisely the
562. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
563. Id. at 19.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
566. Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974)).
567. 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
568. Id. at 148.
569. Id. at 149.
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reasons stated in that decision.” 570 The preliminary hearings
in Puerto Rico had, in fact, been modeled on California’s and
they too were “‘sufficiently like a trial’ to require public
access.” 571 Nor was the reliance on Puerto Rican tradition
appropriate. Instead, the Court said, “the ‘experience’ test of
Globe Newspaper does not look to the particular practice of
any one jurisdiction, but . . . ‘to the experience in that type or
kind of hearing throughout the United States.’” 572
4. Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp. (1999)
United Reporting had, for years, provided the names and
other identifying information of recent arrestees to
subscribers to its services. 573 In 1996, however, the
California legislature amended the open records law through
which United Reporting obtained that information. 574 As a
result, it would be more difficult, if not impossible, for United
Reporting to obtain the arrestee information for delivery to
its subscribers. 575
According to the district court, the case presented the
question of whether the amendment “was an
unconstitutional limitation on plaintiff’s commercial
speech.” 576 While the district court concluded in light of
Houchins that United Reporting had no First Amendment
right of access to the information, it went on to ask whether
the amendment passed the Court’s commercial speech test
as the amendment amounted to a “content-based indirect

570. Id.
571. Id. at 149–50 (citation omitted).
572. Id. at 150 (quoting Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323
(1992)).
573. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822, 824 (S.D.
Cal. 1996) (subsequent history omitted).
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limitation on commercial speech.” 577 The court then found
that the statute did not survive intermediate scrutiny, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 578
The case then went to the Supreme Court on the question
of whether “the government violates the First Amendment
when it releases records only for limited, noncommercial
purposes.” 579 In briefing, the LAPD argued that the Ninth
Circuit erred in considering the law as a restriction on speech
rather than access to information. 580 Citing Houchins, it
asserted that the restriction on the release of records was
constitutional because restrictions “on access to government
information do not run afoul of the First Amendment.” 581 It
then characterized Richmond Newspapers as the “lone
qualification to the state’s ability to limit public access to
government proceedings.” 582 And, it went on to argue that,
unlike criminal trials, there was “no similar historical
pedigree or interest supports a right of access to the home
addresses of arrestees and victims.” 583
At oral argument, Stevens doubted if the case was even
an access case. Questioning LAPD’s counsel, he noted that
below the LAPD “agreed that Central Hudson was the
test.” 584 He explained, “I think if you assume that Central
Hudson applies, you’re assuming it’s an abridgement of
speech case rather than a denial of access case.” 585 And
according to United Reporting’s counsel, it did “not have to
577. Id. at 826.
578. Id.; see also United Reporting Publ’g Corp. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146
F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1998).
579. Brief for Petitioner at i, L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. 32 (No. 98-678).
580. Id. at 9.
581. Id. at 16–17 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
582. Id. at 17.
583. Id.
584. Oral Argument at 15:47, L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. 32 (No. 98-678).
585. Id. at 15:28.
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establish a raw right of access in order to prevail in this
case.” 586 Instead, he argued that the case hinged “on the
discrimination among speakers when access is granted for
governmentally approved purposes, including speech
purposes, journalism, and is denied when access is withheld
for governmentally disapproved speech purposes.” 587
The Court ended up deciding the case on neither ground.
Instead, it found that United Reporting could not bring a
facial challenge to the statute. The statute, the Court
explained, was “not an abridgment of anyone’s right to
engage in speech . . . but simply a law regulating access to
information in the hands of the police department.” 588 While
the Court had allowed facial attacks on statutes that limited
speech, it had not done so for statutes that limited access to
information. 589 The statute at issue “merely require[d] that
if respondent wishes to obtain the addresses of arrestees it
must qualify under the statute to do so.” 590 United Reporting,
however, “did not attempt to qualify and was therefore
denied access to the addresses.” 591 It could not now bring a
facial challenge in lieu of being denied access itself.
In dicta, the Court offered an aside as emphasis. Citing
the Houchins plurality as a “cf.” cite (although not noting
that Houchins was a plurality opinion), it wrote, “California
could decide not to give out arrestee information at all
without violating the First Amendment.” 592 The Court added
nothing further on that point. Yet, it seemed that most other
justices agreed. Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, and was
joined by O’Connor, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer:
“California could, as the Court notes, constitutionally decide
586. Id. at 56:35.
587. Id. at 56:46.
588. L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 40.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id.
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not to give out arrestee address information at all.” 593 Even
Stevens, dissenting with Anthony Kennedy, agreed: “the
majority is surely correct in observing that ‘California could
decide not to give out arrestee information at all without
violating the First Amendment.’” 594 But, he added, “A
different, and more difficult, question is presented when the
State makes information generally available, but denies
access to a small disfavored class.” 595
5. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011)
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a group of data miners and
pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged a Vermont
statute restricting “the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy
records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual
doctors.” 596 These records were received by pharmacies when
they processed prescriptions. 597 Pharmacies then sold the
records to data miners who would lease them to
pharmaceutical companies that used them to inform their
sales of drugs. 598
One argument Vermont raised in defending the statute
was a twist on the Court’s right of access jurisprudence. It
argued that the law only regulated “access to information”
rather than speech itself, and, under the Court’s prior
precedents like United Reporting, that presented no
constitutional issue. 599 While the records were not
themselves government records in the traditional sense,
Vermont asserted that they were “generated in compliance
with a legal mandate . . . so could be considered a kind of

593. Id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
594. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
595. Id.
596. 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
597. Id. at 558.
598. Id.
599. Id. at 567.
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governmental information.” 600 Thus, Vermont was only
putting limitations on access to records that the government
could decide never to require the creation of in the first place.
The Court found “some support” for this argument in
United Reporting but rejected it. 601 First, it clarified that
United Reporting was “about the availability of facial
challenges” to laws limiting access to information, and the
“Court did not rule on the merits of any First Amendment
claim.” 602 An “even more important reason” for
distinguishing it was that the “plaintiff in United Reporting
had neither ‘attempt[ed] to qualify’ for access to the
government’s information nor presented an as-applied claim
in this Court.” 603 Thus, “the Court assumed that the plaintiff
had not suffered a personal First Amendment injury.” 604 In
Sorrell, however, the respondents claimed that the statute
burdened “their own speech.” 605 This argument, the Court
said, found support in the individual opinions in United
Reporting asserting that selective government disclosures of
information to certain recipients “can facilitate or burden the
expression of potential recipients and so transgress the First
Amendment.” 606 The Court then went on to strike the law
down. 607
6. McBurney v. Young (2013)
At issue in McBurney v. Young was Virginia’s state
freedom of information law and whether its requirement that
a requester be a citizen of the Commonwealth violated the
600. Id. at 567–68.
601. Id. at 568.
602. Id.
603. Id. (quoting L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S.
32, 41 (1999)).
604. Id. at 569.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 580.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause. 608 The Court rejected
what it called “petitioners’ sweeping claim that the
challenged provision of the Virginia FOIA violate[d] the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because it denie[d] them
the right to access public information on equal terms with
citizens of the Commonwealth.” 609 Citing Houchins and
United Reporting, the Court said that it had “repeatedly
made clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all
the information provided by FOIA laws.” 610
II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE FIGHT OVER A
“GENERAL RULE”
On its face, this history begs as many questions as it
answers. In cases like Houchins, United Reporting, and
McBurney, the Court or its members concluded that there is
no constitutional right of access. Yet, in Richmond
Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and the Press-Enterprise
Cases, the Court expressly recognized such a right. 611 It,
however, never reconciled these apparently disparate
results. As Solicitor General Archibald Cox observed shortly
after the Court decided Richmond Newspapers, Burger’s
plurality opinion in that case made “no effort to square the
ruling with the rationale of Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.” 612 Nor did it refer to “the Chief
Justice’s own opinion just two years before in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.” “Surely,” he wrote, “some effort to explain the
608. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013).
609. Id. at 232.
610. Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality
opinion); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40
(1999); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 588 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
611. El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1992)
(admitting that the constitutional issues surrounding the right of access were
“fuliginous”).
612. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1980).
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relation between the decision in Richmond Newspapers and
those earlier cases was required.” 613
The Court, however, left litigants and lower courts with
mixed signals. For example, while Stevens recognized in
Richmond Newspapers that “the Court unequivocally holds
that an arbitrary interference with access to important
information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and
of the press protected by the First Amendment,” this
observation was, at best, “wishful thinking.” 614 Richmond
Newspapers did not speak for “the Court”; it was a plurality,
five concurring opinions, and a dissent—hardly the kind of
bedrock in which to bury a constitutional principle. And,
certainly, other Justices did not believe that the opinion
reached so far. As one court aptly observed just months after
the decision came down, “Because the seven opinions . . . are
so badly fragmented on the precise rationale of the Court’s
holding,” it was “impossible to predict” the effect of
Richmond Newspapers. 615
Still, two years later in Globe Newspaper, the Court
recognized a right of access under the First Amendment
based on republican values. 616 The access right, the majority
declared, existed “to ensure that this constitutionally
protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an informed
one.” 617 In doing so, the Globe Newspaper majority must have
overruled the Houchins plurality’s contrary conclusions
albeit implicitly. But on the facts, Globe Newspaper, like
Richmond Newspapers, dealt only with the right of access to
613. Id.
614. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Cox, supra note 612, at 21; see also Lillian R. BeVier, Like
Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 311–12 (1982) (“Justice Stevens’ statement may be neither
a fair reading of the holding nor an accurate accounting of the noses of his
brethren.”).
615. Redding v. Jacobsen, 638 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah 1981).
616. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
617. Id. at 605.
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criminal trials. While its reasoning is not obviously limited
to such facts, the Court never applied it outside that context.
And although Brennan helpfully sought to put an end to
Houchins by endorsing the Houchins dissenters in Footnote
13, he was forced to excise it when White and Blackmun
protested.
Nor do the Court’s later cases offer much in way of
clarification. In the Press-Enterprise Cases, Burger did not
always speak in the same doctrinal language as Brennan had
in Globe Newspaper. This reticence foreshadowed the Court’s
later concern over the theoretical reach of the access right,
as evidenced by United Reporting and McBurney. But as the
Court explained in Sorrell, the “United Reporting . . . Court
did not rule on the merits of any First Amendment claim.” 618
And, in McBurney, the question was not whether the First
Amendment right of access existed, but rather whether it
was protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 619
True enough, the Court said that it had “repeatedly made
clear that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the
information provided by FOIA laws.” 620 But, as in United
Reporting, this appears to be nothing more than obiter
dictum.

618. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011). Prior scholarly
discussions of Houchins and United Reporting did not have the benefit Sorrell.
See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards A Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information
Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 301–02 (2004) (surmise as to United Reporting’s curt
treatment of the access). Nor did early access cases. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec.
Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (relying on United
Reporting’s invocation of Houchins to find no right of access); Copley Press, Inc.
v. Superior Ct., 141 P.3d 288, 308 (Cal. 2006) (same). Other later accounts failed
to recognize the import of Sorrell on United Reporting’s dicta. See David S. Ardia,
Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835, 849–50
(2017) (incorrectly characterizing United Reporting as “removing any doubt that
the First Amendment might encompass the right to demand this information
from the government”).
619. McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 233 (2013) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell,
6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825)).
620. Id.
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So it is not surprising that circuit splits and even intracircuit splits exist concerning whether the Houchins line of
cases or the Richmond Newspapers line provides the general
rule for assessing claimed rights of access. This split pits the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, D.C. Circuits against
the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits. What is more, both the Sixth and the Ninth have
issued conflicting decisions over the years. 621 In short, the
considerable ambiguity in the Court’s jurisprudence makes
ad hoc decision-making commonplace—obfuscating the
underlying doctrine and inhibiting its development.
A. The Richmond Newspapers Line as the “General Rule”
The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all found that the Richmond Newspapers line
of cases control to the exclusion of Houchins. As a result,
these circuits have applied the reasoning of Richmond
Newspapers’ history and logic test to all sorts of government
information and proceedings outside of the limited context of
criminal trials: police operations on public streets, a town
planning
meeting,
a
quasi-judicial
administrative
proceeding, horse roundups on federal lands, executions and
information relating to them, voter lists, search warrant
information, deportation proceedings, and judicial review
boards, among others. In doing so, they have not felt
constrained by Houchins or the Court’s later cases endorsing
it.
For example, in the 2020 case Index Newspapers LLC v.
U.S. Marshals Service, the Ninth Circuit confronted the
question of whether legal observers and reporters had a right
of access to the streets and sidewalks during Black Lives

621. The Third Circuit similarly issued an opinion seemingly conflicting with
its prior decisions. See Marinaccio v. East Hanover Bd. Police Dep’t, No. 20-2677,
2022 WL 964000, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2022). That case, however, was brought
pro se and resulted only in a non-precedential per curiam opinion. As such, it is
not separately reviewed herein.
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Matter protests. 622 In denying the government’s motion for a
stay pending appeal, the court found that it had not shown
that it was likely to defeat the claimed right of access.
According to the panel, Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny “articulated a two-part test to determine whether a
member of the public has a First Amendment right to access
a particular place and process” and that test controlled the
case. 623 This resolution was consistent with the Ninth
Circuit’s broad application of the Richmond Newspapers line
to “government activities” generally but inconsistent with
Houchins, which the panel did not address. 624
In Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West
Whiteland, the Third Circuit invoked the Court’s observation
in Globe Newspaper that “a ‘major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.’” 625 Applying that logic, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had a “constitutional right of
access to the Planning Commission meeting.” 626 In so
holding, it found that whether such a right existed depended
on whether the history and logic test from the Richmond
Newspapers was satisfied. 627 And, it reframed Houchins not
as setting forth a general rule that no right of access existed,
but as not presenting a context that satisfied the later-

622. 977 F.3d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 2020).
623. Id. (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986)).
624. See, e.g., Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To provide
this First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has long recognized a
qualified right of access for the press and public to observe government
activities.”) (horse roundups on federal land); Cal. First Amend. Coal. v.
Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (executions); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (voter lists); see also Wood v.
Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (access to information relating to execution),
vacated, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
625. 193 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)).
626. Id. at 180–81.
627. Id. at 181.
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adopted two-part test. 628 The Third Circuit would later
reaffirm this view: “Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly
applicable to issues of access to government proceedings.” 629
As it later said, “These three cases—Richmond Newspapers,
Globe, and Press-Enterprise—set out a balancing test for
evaluating whether a right of access to information about
government bodies, their processes, and their decision
exists.” 630
The Second Circuit, in New York Civil Liberties Union v.
N.Y.C. Transit Authority, also found that Richmond
Newspapers controlled over Houchins. 631 There, in finding
the right of access applied to New York City Transit
Authority proceedings, the court observed that Globe
Newspaper read “Richmond Newspapers broadly.” 632 It
mattered not that the proceedings at issue in the present
case were not “trials,” because the “public access cases”
focused “not on formalistic descriptions of the government
proceeding but on the kind of work the proceeding actually
does and on the First Amendment principles at stake.” 633 In
other words, the Richmond Newspapers test controlled
because what mattered was “the importance of access to
public participation and to government accountability—
values, the courts have emphasized, that are central to
democracy.” 634 The panel never cited Houchins.
In In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside
Office of Gunn, the question for the Eighth Circuit was
whether a right of access applied to documents relating to

628. Id. at 182; see also First Amend. Coal. v. Jud. Inquiry & Rev. Bd., 784 F.2d
467 (3d Cir.1986) (applying two-part test to judicial review board materials).
629. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2002)
(deportation proceedings).
630. PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (voting process).
631. 684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2012).
632. Id. at 298.
633. Id. at 299.
634. Id.
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the issuance of a search warrant. 635 While the documents at
issue were “not part of the criminal trial itself,” the panel
found that the right of access nevertheless applied because
“public access to documents filed in support of search
warrants is important to the public’s understanding of the
function and operation of the judicial process and the
criminal justice system and may operate as a curb on
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct.” 636 Like the Second
Circuit, the panel did not cite Houchins. Consistent with In
re Search Warrant, the Eighth Circuit would later assume
that the history and logic test applied to other contexts, like
information relating to executions. 637
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Detroit Free Press
sought access to deportation proceedings in the aftermath of
9/11, and the Sixth Circuit held that “Richmond Newspapers
is a test of generally applicability.” 638 The court
distinguished Houchins, a case “decided two years before
Richmond Newspapers,” as deciding only whether the press
had a special right of access to prisons. 639 Moreover,
Houchins rested on “the Court’s interpretation of the press
clause,” was merely a plurality opinion, and the “policy
reasons underlying the Court’s plurality opinion in
Houchins” were all addressed by the two-part history and
logic test. 640 The Sixth Circuit’s ruling was in line with its
historically broad interpretation of the access right. 641
Finally,

in

Wellons

v.

Commissioner,

Georgia

635. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
636. Id. at 573.
637. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1112 (8th Cir. 2015) (assuming two-part
test applied to execution materials, but not deciding the question).
638. 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002); see also In re Search of Fair Fin., 692
F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying two-part test to search warrant
documents).
639. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002).
640. Id. at 694–95.
641. See, e.g., United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Department of Corrections, an Eleventh Circuit case, an
inmate argued that the refusal of the state to provide him
with information about his execution denied “him his First
Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings.” 642
Citing the Richmond Newspapers line of cases, the Eleventh
Circuit explained, “When determining whether the public
has a First Amendment right of access to a particular
governmental proceeding, reviewing courts must inquire into
two ‘complementary considerations’” of history and logic. 643
But it found that the inmate had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success. 644
B. Houchins as the “General Rule”
On the other side of the balance, the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have found that Houchins
controls. Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also applied
Houchins despite contrary precedent in those circuits. And,
in many instances, these courts have been outright hostile to
any suggestion that a constitutional right of access might
exist.
The D.C. Circuit has been the most skeptical. In Center
for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice,
various non-profits sought access to information in the
possession of the federal government relating to post-9/11
arrests. 645 While the case was primarily a Freedom of
Information Act case, the plaintiffs also argued that the First
Amendment provided a right of access. 646 The panel,
however, characterized the right of access in Richmond
Newspapers as a “narrow” one that did “not extend to nonjudicial documents that are not part of a criminal trial, such

642. 754 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014).
643. Id.
644. Id. at 1267.
645. 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
646. Id. at 934.
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as the investigatory documents at issue here.” 647 Relying on
the Houchins plurality and the Stewart concurrence, it
added that “the First Amendment does not ‘mandate[] a right
of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.’” 648
Although it went on to admit that the Court “expanded
this limited right” after Richmond Newspapers, the Court
never “applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside the
context of criminal judicial proceedings.” 649 It added
(inaccurately) that neither it nor the Court ever indicated
that the Richmond Newspapers two-part test applied outside
of criminal proceedings. 650 Citing United Reporting,
moreover, it explained that “to the extent the Supreme Court
has addressed the constitutional right of access to
information outside the criminal trial context, the Court has
applied the general rule of Houchins, not Richmond
Newspapers.” 651 Thus, the panel concluded, “We will not
convert the First Amendment right of access to criminal
judicial proceedings into a requirement that the government
disclose information compiled during the exercise of a
quintessential executive power—the investigation and
prevention of terrorism.” 652
The Fifth Circuit has also found Houchins controlling. In
Calder v. IRS, a university professor sought access to IRS
records relating to Al Capone. 653 The professor argued under
Richmond Newspapers that the First Amendment included
647. Id.
648. Id. (quoting Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion);
id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
649. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 935.
650. Id. But see In re Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325,
1332 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying Richmond Newspapers in civil context).
651. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 935 (citing L.A. Police Dep’t v. United
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999)).
652. Id.; see also Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(characterizing Houchins as the “general rule”).
653. 890 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1989).
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“a right of access to records in the hands of an administrative
agency which have historically been available for public
perusal.” 654 The Fifth Circuit disagreed. While it recognized
that Richmond Newspapers indicated that the First
Amendment prohibits the “‘government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may
draw,” it pointed to O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Globe
Newspaper where she explained that Richmond Newspapers
carried no implications outside of criminal trials and that the
Court had never applied the two-part test outside the
criminal context. 655 Finally, pointing to Houchins, it
concluded that there was “no constitutional right to have
access to particular government information.” 656
In 2019, the Fourth Circuit agreed that Houchins sets
forth the “general rule.” 657 In a case seeking access to voter
lists, the panel explained that “there is no general First
Amendment right to access a government record.” 658 Rather,
citing Houchins, it observed, “The Supreme Court has ruled
that the First Amendment does not ‘guarantee the public a
right of access to information generated or controlled by
government.’” 659 It explained that Richmond Newspapers
only created a “narrow exception” to Houchins. 660 But that
exception, it held (inconsistent with its prior precedent), was
limited to criminal proceedings and, therefore, had “no

654. Id. at 783.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 784 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)
(plurality opinion)); see also Bonnet v. Ward County, Tex., 539 Fed. Appx. 481,
483 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Houchins); Sullo & Bobbitt, P.L.L.C. v. Milner,
765 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); ACLU of Miss., Inc. v. Mississippi, 911
F.2d 1066, 1071–72 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
657. Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 250 (4th Cir. 2019).
658. Id.
659. Id. at 249 (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
660. Id. at 250.
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bearing” on the claimed right of access in that case. 661
Other circuits have taken this approach too. In Travis v.
Reno, the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which limited disclosure of
certain driver licensing records. 662 Pointing to Houchins, the
panel explained that “[p]eering into public records is not part
of the ‘freedom of speech’ that the first amendment
protects.” 663 It added, “No one thinks that the Privacy Act
violates the first amendment. Well, maybe these plaintiffs do
think this, but the position is untenable.” 664 Distinguishing
Richmond Newspapers, the panel explained that perhaps “in
the future,” i.e., in litigation, some records might become
subject to the “access rights connected to the judicial
process.” 665 But, the facial attack on the law was “not the
time or place to explore the subject.” 666 The Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed this holding in 2015, emphasizing in light of
United Reporting and McBurney that Travis was correctly
decided. 667
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit departed from its holding in
Detroit Free Press that Richmond Newspapers provided the
general rule. 668 In Phillips v. Dewine, death row inmates
challenged a law that secreted information relating to lethal
injections. Rejecting that claim, the panel (in violation of the
661. Id. But see Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting
that it was “well settled” that Richmond Newspapers applied to civil proceedings).
662. 163 F.3d 1000, 1000 (1998).
663. Id. at 1007.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id.; see also United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citing Houchins for the proposition that “there is no general constitutional ‘right
of access’ to information that a governmental official knows but has not released
to the public”); City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 784 (7th
Cir. 2005) (citing Houchins as support for the general proposition).
667. Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 2015).
668. Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that prior
precedent bound subsequent panels absent en banc hearing).
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prior precedent rule) said that Houchins “sets the baseline
principle for First Amendment claims seeking access to
information held by the government.” 669 The panel added
that Richmond Newspapers created only an “exception” to
Houchins. 670 It then concluded, “Finding that the Plaintiffs
have stated a valid claim under Richmond Newspapers
would, of necessity, disregard the general applicability of
Houchins and represent a significant—and unwarranted—
expansion of the right of access under the First
Amendment.” 671
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit did the same, issuing two
opinions within two weeks arriving at two different results.
First, it issued Index Newspapers LLC, mentioned above,
which broadly applied the Richmond Newspapers framework
to a right of access to public streets during protests. 672 But
then, it issued Boardman v. Inslee, a case about a right of
access to certain state records. 673 There, it adopted Houchins
as the general rule, explaining that the plaintiffs
acknowledged “(as they must) that they have no First
Amendment right of access to Provider Information and that
Washington lawmakers have the political prerogative to
‘decide not to give out [this] information at all without
violating the First Amendment.’” 674
The

First

Circuit

has

also

limited

Richmond

669. 841 F.3d 405, 418 (6th Cir. 2016).
670. Id. (quoting In re Search of Fair Fin., 692 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2012)).
671. Id. at 419–20; see also S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty.,
499 F.3d 553, 560 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Because the case law discussing access to
judicial proceedings is based on the unique issues that arise in that context, this
framework is inapplicable to the case at bar,” which did not concern such
proceedings) (citation omitted); Manogg v. Stickle, 181 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1999)
(applying Houchins in finding no right of access to township meeting).
672. Index Newspapers L.L.C. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 829 (9th
Cir. 2020) (applying two-part test and holding that press had a right of access to
streets and sidewalks even where dispersal orders had been made).
673. 978 F.3d 1092, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020).
674. Id. (quoting L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S.
32, 40 (1999)).
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Newspapers’ application. In El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon,
the issue was whether a law signed by the governor of Puerto
Rico abridged a newspaper’s “First Amendment right of
informational access.” 675 The panel found that it did not. It
distinguished the right of access in Richmond Newspapers,
which it said governed access to “records and proceedings
connected to the criminal justice system,” and Houchins,
which governed the “right of access to Executive Branch
documents.” 676 The panel then “seriously question[ed]
whether Richmond Newspapers and its progeny carry
positive implications favoring rights of access outside the
criminal justice system.” 677 Future panels agreed. 678
The Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in
Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colorado. 679 There, the
issue was whether a statute prohibiting disclosure of agency
records relating to driving while intoxicated charges was
constitutional. 680 Concluding it was, the panel found that
Houchins set forth the general rule: “there is no
constitutional right, and specifically no First Amendment
right, of access to government records.” 681 Distinguishing
Richmond Newspapers, the panel said that the limited right
of access recognized in that case was only “implicated in
relation to the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and public
trial.” 682 It then stated, “To hold that these principles provide
for access to any criminal justice record which happens to
675. 963 F.2d 488, 491 (1st Cir. 1992).
676. Id. at 494–95.
677. Id. at 495.
678. In re Bos. Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2003) (“There is no
general constitutional right of access to information in the government’s
possession.”); Lu v. Emergency Shelter Comm’n of Bos., 2 Fed. Appx. 12, 14 (1st
Cir. 2001)
679. 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
680. Id. at 1510.
681. Id. at 1511 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
682. Id. at 1512.
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contain a defendant’s address and/or phone number and
which is sought for that reason alone would stretch them well
beyond their current bounds.” 683 Subsequent precedent in
that circuit is in accord. 684
III. DOES HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC. MATTER?
This circuit survey demonstrates that while many
circuits have held that the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases controls and establishes the general rule for
constitutional right of access cases, arguably more have held
that the Houchins line of cases controls. In other words, a
three-Justice plurality opinion is prevailing over several
majority opinions. Surprisingly, Houchins’ import has,
rarely, been interrogated. 685 True, as one publication noted
early on, “Much constitutional [access] jurisprudence has
poured over the dam since [the 1970s].” 686 But there is little
critical analysis in this torrent as courts often just invoke the
absolutist rule in Houchins much as courts before them had
been seduced by the “strict and flat result” in Gannett. 687
And, true, there is also much scholarship relating to the
constitutional right of access. But much of it is outdated. 688
683. Id.
684. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Kelly, 9 F.4th 1219, 1237 (10th Cir. 2021)
(crediting Houchins as “precedent”); Allen v. Lang, 738 Fed. Appx. 934, 939 (10th
Cir. 2018); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1178 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
Richmond Newspapers “not particularly relevant” where request was not for civil
or criminal judicial records); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1260 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is no First Amendment right of access to government
processes in general.”).
685. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond:
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 95, 168 (2004) (observing that “few scholarly works . . . critically” examine
the right of access cases).
686. There Are Many Things That You Can Do When the Supreme Court Is
Wrong, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 209, 209 (2015).
687. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 US 368, 406 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
688. See infra note 804. The most cited of these assessments is Eugene
Cerruti’s “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access
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Moreover, this scholarship largely fails to undertake a
searching examination of Houchins and its interplay with
the Richmond Newspapers line of cases.
This Part fills that gap. First, it scrutinizes Houchins
itself. It observes that Houchins related only to the existence
of a special right of access held by the media, its analysis was
limited to the Press Clause, and it presupposed some level of
public access. Second, this Part explores what precedential
weight should be given to Houchins. It asserts that Houchins
provides no binding rule as it lacks a controlling opinion
under Marks v. United States. 689 It also questions the
precedential weight of a three-Justice plurality in a case
where only seven-Justices participated. Third, it assesses
Houchins within the Court’s broader right of access cannon
and suggests that subsequent case law displaced Houchins.
Finally, it contends that Houchins should not, as a normative
matter, be viewed as controlling because it is staggeringly
undemocratic.
A. The Narrow Premises of Houchins
There are three reasons to doubt that Houchins matters
on its own terms. Initially, a general right of access was not
at issue in Houchins. Instead, the case was about the
existence of a special right of access for the press above that
of the public. Relatedly, the issue was not whether a right of
access existed under the Free Speech Clause or the First
Amendment generally, but instead whether the press was
owed special treatment under the Press Clause. Moreover,
Houchins was not a case about the total exclusion of the
Opens A New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237 (1995). Cerruti’s treatment of these
issues is dealt with sporadically in the margins. Another influential piece is
Lillian BeVier’s digest of Richmond Newspapers shortly after the Court issued
that opinion, which deals with the tension between that case and Houchins. See
BeVier, supra note 614. And, there is David Ardia’s article, which assumes that
Houchins matters without interrogating whether it should. See Ardia, supra note
618, at 865.
689. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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press. The press in Houchins, in fact, had substantial access
to the jail so the case should not be viewed as greenlighting
the complete exclusion of the press and the public from
government proceedings or information.
1. A General Right of Access Was Not at Issue in
Houchins
The issue in Houchins was whether the news media,
which, along with the public, already had access to the Santa
Rita jail, could force Houchins to provide it special access to
still more of the jail. The Court found that it could not. Thus,
the holding in Houchins is this: “the media have no special
right of access to the Alameda County Jail different from or
greater than that accorded the public generally.” 690
Houchins, however, is rarely cited for this proposition.
Instead, Houchins’ lasting contribution to access
jurisprudence is what it did not hold, namely, as the plurality
put it, that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within the
government’s control.” 691 Or, as Stewart explained in his
opinion concurring in judgment: “The First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to
information generated or controlled by government.” 692
But both statements are dicta. As an unsigned student
note for the Harvard Law Review explained at the time,
“General pronouncements in the plurality opinion that seem
to deny any public right clearly should be read in context as
denying anyone special rights, since only this latter issue was
argued and analyzed, and the district court’s order granted
injunctive relief only to representatives of the media.” 693 Nor
is this wishful spin from a pro-access academic in waiting.
690. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (plurality opinion).
691. Id. at 15.
692. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
693. Media Right of Access, supra note 185, at 183–84 (emphasis added).
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Instead, it was to-be Chief Justice John Roberts who wrote
that note, recognizing that Houchins’ dicta was nothing more
than “tangential” treatment of a question otherwise avoided
in the case. 694
This analysis is supported by language in Houchins
itself. On nearly a dozen occasions, these opinions remind the
reader that the plurality and Stewart viewed the issue solely
as a special right of access case:
“The question presented is whether the news media have
a constitutional right of access to a county jail, over and
above that of other persons;” 695
“From the right to gather news and the right to receive
information, they argue for an implied special right of access
to government-controlled sources of information;” 696
“[N]othing in the Court’s holding [in Grosjean] implied a
special privilege of access to information as distinguished
from a right to publish information which has been
obtained;” 697
“[T]he Court [in Mills] did not remotely imply a
constitutional right guaranteeing anyone access to
government information beyond that open to the public
generally;” 698
“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally;” 699

694. William Bennett Turner, Chief Justice Roberts’ Surprising Views on the
Public’s
Right
to
Know,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(Feb.
19,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-chief-justice-robertssurprising-views-on-the-publics-right-to-know; see also Media Right of Access,
supra note 185, at 180.
695. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
696. Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
697. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
698. Id. (emphasis added).
699. Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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“In [Pell and Saxbe,] the Court declared, explicitly and
without reservation, that the media have ‘no constitutional
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that
afforded the general public;’” 700
“The issue is a claimed special privilege of access which
the Court rejected in Pell and Saxbe, a right which is not
essential to guarantee the freedom to communicate or
publish;” 701
“Under our holdings in Pell v. Procunier, supra, and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., supra, until the political
branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the media
have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail
different from or greater than that accorded the public
generally;” 702 and
“The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not . . .
guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to that
of the public generally.” 703
Burger’s and Stewart’s emphasis on the special right of
access is also consistent with their questioning at oral
argument. Beginning the argument, counsel for Houchins,
Kevin Booty, explained that the question presented was
“must the sheriff give greater access to his county jail facility
to the media than he gives to the public?”. 704 When asked
whether Houchins could have entirely excluded the press
and the public, Booty responded, “[W]ith respect, that is not
before you.” He added, “KQED’s position [below] . . . was
that, we have to have special things for the media, we tried
it as a media access case, not a public access case.” 705
Other Justices agreed. As White said at argument, “The
700. Id. (emphasis added).
701. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
702. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added).
703. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
704. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 0:45.
705. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 16:15.
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only issue is whether this injunction is giving a special
privilege to the press is constitutionally required?” 706 Turner
attempted to reframe those questions by saying that “we do
not want a special privilege, what we want is access
sufficient to prevent concealment of the conditions.” 707
White, however, rebuffed him, “Oh! I know but that is what
you have got and if you say you are defending the Court of
Appeals opinion you must defend that proposition.” 708
The drafting process also confirms that Houchins was a
case about a special right of access for the media. 709 Burger
originally posed the question presented in his first draft
opinion as “whether the First Amendment gives the news
media the right of access to a county jail” at all. 710 In his later
draft, however, he changed the question presented from a
general right of access to whether the press had a right of
access “over and above that of other persons.” 711 He also
changed the holding in his first draft from one rejecting a
right of access to government information to a holding in
later drafts that the First Amendment did “not provide a
right of access . . . different from or greater than that of the
public generally.” 712
While to-be Chief Justice Roberts did not have the
benefit of insight into the drafting process, he was correct in
his assessment: “In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court once
again announced that the press enjoyed no special right of
access beyond that of the public, but did nothing to clarify
what right, if any, the public had.” 713 Simply, in Houchins,
the Court did “not dispose of the more fundamental issue of
706. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 51:02.
707. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 51:11.
708. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 51:17.
709. See supra notes 169–82 and accompanying text.
710. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 1st Draft, supra note 151, at 1.
711. Warren Burger, Majority Opinion, 2d Draft, supra note 168, at 1.
712. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
713. Media Right of Access, supra note 185, at 175.
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what must be open to the public generally.” 714 In fact, to
Roberts, “far from rejecting any first amendment right of
public access, certain characteristics of the plurality opinion
seem to imply the existence of such a right.” 715 Burger, he
wrote, “went to considerable lengths . . . to list the range of
alternative means of access to information about prisons
available to the public,” which “would have been irrelevant if
there were indeed no right of access, and the sheriff could
have completely sealed off the prison from the public.” 716
Moreover, within a year of Houchins being handed down,
a majority of the Court in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale
ratified the belief that Houchins decided only whether there
was a special right of access of the news media. 717 Citing Pell,
Saxbe, and Houchins, the Court observed that in each case it
had “upheld prison regulations that denied to members of the
press access to prisons superior to that afforded to the public
generally.” 718 It then explicitly reserved judgment on the
question of whether to recognize a First Amendment right to
attend criminal trials. In fact, citing the Houchins dissenters
and his own opinion in Houchins, Stewart explained that
some “Members of the Court . . . took the position in those
cases that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
guarantee to the public in general . . . a right of access that
precludes their complete exclusion in the absence of a
significant governmental interest.” 719 If Houchins really had
decided the question of whether a right of access existed at
714. Id. at 184.
715. Id.
716. Id. at 184–85; see also supra text accompanying note 216; Closure of
Pretrial Proceedings, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 68 n.50 (1979) (citing Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)); see also Elizabeth Alexander, The New Prison
Administrators and the Court: New Directions in Prison Law, 56 TEX. L. REV. 963,
1001 (1978) (“The Court has not yet ruled definitively on whether the first
amendment encompasses a public right of access to information within the
control of the government.”).
717. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
718. Id. at 391.
719. Id. at 391–92.

1440

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

all, there would be no reason for the Court to later reserve
that question in Gannett. 720
Stewart, Gannett’s author and an author of the Houchins
dicta seemingly foreclosing the question reserved, was in a
better position than anyone to say what Houchins meant.
Yet, lower courts have largely overlooked Gannett’s effect on
any interpretation of Houchins. In one rare example though,
a group of dissenting judges sitting en banc in Capital Cities
Media, Inc. v. Chester, explained, “[I]t is clear from [Gannett]
that there was no majority support for any dicta in Houchins
that the first amendment did not protect the public’s right of
access to governmental information.” 721 The only issue at
stake in Houchins, they said, was whether the First
Amendment mandated “a preferred position for the press.” 722
Commentators have come to the same conclusion. For
example, one observed of Houchins’ broad dicta: “Although it
has been suggested that ‘[t]he Constitution itself is neither a
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act,’ . . .
the Court has neither persuasively argued this idea nor
relied on it in the holding of a case; statements of this idea
can be found only as conclusory dicta.” 723 As another noted,
“the Houchins approach has never been adopted by a
majority of the Court.” 724 At most, as Heidi Kitrosser has
explained, Houchins “inched closer to an outright rejection of
access” in some of its “bolder dicta.” 725 But, she too agreed
that “Houchins’ holding . . . can be construed simply as
720. Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“this Court emphatically has
rejected the proposition”).
721. 797 F.2d 1164, 1188 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
722. Id.
723. The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89 YALE
L.J. 923, 939 n.50 (1980) (emphasis added) (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1, 14–15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)).
724. Michael J. Hayes, What Ever Happened to “The Right to Know”?: Access
to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1138 (1987).
725. Kitrosser, supra note 685, at 104.
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rejecting ‘special’ press access rights.” 726
Still, the fact remains that few courts have ever
recognized that Houchins’ statements about a constitutional
right of access generally—separate from a special right of
access for the press—are dicta. True, the same group of Third
Circuit judges in Capital Cities Media characterized those
broader statements as such, but their colleagues in the
majority elevated these statements to a holding: “A majority
of the seven judge Court in Houchins held that there is no
First Amendment right of press access to government-held
information and, in the process, rejected the idea of a First
Amendment right of public access.” 727 In fact, every federal
appellate court has carelessly bandied around Houchins’
dicta as a holding of the Court at one time or another. 728
This is problematic. Dicta is a “judicial comment made
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” 729
It thus eschews Article III’s case and controversy
requirement. 730 As RonNell Andersen Jones has explained,
issuing dicta is beyond the Supreme Court’s “constitutional
job description.” 731 Nor should dicta be “given the

726. Id.
727. Cap. Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1172 (3d Cir. 1986).
728. See In re Bos. Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2003); Ladeairous
v. Att’y Gen. of N.Y., 592 F. App’x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2015); Bonnet v. Ward County.,
539 F. App’x 481, 483 (5th Cir. 2013); Cap. Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d
1164, 1167, 1171–73 (3d Cir. 1986); Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 249–50 (4th
Cir. 2019); Sullo & Bobbitt, P.L.L.C. v. Milner, 765 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2014);
S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir.
2007); City of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2005);
Entler v. McKenna, 487 F. App’x 417, 418 (9th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d
1167, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498,
1513 (11th Cir. 1992); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
729. Dictum, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
730. RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L.
REV. 705, 720 (2014).
731. Id.
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precedential weight of holdings precisely because of this
substantial justiciability flaw.” 732 For good reason: the Court
is in a particularly poor position to decide questions that are
not directly before it.
The point need not be belabored. It is settled that
excessive use of dicta “presents risks to the accuracy,
authority, and legitimacy of the law.” 733 Such dicta are “less
carefully considered and less thoroughly reasoned than
holdings and are, by definition, less accurate reflections of
the state of the law.” 734 They also “undermine[] the rule of
law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity, and
second by inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine.” 735
As Chief Justice John Marshall explained long ago: “It is a
maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, . . .
[i]f they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the
very point is presented for decision.” 736
An overreliance on the Houchins dicta proves precisely
why dicta should be treated as such. Houchins speaks in
absolutist terms: “Neither the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within the
government’s control.” 737 This is potent dicta. If followed
uncritically, colorable claims of access must be rejected out
of hand irrespective of whether competing interests in one
case are different than those in Houchins. For example, what
if the exclusion of press access came only after allegations of
mistreatment were made public? But absolute rules leave
little room for nuance. This is exactly why the Court should
“not decide important questions of law by cursory dicta,”
732. Id. at 720–21.
733. Id. at 721.
734. Id.
735. Id.
736. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
737. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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especially cursory but sweeping dicta. 738
2. Houchins Was a Press Clause Case
A consequence of properly situating Houchins as a case
about the special right of access is the concomitant
recognition that Houchins was not a case about the First
Amendment generally—as were Richmond Newspaper and
Globe Newspaper—but rather about the Press Clause.
Specifically, it was a case about whether the Press Clause
provided special constitutional protection to the press as an
institution. As the plurality framed KQED’s argument at the
outset, “They argue that there is a constitutionally
guaranteed right to gather news . . . . From the right to
gather news and the right to receive information, they argue
for an implied special right of access to governmentcontrolled sources of information. This right, they contend,
compels access as a constitutional matter.” 739
In Houchins then, the Court focused its analysis on other
Press Clause cases like Grosjean v. American Press Co., Mills
v. Alabama, and Branzburg v. Hayes. 740 For example, it
explained that while Branzburg observed that “‘news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”
it “in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news
sources.” 741 Instead, the Branzburg Court found that “‘the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally’” and that “‘[n]ewsmen have
no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded.’” 742
Burger and the plurality also found Pell v. Procunier and
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., two other Press Clause cases,
738. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 775 (1968).
739. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 7–8 (first and second emphases added).
740. 297 U.S. 233 (1936); 384 U.S. 214 (1966); 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
741. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 10.
742. Id. at 11 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–85).
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controlling. 743 As the plurality explained, “In those cases the
Court declared, explicitly and without reservation, that the
media have ‘no constitutional right of access to prisons or
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.’” 744 It
was “on that premise” that the Court found against the press
in those earlier cases. 745 As Burger emphasized quoting
Stewart’s law review article Or of the Press: “‘The public’s
interest in knowing about its government is protected by the
guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.’” 746
Stewart too rested on the Press Clause in his concurring
opinion, invoking what he called the “constitutional role of
the press.” 747 Emphasizing a point made in his law review
article, he wrote, “That the First Amendment speaks
separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is
no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the
critical role played by the press in American society.” 748 As
to the press, he explained, the inclusion of the Press Clause
in the Constitution required “sensitivity” to “that role.” 749
At least one federal appellate court has cabined
Houchins on these grounds. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,
the Sixth Circuit found that Richmond Newspapers provided
the controlling standard because “Houchins rested its
holding on the Court’s interpretation of the press clause, a
First Amendment clause distinct from the speech clause,”
which was at issue in that case. 750 Similarly, a district court
743. Id. (citing 417 U.S. 817 (1974); 417 U.S. 843 (1974)).
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 14 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,
636 (1975)). It was that guarantee that Stewart spoke about in what he called
“an inquiry into an aspect of constitutional law,” separate from the Free Speech
Clause, “that has only recently begun to engage” the Court’s attention. Stewart,
supra, at 631.
747. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 19 (Stewart, J., concurring).
748. Id. at 17.
749. Id.
750. 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Phillips v.
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recognized the narrow question addressed in Houchins: “The
Supreme Court has ruled out a right of access based on the
freedom of the press guarantee standing alone. This court
will follow the Supreme Court, as it must, and not base the
right of access solely on the freedom of the press guarantee
of the first amendment.” 751
Houchins thus answers a different question (the
existence of a special right of access for the press) than the
Richmond Newspapers line of cases does (whether there
exists a right of access at all). This distinction is important.
As Brennan recognized in his Richmond Newspapers
concurrence, “A conceptually separate, yet related, question
is whether the media should enjoy greater access rights than
the general public.” 752 But, Brennan added, “no such
contention is at stake here.” 753
Still, it is not surprising that courts conflate the two. As
Brennan also recognized, “As a practical matter . . . the
institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary
of a right of access because it serves as the ‘agent’ of
interested citizens, and funnels information about trials to a
large number of individuals.” 754 It was, ultimately, the press
bringing the claims in both cases, and the underlying remedy
sought in each was more access. That the cases appear
similar in these generalities makes it easy to lose sight of
DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 427 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., dissenting).
751. Soc’y of Pro. Journalists v. Sec’y of Lab., 616 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D. Utah
1985) (citations omitted). Scholars generally agree with this view of Houchins.
See, e.g., Harlan Grant Cohen, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History:
Deportation Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1431, 1438 n.2 (2003) (“In Houchins, the Court held that the First
Amendment ‘press clause’ did not grant the media ‘a constitutional right of access
to a county jail, over and above that of other persons . . . . ‘“) (quoting Houchins,
438 U.S. at 3); Christopher R. Edgar, The Right to Freedom of Expressive
Association and the Press, 55 STAN. L. REV. 191, 239 n.174 (2002).
752. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
753. Id.
754. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

1446

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

their differences in the specifics. Nevertheless, it is in those
specifics that we find that Houchins and Richmond
Newspapers resolved different questions, the former relating
to special access, the latter relating to access generally.
3. Houchins Presupposed Some Level of Access
Other facets of Houchins further diminish its
precedential reach: Houchins did not condone the complete
exclusion of the press—the holding for which it is so often
cited today. On the contrary, as the plurality catalogued,
Houchins adopted regulations that provided “various means
by which information concerning the jail could reach the
public.” 755 This included corresponding through mail,
participating in visitation, and making phone calls to
inmates. Inmates could “send an unlimited number of letters
to judges, attorneys, elected officials, the Attorney General,
petitioner, jail officials, or probation officers,” and “all
persons, including representatives of the media, who knew a
prisoner could visit him.” 756 And Houchins had established
tours for both the public and the press, providing “limited
access” to the jail, including Little Greystone. 757
Not only was public access provided in Houchins, but
Houchins’ counsel did not even argue that Houchins could
simply revoke access entirely and avoid constitutional
scrutiny. In fact, in an exchange with Rehnquist during
argument, he contended the opposite:
Rehnquist: When you say the public right, are you talking about
some term that has meaning in constitutional law?
755. Houchins, 436 U.S. at 6.
756. Id.
757. Id. at 4–5. Both courts and academics have incorrectly stated that no
access at all was provided to Little Greystone. See, e.g., Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris,
5:07CV00195 SWW, 2008 WL 110853, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008); First
Amend. Coal. v. Jud. Inquiry & Rev. Bd., 579 F. Supp. 192, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(subsequent history omitted); Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed in
Context: The Journalists’ Right of Access to Places, 52 MO. L. REV. 751, 780 (1987);
Media Right of Access, supra note 185, at 175. But see supra note 18 and
accompanying text (describing a visit to Little Greystone).
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Booty: Yes, I think I am. I think the public does have some rights
of access . . . . In the Pell case, what the Court did, as I read it any
case is, the Court found that there was no intention to conceal any
conditions. The Court found that there was public access and that
was enough, those two factors, there was plainly no—nothing being
swept under the rug, nothing being hidden . . . .
Rehnquist: Was not Pell really a decision that said whatever the
public access is the media access need to be no greater?
Booty: Indeed, that is exactly what the Court said. But I do not
read the decision they are saying that means necessarily that the
public access is zero. That is not resolved in any decision that this
Court that I am aware of. It was not placed an issue in that case.
That is my point. 758

In additional questioning, Stevens asked of Booty, “[Y]ou
do not seriously contend that the whole problem could be
solved by having zero access to public and press both?” 759
Booty responded, “Certainly not.” 760 Stevens pressed, “[Y]ou
would not urge the court to extreme position, would you?” 761
Again, Booty said, “No I am not urging that.” 762
Because Houchins presupposed some level of access,
courts should be especially wary of elevating its dicta to
condone the complete exclusion of the press and public from
government proceedings in all circumstances. What if a
sheriff excludes the public completely from a prison to
conceal routine beatings of inmates? Or if a small-town judge
seals whole civil dockets as a favor to a friendly lawyer? What
if the government enforces a curfew against journalists to
hide illegal conduct? The competing interests in these cases
of complete exclusion are much different than those in
Houchins where there were substantial alternatives to the
access sought.
The Court has itself recognized as much. In Pell, it left
758. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 12:16.
759. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 14:25.
760. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 14:33.
761. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 15:39.
762. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 15:43.
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open the question of the constitutionality of the total
exclusion of the press as “part of an attempt by the State to
conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press’
investigation and reporting of those conditions.” 763 In Globe
Newspaper, Burger and Rehnquist argued that the
compelling interest standard adopted in that case was too
high where “[n]either the purpose of the law nor its effect is
primarily to deny the press or public access to
information.” 764 In Press-Enterprise II, Stevens argued that
the Court never blessed the exclusion of the press to conceal
impropriety. On the contrary, the Court suggested that
“[n]either our elected nor our appointed representatives may
abridge the free flow of information simply to protect their
own activities from public scrutiny.” 765 As one contemporary
account observed, “Even while denying requests for access to
prisons [in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins], . . . the Supreme
Court has consistently taken pains to point out that the
challenged restrictions did not foreclose all access, implying
that some form of access is required.” 766
In short, the Supreme Court has never applied the
Houchins dicta to condone the complete exclusion of the
press and the public from a government proceeding or from
government records. Yet, because of the undisciplined use of
broad dicta in Houchins and lower courts’ misplaced reliance
on that dicta, Houchins, a case that presupposed some
meaningful level of public access, looms large even over cases
concerning the complete exclusion of the press and the
public. The dicta should have never been included in the
plurality and concurring opinions, and it should not be
(indeed, is not) binding on lower courts today.
763. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974).
764. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 616 (1982) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
765. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (Steven, J.,
dissenting).
766. Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial
Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (1978).

2022]

DOES HOUCHINS MATTER?

1449

B. Houchins Lacks Precedential Weight
Moving from the facts to the law, there are at least two
additional reasons to question the import of Houchins.
Initially, there is no majority opinion. Instead, Burger
mustered only a three-Justice plurality. Nor is there a
controlling rationale under the framework established in
Marks v. United States to assess the precedential value of a
plurality. Next, even if one were to consolidate the plurality
and Stewart’s concurrence in judgment, that would
represent only a minority-majority decision, where four
Justices constituted a majority on a short bench. This is not,
under the Court’s traditional approach, the kind of Court
that should be declaring far-reaching constitutional
principles.
1. There Is No Majority or Controlling Opinion in
Houchins
Because Houchins was decided by a splintered sevenmember Court in a 3-1-(3) decision, there is the question of
what opinion should be treated as the controlling, and,
therefore, the precedential one. Does the plurality control?
Stewart’s opinion concurring in judgment? Are there
controlling portions of both the plurality and the dissent in
light of Stewart agreeing with the plurality that there is no
constitutional right of access to information in the hands of
the government, while also agreeing with the dissenters that
some injunctive relief should be provided?
Courts have rarely confronted these questions. They
have rarely recognized that the lead opinion in Houchins was
a plurality opinion, let alone a three-judge plurality
opinion. 767 And although Stewart did not sign on to the
767. See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553,
559 (6th Cir. 2007); Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2004); Smith v.
Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001); Senate of Cal. v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d
974, 976–77 (9th Cir. 1992); ACLU of Miss., Inc. v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066,
1071–72 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 113
(2d Cir. 1984).
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plurality opinion, some courts have construed his opinion as
transforming the plurality into a majority. As the California
Supreme Court explained in Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior
Court, “Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Houchins
agreed with what the lead opinion said regarding an alleged
First Amendment ‘right of access to information generated
or controlled by government.’” 768 Based on this reasoning,
the California court concluded that Houchins was not a 3-1(3) decision with a plurality, an opinion concurring in
judgment, and a dissent, it was a “four-member majority” of
a seven-member Court. 769 Other courts have invoked similar
judicial license to transmute the Houchins plurality into a
majority opinion. 770
This judicial alchemy is misguided. Stewart did not join
the plurality, and Burger’s opinion was not an opinion of the
Court. Burger only “announced the judgment of the Court,”
while what followed was “an opinion, in which Mr. Justice
WHITE and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joined.” 771
“STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment”
only. 772 This was a considered choice. Stewart could not
“bring [himself] to agree” with the dissenters; nor could he
bring himself to agree with the plurality that no injunctive
relief should be granted. 773 This matters: there is a difference
between joining an opinion and what Blackmun once called
“a mere concurrence in the Court’s judgment.” 774

768. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 141 P.3d 288, 309 (Cal. 2006).
769. Id. (quoting San Jose Mercury-News v. Mun. Ct., 638 P.2d 655, 658 (Cal.
1982)).
770. Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts, 839 A.2d 185, 191 (Pa. 2003)
(explaining that the “majority in Houchins concluded”); Cap. Cities Media, Inc. v.
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1171 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (describing a “majority of
the seven judge Court”); San Jose Mercury-News, 638 P.2d at 658.
771. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 3 (1978) (plurality opinion).
772. Id.
773. Letter from Potter Stewart to John Paul Stevens (Apr. 24, 1978), in
POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED, INC., supra note 54, at 99.
774. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 602 (1980)
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In light of Stewart’s vote, several courts have, thus,
emphasized that the lead opinion in Houchins was a
plurality opinion. As the Sixth Circuit explained, “Houchins
represented a plurality opinion of the Court, and as such, the
conclusion that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not guarantee the public a right of access to information
generated or controlled by the government was neither
accepted nor rejected by a majority of the Court.” 775 Other
courts agree: “the case resulted in a plurality opinion.” 776 Or,
as another put it, “Houchins was merely a plurality
opinion.” 777 In short, Burger’s “opinion was joined by only
two other justices . . . and thus did not command a majority
of the full Court.” 778
Nor is there a “single rationale explaining the result”
that “enjoys the assent” of a majority of Justices that would
provide a binding rule of law on lower courts. 779 True enough,
in his published concurrence, Stewart noted that he “agree[d]
substantially” with the legal principles in the plurality
opinion, perhaps suggesting that there was a single
rationale. But then he “part[ed] company” in applying those
“abstractions to the facts of [the] case.” 780 As a result, while
the plurality found no right at all to be vindicated, Stewart
believed that KQED was “entitled to” some injunctive
relief. 781 In so finding, he endorsed an understanding of the
Press Clause inconsistent with the plurality’s views: “That
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
775. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002).
776. United States v. Miami Univ., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1154 (S.D. Ohio 2000),
aff’d, 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002).
777. Soc’y of Pro. Journalists v. Sec’y of Lab., 616 F. Supp. 569, 573 n.4 (D.
Utah 1985) (emphasis added).
778. Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to
Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 276 (2004).
779. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
780. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, concurring in
judgment).
781. Id.
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the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an
acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in
American society.” 782 In vindication of that role, Stewart
agreed with the dissenters that “KQED was clearly entitled
to some form of preliminary injunctive relief” 783 and refused
to “foreclose the possibility of further relief for KQED on
remand.” 784
Absent a majority opinion or single rationale shared by
the plurality and Stewart, Houchins presents a Marks v.
United States problem: “When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices” (or four on a Court of seven
Justices 785) “‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . . ‘“ 786 This rule is
“intended to limit the precedential reach of plurality
decisions, while ensuring that they are followed by lower
courts.” 787
Despite Houchins presenting a classic Marks problem,
courts rarely confront the question of which opinion in
Houchins is properly understood to be the controlling one
under Marks. In fact, only four decisions even cite Houchins
together with Marks. 788 The rest are largely rudderless with

782. Id. at 17.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 18.
785. For the purpose of argument, this Article assumes that Marks applies to
plurality opinions issued in cases with fewer than nine Justices participating.
786. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
787. Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 421
(1992).
788. See Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019); Velie v. Hill,
736 F. App’x 165, 167 n.2 (9th Cir. 2018); Hanrahan v. Mohr, No. 2:13-CV-1212,
2015 WL 1476551, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2015); Hanrahan v. Mohr, No. 2:13CV-1212, 2017 WL 1134772, at *8 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2017), aff’d, 905 F.3d
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one even resorting to the awkward exercise of trying to
discern what it called the “feeling of the majority” in
Houchins. 789 Rather than engage in jurisprudential
psychology, courts would be better served by relying on
Marks to discern Houchins’ holding, if any.
Lower courts have interpreted Marks’ “narrowest
grounds” requirements differently, but commentators have
distilled three approaches. 790 The first is the “implicit
consensus” approach. As described by the D.C. Circuit,
“[O]ne opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’
than another . . . only when one opinion is a logical subset of
other, broader opinions.” 791 Under this approach, “the
narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator of
the Court’s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly
approved by at least five Justices [or four on a seven-Justice
Court] who support the judgment.” 792 That is, “the rationales
for the majority outcome” must be able to fit “within each
other like Russian dolls.” 793
Second is the “fifth vote” approach, which instructs lower
courts to “treat as controlling ‘the opinion of the Justice or
Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds necessary
to secure a majority,’ even if the opinion reflects the views of
only one Justice.” 794 This approach “views Marks as an
instruction to search for the opinion reflecting the views of
the Court’s median or ‘swing’ Justice—typically, the fifth

947 (6th Cir. 2018).
789. Soto v. Secretario de Justicia, 112 P.R. Dec. 477 (1982).
790. Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 807 (2017).
791. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
792. Id.
793. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1993); see also Williams,
supra note 790, at 808 (quoting same).
794. Williams, supra note 790, at 813–14 (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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vote—and accord that decision full precedential effect.” 795
While this approach “promises guidance with respect to a
broader range of plurality decisions than does the implicit
consensus approach,” it suffers drawbacks; among others, it
treats as binding “the opinion reflecting the median Justice’s
views, including propositions that no other participating
Justice explicitly or implicitly assented to.” 796
Third is the “issue-by-issue” approach. Under this
approach, a court must parse “each of the various opinions in
the plurality case—including the plurality opinion,
concurrences, and dissents—‘to determine each proposition
where five [or less on a short Court] or more Justices
agree.’” 797 This “avoids the fifth vote approach’s
uncomfortable conclusion that the views of a single Justice
can establish binding precedent for the Court” and “looks for
specific propositions that have actually been explicitly or
implicitly assented to by a majority of Justices, though
perhaps not the same majority whose votes were necessary
to the judgment in the precedent case.” 798
Courts have invoked each of these approaches in
construing Houchins. Those taking the “implicit consensus”
approach (albeit without citing Marks specifically) have
observed that the Houchins plurality opinion, in light of
Stewart’s noted “substantial[] agree[ment]” with it, should
be viewed as the controlling opinion. 799 In Center of National
Securities Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, for example,
the D.C. Circuit strung together the plurality and
concurrence to find that “the First Amendment does not
‘mandate[] a right of access to government information or
795. Id. at 814.
796. Id. at 815.
797. Id. at 817.
798. Id.
799. See, e.g., Allen v. Lang, 738 F. App’x 934, 947 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018); Shero
v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1209 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007); Gaubert v. Denton, No.
CIV. A. 98-2947, 1999 WL 350103, at *9 n.5 (E.D. La. May 28, 1999), aff’d, 210
F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2000).
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sources of information within the government’s control.’” 800
It then went on to describe Houchins as an opinion of “the
Court.” 801
Others have treated Stewart’s concurring opinion as
controlling under the “fifth vote” approach (or, on this short
Court, the “fourth vote” approach). In Fusaro v. Cogan, the
Fourth Circuit explained:
Houchins was decided by seven members of the Supreme
Court. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion.
Justice Stewart’s concurrence is recognized as having
controlling effect as the narrowest prevailing vote. See Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Justice Stewart
“agree[d] substantially” with the Chief Justice that the First
Amendment confers no general right of access to government
documents. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. 2588. He
wrote separately to emphasize that, in some circumstances,
the press might merit additional solicitude in its
information-gathering efforts to which the general public
would not be entitled. 802
The Ninth Circuit has agreed, explaining that because
“Stewart’s view in Houchins was the narrowest prevailing
one, it has controlling effect.” 803 Several commentators have
agreed that Stewart’s concurrence was “in effect, the
controlling opinion in the 4 to 3 decision.” 804
800. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir.
2003); see also Sullo & Bobbitt, P.L.L.C. v. Milner, 765 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.
2014).
801. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud., 331 F.3d at 934; see also City of Chicago v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Houchins plurality as
if a majority).
802. Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 249–50 n.5 (4th Cir. 2019).
803. Velie v. Hill, 736 F. App’x 165, 167 n.2 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
804. Erin C. Carroll, Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of
Information Act to Preference the Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193, 221 (2016); see
also Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking Beyond
the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV. 529, 589
n.91 (2020) (“Justice Stewart’s opinion, which was effectively the controlling one
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Finally, there are those courts that take the issue-byissue approach. As one explained, “Stewart concurred in the
judgment of the three-justice majority, but agreed with the
three dissenting justices that at least some limited injunctive
relief was warranted in favor of media plaintiffs.” 805 That
court refused to dismiss a complaint seeking access based on
this approach: “Justice Stewart and the dissenting Justices
all believed that at least some measure of injunctive relief in
favor of the media plaintiffs was warranted.” 806 Another
court similarly grouped Stewart with the dissenters,
explaining that a “majority of the voting members of the
Court . . . recognized the First Amendment’s concern that the
public be optimally informed could in some instances render
unreasonable restraints upon the scope of access to members
of the press even where it would not be unreasonable to
exclude the general public.” 807
None of these approaches is particularly satisfying
though—not least because they all reach different results in
applying variations of the same test. The implicit consensus
approach does not work because neither the plurality nor
Stewart’s concurrence entirely subsumes the other. The
plurality’s holding that there is no special right of access for
in the 4-3 decision”); William Bennett Turner & Beth S. Brinkmann, Televising
Executions: The First Amendment Issues, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1152
(1992) (“Justice Stewart wrote an opinion concurring with the justices voting to
affirm which, under the narrowest concurrence rule, became the Court’s binding
precedent.”).
805. Hanrahan v. Mohr, No. 2:13-CV-1212, 2017 WL 1134772, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 24, 2017) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193), aff’d, 905 F.3d 947 (6th Cir.
2018).
806. Hanrahan v. Mohr, No. 2:13-CV-1212, 2015 WL 1476551, at *8 n.3 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 31, 2015).
807. State v. Lashinsky, 404 A.2d 1121, 1128 (N.J. 1979); see also CHRISTOPHER
E. SMITH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW THROUGH THE
PRISM OF PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 150 (2016) (“The viewpoints of Stewart and three
dissenters (Stevens, Powell, and Brennan), although not identical, effectively
constituted a majority in support of the possibility of district court orders
requiring news media access to correctional institutions in specific
circumstances. Thus, the Court’s decision . . . did not define strict limits on lower
court judges’ remedial authority in lawsuits arising from such situations.”).
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the press beyond that of the public does not fit within
Stewart’s opinion that would provide at least some special
access. 808 The fifth-vote gives Stewart’s lone opinion the
effect of a majority opinion despite every other Justice
refusing to join him. And issue-by-issue gives legal force to
the dissenters. But as Chief Justice John Roberts has
written, “‘comments in [a] dissenting opinion’ about legal
principles and precedents ‘are just that: comments in a
dissenting opinion.’” 809
But what is a court to do then where the Marks inquiry
does little to help? In similarly badly fractured cases, the
Supreme Court has explained, “We think it not useful to
pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility
when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts
that have considered it.” 810 Instead, the Court has admitted
that where a “splintered decision” leads to such a substantial
“degree of confusion” in lower courts, its continued viability
may reasonably be questioned. 811 In such instances, lower
courts have found the judgment to be binding, but not the
Court’s reasoning. That is, not every judgment has a binding
holding.
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, in refusing to follow
Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, observed that the Supreme Court has “indicated that
there may be situations where even the Marks inquiry does
not yield any rule to be treated as binding in future cases.” 812
The Seventh Circuit, in trying to discern the holding of the
808. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment).
809. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1511 (2020) (quoting
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980)). But see Nichols
v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (describing agreement between four
dissenters and a concurring opinion as a “holding”).
810. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46 (1994).
811. Id. at 746.
812. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1248 n.12
(11th Cir. 2001).
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Court’s ruling in June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, 813
agreed. Expressing its frustration with Marks, it explained:
“Marks does not command lower courts to find a common
denominator—to find an implicit consensus among divergent
approaches—where there is actually none. It is not our duty
or function to bring symmetry to any ‘doctrinal disarray’ we
might encounter in our application of Supreme Court
precedent.” 814
Houchins cries out for the same treatment. It reads
exactly as it was drafted: two groups of three Justices at
either extreme with Stewart straddling both. Sure, Stewart
agreed with the plurality at a certain level of abstraction, but
he arrived at results consistent only with the dissenters’
views. Said differently, while Stewart expressed his
disagreement with the dissenters, the result he arrives at
betrays that disagreement. As White observed of Stewart’s
position at the conference, “But if there is no right of public
generally, [I] can’t understand [Stewart’s] position.” 815 That
Stewart, as the deciding vote, tried to have the best of both
worlds had an inescapable knock-on effect: his opinion makes
it impossible to discern a single ratio decidendi in Houchins.
As such, courts should simply recognize that Houchins lacks
one and, thus, does not provide a binding rule.
2. Prudential Considerations Undercut Houchins
While Houchins should not be viewed as precedential for
the reasons just discussed, it is worth going beyond the
judicial bean counting to explain why, as a normative matter,
813. See generally 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
814. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir.
2021); see also Baker v. State, 289 A.2d 348, 354 (Md. App. 1972) (departing from
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), where plurality lacked a common
thread with other opinions and concluding that such a plurality opinion “is no
more controlling in this State than is the dissenting opinion”); John F. Davis &
William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 974 DUKE L.J. 59, 74 (1974) (discussing same).
815. Conference Notes (Dec. 2, 1977), in POWELL PAPERS: HOUCHINS V. KQED,
INC., supra note 54, at 32.
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Houchins should not be considered precedential. As Powell’s
clerk recognized when Stevens circulated his ill-fated draft
majority opinion in Houchins: “Even if the Justice does get a
majority to join his opinion, the Court will be in the awkward
position of handing down an important new precedent by a
4-3 vote.” 816 While Stevens did not get a majority, the point
applies with even greater force to the plurality handing down
an important decision in that case by a 3-1-(3) vote.
For most of the Court’s history, it simply did not issue
plurality opinions. One early study found that once Chief
Justice Marshall discarded the Court’s practice of issuing
seriatim opinions, the Court issued just ten plurality
opinions in the entirety of the nineteenth century. 817
Between 1900 and 1956, it issued thirty-five. 818 After 1956,
the Court’s use of plurality opinions exploded, and by the
early 1970s, it had issued some sixty-one more. 819
Traditionally, such opinions represented “nothing more than
the views of the individual justices who join[ed] in the
opinion.” 820 As such, members of the Court “indicated that
such cases lack authority.” 821
This made sense because a plurality opinion was not “an
opinion of the Court as an institution.” 822 Instead, as scholars
observed in the 1970s, a plurality opinion carries “less
precedential weight” precisely because it is not a majority. 823
As a result, the bar and the public would be less willing to
accept them. 824 Nor would such cases give lower courts
816. Id.
817. Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare
Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 99 & n.4 (1956)
818. Id.
819. Davis & Reynolds, supra note 814, at 60.
820. Id. at 61.
821. Comment, supra note 817, at 100.
822. Davis & Reynolds, supra note 814, at 61.
823. Id. at 62.
824. Id.
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“definitive guidance as to the state of the law.” 825
Plurality opinions raised another issue particularly
relevant to Houchins: they detract from the Court’s role as a
constitutional arbiter by “failing to provide a foundation
which can give stability to the Court’s own development of
constitutional law.” 826 As one commentator said, a plurality
opinion, “by its very nature, represents the most unstable
form of case law. It is the resolution of a ‘hard’ case by a
nonunanimous Court.” 827 Justices who join a plurality are
free to change their minds in later cases without the pull of
stare decisis. 828 Future Justices are also “free to diverge from
the plurality view without considering the serious
consequences of overruling a precedent firmly established by
a majority of the Court.” 829 Therefore, “the law develops not
in an orderly process of logical progression, but in a confused
ebb and flow of divergent concepts.” 830
These “juridical cripples” cause related problems in the
lower courts too. There, they may do “more to confuse the
current state of the law than to clarify it.” 831 Decisions like
Houchins “often fail[] to give definitive guidance as to the
state of the law to lower courts-both state and federal.” 832 As
such, lower courts, as the circuit splits demonstrate in the
case of Houchins, “must—and often do—‘guess’ at the Court’s
reaction when faced with a somewhat similar case.” 833 This
confusion is attributable first to the Court’s “inability to give

825. Id.
826. Id. at 66.
827. Ken Kimura, Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality
Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1594 (1992).
828. Id.
829. Davis & Reynolds, supra note 814, at 66.
830. Id.
831. Id. at 62.
832. Id.
833. Id. at 71.
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stability to the development of constitutional law.” 834 The
Burger Court’s many plurality opinions were thus “much
criticized for their inadequacy as pronouncements of the
court of final resort, as guides to lower courts, and as
statements of the law.” 835 Houchins is a prime example.
Even if Houchins was viewed not as a plurality but as a
majority opinion as some have suggested, these prudential
concerns remain. How much precedential value should a
four-Justice “majority” have on a Court where, as Brennan
remarked, the most important thing is “counting to five”?836
Traditionally, the question was moot because the Court
refused to issue opinions on constitutional questions where
it did not have a full complement of Justices. As Chief Justice
Marshal said (when the Court was composed of seven): “The
practice of this court is, not (except in cases of absolute
necessity) to deliver any judgment in cases where
constitutional questions are involved, unless four judges
concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of a majority
of the whole court.” 837 While that rule relaxed as time went
on, decisions of a short Court were still “regarded as of less
weight and value as a precedent.” 838 A four-Justice majority
on a nine-Justice Court is, after all, a minority-majority
opinion or, as Blackmun (joined by then-Justice Rehnquist)
called such decisions: a “4-3 vote by a bobtailed Court.” 839
834. Id. at 73.
835. Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127,
1127 (1981); see also James A. Bloom, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial
Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2007) (“plurality decisions create confusion and
inefficiency in the lower courts”).
836. Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Thousand Opinions, One Voice, N.Y. TIMES (July
25, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/25/opinion/a-thousand-opinionsone-voice.html.
837. Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Ky., 33 U.S. 118, 122 (1834); see also
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 34 U.S. 85 (1835).
838. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK
(1912).

ON THE

LAW

OF

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 135

839. N. Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 615 (1975)
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Other Justices have also questioned overreliance on such
opinions. Justice Robert Jackson in Saia v. People of New
York wrote, “The quotation in the Court’s opinion today [of
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), a seven-Justice opinion]
had the support of only two Justices, with a possible third.
The failure of six or seven Justices to subscribe to those views
would seem to fatally impair the standing of that quotation
as an authority.” 840 Justice Harold Burton, writing of the
Legal Tender Cases, would say that an opinion “of a majority
of the whole Court, as against a lesser majority” of the same
Court provided “additional degrees of stability and
soundness.” 841 Justice Stevens, in Montana v. United States,
similarly observed that a prior seven-Justice case, Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, should not “be read as having made a
substantial change in settled law,” because “only four
Justices . . . joined the Court’s opinion.” 842 And, recently,
Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch
observed that there is a difference between what a plurality
opinion “actually decided” and mere “comments” made in it—
especially comments that might lead “to confusion in the
lower courts.” 843
Other decisions by a 4-3 Court, even if considered
binding on lower courts under modern rules, have
nonetheless faced ignoble deaths. 844 The prime example is
(Blackmun, J. dissenting).
840. 334 U.S. 558, 568 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
841. Harold H. Burton, The Legal Tender Cases: A Celebrated Supreme Court
Reversal, 42 A.B.A.J. 231, 233 (1956).
842. 450 U.S. 544, 568 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Schuette v.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 325 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
843. See Thompson v. Clark, No. 20-659, slip op. at 8 (S. Ct. Apr. 4, 2022) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
844. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of
Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043, 1078 n.169 (2017) (“A majority of four on a
seven-member Supreme Court is treated as binding precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 1
(2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice
of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute
a quorum.”).”); Jonathan Remy Nash, The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis,

2022]

DOES HOUCHINS MATTER?

1463

Fuentes v. Shervin, a 4-3 decision issued in the 1970s like
Houchins that purported to hold unconstitutional certain
repossession statutes. 845 Shortly after Fuentes was decided,
however, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to follow it. 846
It did so because of the 4-3 nature of the opinion: “We do not
believe . . . that it is unreasonable to ask that before we are
required to declare unconstitutional statutes enacted by our
legislature . . . that the United States Supreme Court speak
with at least a majority voice on the subject.” 847
While the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was met
with criticism in some corners, it turned out to be right to
question Fuentes: a fully constituted U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed with the result in Fuentes just two years later. 848
And, in 1975, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist argued that
“Fuentes, a constitutional decision, obviously should not have
been brought down and decided by a 4-3 vote.” 849 They added,
“Announcing the constitutional decision, with a four-Justice
majority of a seven-Justice shorthanded Court, did violence
to Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s wise assurance that . . . the
practice of the Court ‘except in cases of absolute necessity’ is
not to decide a constitutional question unless there is a
majority ‘of the whole court.’” 850
Houchins did similar violence. It was, at its very, very
Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831, 835
(2009) (collecting minority-majority cases the Court did not treat as binding).
845. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
846. Roofing Wholesale Co. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Ariz. 1972).
847. Id.; see also Hart v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 582, 588 (Va. 1921)
(considering a 4-2 Supreme Court decision and observing that “it may be fairly
said to be still an open question in so far as the authority of the Supreme Court
is concerned”).
848. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 623 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
849. N. Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 616 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
850. Id. (quoting Briscoe v. Commonwealth’s Bank of Ky., 8 Pet. 118, 122
(1834)).
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best, a 4-3 decision, but still purported to establish an
unqualified constitutional rule—a rule that was almost
immediately drawn into doubt by the Court’s subsequent
cases in Gannett, Richmond Newspapers, and Globe
Newspaper. Houchins thus never spoke for the Court. As
Stevens wrote in Richmond Newspapers, “Since Mr. Justice
MARSHALL and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN were unable to
participate in that case, a majority of the Court neither
accepted nor rejected that conclusion [regarding access] or
the contrary conclusion expressed in the prevailing
opinions.” 851 The Court aggravated this violence when it
failed to, as it had in North Georgia Fishing, Inc., explicitly
disclaim Houchins, leaving it as some sort of undeveloped
vestigial remnant in the U.S. Reporter.
C. Post-Houchins Precedent Displaced Houchins
The question of whether Houchins matters cannot be
answered only be reference to its narrow factual premises
and precedential idiosyncrasies. Instead, the inquiry has to
expand beyond Houchins itself to the right of access cases
that came after it. Three observations can be drawn from this
history. First, the Court’s post-Houchins jurisprudence,
beginning with Richmond Newspapers, speaks directly to the
existence of a First Amendment right of access. Second, while
the Court was fractured in Richmond Newspapers, in
subsequent cases the Court spoke in one voice adopting a
doctrine inconsistent with Houchins’ dicta. Third, the
Richmond Newspapers line of cases is consistent with the
Court’s modern First Amendment doctrine, while Houchins
is not.
1. Post-Houchins Jurisprudence Speaks Directly to the
Issue
Courts finding that Houchins establishes the general
851. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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rule often observe that Houchins must control because the
Supreme Court has never applied Richmond Newspapers’
two-part test outside the criminal prosecution context. As the
First Circuit wrote, “While the Supreme Court has
recognized a qualified First Amendment right of access to
records and proceedings connected to the criminal justice
system, the Court has never recognized a corresponding
right of access to Executive Branch documents.” 852 Stated
simply, as the D.C. Circuit did, “Neither the Supreme Court
nor this Court has applied the Richmond Newspapers test
outside the context of criminal judicial proceedings or the
transcripts of such proceedings.” 853
This reasoning is unpersuasive though. As an initial
matter, it goes both ways. It is true that the Court has never
applied Richmond Newspapers outside of the criminal
context. But it is just as true that the Court has never applied
the Houchins rule to anything but prisons. Moreover, while
the Court has invoked Houchins in dicta in non-prison cases,
it has also suggested that the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases establish a rule of general applicability. In Richmond
Newspapers, for example, Burger, speaking for himself and
Justices White and Stevens, noted, “Whether the public has
a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised
by this case, but we note that historically both civil and
criminal trials have been presumptively open.” 854 Stewart
also left little doubt that the right of access recognized by the
Court went further than simply guaranteeing a right of
access to criminal trials: “the First and Fourteenth
Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of
access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal.” 855
Additionally, at least three Justices thought the
852. El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1992).
853. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
854. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (plurality opinion).
855. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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implications of the case stretched beyond judicial
proceedings and records. The First Amendment, Brennan
and Marshall explained, had “a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment.” 856 That Amendment did not protect freedom of
speech for its “own sake,” but for the sake of advancing the
system of self-government established by the Constitution.
Protecting speech, without also protecting “the antecedent
assumption that valuable public debate . . . must be
informed,” would inhibit self-governance. 857 Thus, the First
Amendment had to be seen as protecting speech, yes, but also
the
“indispensable
conditions
of
meaningful
858
communication.”
To contain the stretch of this theory, Brennan did not
suggest that the right of access be limited by the kind of
proceeding. Instead, Brennan suggested it be limited by
principles generally applicable to government proceedings. It
should be limited to access to “particular proceedings or
information” that had an “enduring and vital tradition of
public entree.” 859 And, it should be enforced only where
“access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process.” 860 Thus, Brennan spoke of access
to government proceedings and information generally, not
just criminal trials specifically. Stevens did as well: “an
arbitrary interference with access to important information
is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment.” 861
856. Id. at 586–87 (Brennan, J., concurring).
857. Id.
858. Id. (emphasis added).
859. Id. at 589.
860. Id.
861. Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). While in Houchins
Stevens had suggested that the Sixth Amendment played a role, he did not revive
that argument. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1,36–37 (1978) (Stevens,
dissenting). In Richmond Newspapers, only Blackmun confined himself strictly
to criminal trials. He alone credited Tribe’s argument that the interplay between
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Moreover, while Richmond Newspapers may have left
uncertainty as to whether Burger’s or Brennan’s approach
would prevail, the Court in Globe Newspaper dispelled that
uncertainty. As the Second Circuit explained, there the
Court read “Richmond Newspapers broadly.” 862 In Globe
Newspaper, Brennan adopted for the Court his republican
approach to the First Amendment right of access proffered in
Richmond Newspapers:
Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly
mentioned in terms in the First Amendment. But we have long
eschewed any “narrow, literal conception” of the Amendment’s
terms for the Framers were concerned with broad principles, and
wrote against a background of shared values and practices. The
First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights
that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the
Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other
First Amendment rights. Underlying the First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials is the common understanding that “a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.” By offering such protection, the First
Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of
self-government. Thus to the extent that the First Amendment
embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this
constitutionally protected “discussion of governmental affairs” is an
informed one. 863

The republican right of access endorsed by the Court in
Globe Newspaper was not a recognition of a right of access to
trials alone. It was a recognition of a republican right of
access: that the First Amendment existed to advance selfgovernance through the public exchange of ideas and, thus,
protected indispensable conditions for it, including access to
certain government information. 864 Nothing about that
the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and of the press and the Sixth
Amendment’s public trial right demarcated the boundaries of a constitutional
access right. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
862. New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d
286, 297 (2d Cir. 2012).
863. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982)
(emphasis added).
864. While Cerruti disagreed with the outcome, he agreed with this principle.
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theory suggests that it is inherently limited to criminal
trials, or even to the judiciary. 865 The limiting principles
were the complementary considerations of a history of
openness and whether access “plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the . . . government as a
whole.” 866
Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Globe Newspaper was
then many things. It was first an adoption by the Court of
Brennan’s broad concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers and the republican theory of the First
Amendment he outlined in that opinion. It was, second, a
tacit critique of Houchins. Where the Houchins plurality
believed that the First Amendment had nothing to say about
an access right, the Court in Globe Newspaper rejected that
position. In that way, Globe Newspaper was also the
vindication of the Houchins dissenters and the view that
“[t]he preservation of a full and free flow of information to
the general public has long been recognized as a core
objective of the First Amendment to the Constitution,” and
that, it was “for this reason that the First Amendment
protects not only the dissemination but also the receipt of
information and ideas.” 867
While pre-Globe Newspaper cases like Gannett and
Richmond Newspapers suggested potential alternative
doctrinal hooks for the access right instead of the republican
theory, none of those were ever adopted by the Court. There
was no mention of the argument that the First Amendment
right of access should be viewed through the lens Sixth
See Cerruti, supra note 688, at 283 (“Richmond Newspapers does not vindicate a
freedom of speech so much as it does a freedom of self-rule.”).
865. Cerruti has argued that “[t]he answer to this riddle [regarding the reach
of the access right] may indeed be straightforward: perhaps the First Amendment
right of access does not apply to the other branches of government simply because
it cannot be so applied. In other words, the limitation is practical, or political, but
not theoretical.” Id. at 309.
866. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.
867. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Amendment, as proposed by Tribe in Richmond Newspapers.
There was no futzing with the relationship between the right
of access and the public forum doctrine, as had been
advocated for by counsel in Gannett and by Burger in
Richmond Newspapers. And there were no lingering
assertions that maybe the Ninth Amendment had something
to do with it. Rather, the theory adopted by a majority in
Globe Newspaper owed itself to and was defined by the
broadly applicable theories of self-governance advanced by
Powell’s dissent in Saxbe, Stevens’ dissent in Houchins, and,
finally, Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers.
Nor did any subsequent jurisprudence upset Globe
Newspaper. At best, those subsequent cases tacitly endorsed
Brennan’s theory; at worst, they were ambivalent. In PressEnterprise II, for example, Burger, writing for the Court,
used broad language to describe the access right as a right of
access to government information. 868 As Burger explained, in
language suggested by Brennan himself, “history and
experience shape the functioning of governmental processes.
If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of
experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of
public access attaches.” 869 If the end was to limit the right of
access to judicial processes, Burger’s use of Brennan’s phrase
“governmental processes” is an odd one—indeed, seemingly
inconsistent with those courts of appeal holding that the
right of access is limited to the judiciary.
Those courts of appeals that treat the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases as establishing the general rule

868. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986).
869. Id. at 9. While Brennan offered the language, Burger’s initial draft also
included broad language of its own: “[P]ublic access to the affairs of government
does not merit Constitutional protection unless it plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Warren Burger, Majority
Opinion, 1st Draft (May 30, 1986) (emphasis added), in POWELL PAPERS: PRESSENTERPRISE CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE,
supra note 559, at 47.
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have done so precisely because of Globe Newspaper’s
theoretical dominance. When the Third Circuit confronted
the issue of whether there was a right of access to a town
planning meeting, it was the theory adopted in Globe
Newspaper that was at the forefront of the court’s analysis.
As the panel said, “Because a ‘major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs,’ the public and press have the right to
attend certain types of governmental proceedings.” 870 The
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all also relied on this
doctrinal anchor in finding that the right of access is
generally applicable to government proceedings. 871 These
courts recognized that Globe Newspaper spoke directly to the
question of whether the First Amendment provides an
enforceable right of access and why—Houchins did not.
2. The Richmond Newspapers Line of Cases Displaced
Houchins
While the Houchins plurality found that neither “the
First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control,” that
statement cannot survive holdings in cases like Richmond
Newspapers finding that the “First Amendment . . .
prohibit[s] government from summarily closing courtroom
doors.” 872 The two propositions cannot exist together; one is
right, and one is wrong. As First Amendment scholar Lillian
BeVier wrote at the time, Burger’s plurality opinion in
Houchins was “particularly difficult to reconcile with the
870. Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604).
871. See, e.g., Cal. First Amend. Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 704 (6th Cir. 2002); New York
Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 303 (2d Cir.
2012); Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2012).
872. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (Burger, C.J.);
see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604–05.
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Richmond Newspapers result.” 873
Almost everything Burger did in Houchins he did the
opposite in Richmond Newspapers. BeVier noted that in
Houchins Burger stressed that the Court “‘never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources
of information within government control.’” 874 But in
Richmond
Newspapers,
that
appeared
“nearly
inconsequential,” a “momentar[y] inconvenience.” 875 In
Houchins, Burger said that “‘the public importance of
conditions in penal facilities and the media’s role of providing
information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution
a right of the public or the media to enter these
institutions.’” 876 In Richmond Newspapers, however, the
importance of public trials was central to his logic. 877 In
Houchins, Burger dismissed Branzburg’s dicta that “‘news
gathering is not without its First Amendment
protections.’” 878 Yet, in Richmond Newspapers, he credited
it. 879
Despite this, “[c]onspicuously absent” from Burger’s
Richmond Newspapers opinion was any mention of
Houchins. 880 As a result, lower courts have had to try to
reconcile Houchins and the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases without guidance. 881 For courts that prefer Houchins
873. See BeVier, supra note 614, at 322.
874. Id. at 324 (citation omitted).
875. Id.
876. Id. (citation omitted).
877. Id.
878. Id. (citation omitted).
879. Id.
880. Id. at 323.
881. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002);
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992);
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) with Phillips v.
DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 418 (6th Cir. 2016); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 704
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 934
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
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over Richmond Newspapers, they dismiss Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny as providing only a “limited
exception” to Houchins’ “general rule.” In these courts,
Houchins’ holding applies to all government information and
proceedings except criminal trials. As the Sixth Circuit
explained, “[a]n exception to Houchins’ general rule exists.
In a line of cases beginning with Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of access
to certain criminal proceedings and the documents filed in
those proceedings.” 882
This approach suffers from several deficiencies. First,
nowhere in Richmond Newspapers nor any subsequent cases
did the Court say that it was marking out a limited exception
to Houchins. One would expect that had the Court intended
to create an explicit exception to Houchins it would have said
so. Instead, in Globe Newspaper the Court adopted a theory
that was not tethered to judicial proceedings alone—and,
based on that theory, the Court in Globe Newspaper and
Press-Enterprise II spoke of access to government
information not just criminal trials. 883 This rule is, by its
nature, a general rule, not an exception.
Second, that the Court recognized a right of access in the
Richmond Newspapers line of cases means that the broad
dicta in Houchins that no right of access existed was, in fact,
wrong. Richmond Newspapers proved as much in finding
that the First Amendment protects a right of access to
criminal trials. And if Houchins was wrong once, what is to
say that it is not wrong in other places as well? As one court
explained, “the Houchins holding does not provide quite the
bright line standard that might first appear,” because courts
“have noted a number of exceptions to the Houchins rule.” 884
882. Phillips, 841 F.3d at 418; see also, Flynt, 355 F.3d at 704 (describing
Richmond Newspapers as an “exception” to the “general rule of Houchins”).
883. See supra Section III.C.1.
884. Shero v. City of Grove, No. 05-cv-0137, 2007 WL 1574759, at *14 (N.D.
Okla. May 29, 2007) (Cleary, Mag. J., report and recommendation as adopted by
the court).
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Maybe these should not be viewed as exceptions, but rather
the proper application of the two-part test adopted by the
Court in Globe Newspaper.
Third, in the face of any ambiguity between Houchins
and Richmond Newspapers line of cases, the better path is to
rely on the majority positions in cases like Globe Newspaper
rather than on a three-Justice plurality opinion. Otherwise,
courts would find themselves elevating a plurality opinion
that never garnered majority support over a majority
opinion. As the Sixth Circuit said in finding that the
Richmond Newspapers line of cases controlled over
Houchins, “Houchins represented a plurality opinion of the
Court.” 885 And while it would have been preferable for the
Court to explicitly abrogate Houchins, the prudent course is
to rely on a majority opinion like Globe Newspaper as
opposed to a plurality opinion like Houchins. 886
3. Globe Newspaper is the Better Fit Doctrinally than
Houchins
Another reason to question whether Houchins matters is
its relation to First Amendment doctrine generally. Of
course, Houchins did not attempt to fit the access right into
any extant First Amendment theory because it did not
believe that the First Amendment was implicated at all. In
fact, to support its broad dicta, the Houchins plurality had to
distinguish itself out of the Court’s prior case law relating to
the necessity of an informed public and what was required to
ensure such an informed public. Indeed, much of the
Houchins plurality was devoted to explaining why this prior,
seemingly relevant case law was not controlling.
Of Grosjean v. American Press Co., which challenged
885. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694 (6th Cir. 2002).
886. Remember that Brennan sought in Globe Newspaper to dispatch
Houchins with Footnote 13 that approvingly cited the dissenters in Houchins. See
supra text accompanying note 474. That footnote did not survive the drafting
process, but that it was even attempted demonstrates that Brennan did not view
Globe Newspaper as some kind of exception to Houchins.
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retaliatory taxes imposed on newspapers, the Houchins
plurality admitted that “Grosjean readily acknowledged the
need for ‘informed public opinion’ as a restraint upon
misgovernment.” 887 But, it dismissed this as meaning “no
more than that the government cannot restrain
communication of whatever information the media acquire—
and which they elect to reveal.” 888 Of Mills v. Alabama,
which challenged a law that made it a crime to publish an
editorial about the election on the day of the election, it
similarly admitted that “the Court noted that ‘a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.’” 889 But, it added, “the
Court did not remotely imply a constitutional right
guaranteeing anyone access to government information
beyond that open to the public generally.” 890 It similarly
distinguished Branzburg v. Hayes and Zemel v. Rusk. 891
On the other hand, the republican theory adopted in
Globe Newspaper conforms to the Court’s contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence. 892 As Brennan explained there,
the access right was necessary to ensure that the “major
purpose” of the Amendment, i.e., “to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs,” was more than an empty
promise, that such discussion would be both free and
informed. 893 As he put it in Richmond Newspapers, “[t]he
887. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
888. Id.
889. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
890. Id.
891. Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965)).
892. Cerruti is at war with himself on this point. On the one hand, he argues
that Brennan’s approach in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper was
“novel, even radical.” See Cerruti, supra note 688, at 283. On the other hand, he
asserts that like New York Times v. Sullivan, Richmond Newspapers
“restructured the core meaning of the First Amendment to advance the central
political purposes of the Constitution.” Id. at 262.
893. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
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structural model links the First Amendment to that process
of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and
thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but
also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.” 894 With this theory, “Brennan supplied a
principle more readily identified with the purposes of the
first amendment: retention by the people of meaningful
control over the workings of government.” 895
In this way, Globe Newspaper is consistent with the
Court’s defining First Amendment precedent New York
Times v. Sullivan, while Houchins is not. In Sullivan, which
Brennan also authored, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment had a “central meaning,” namely, it protected
the public discussion necessary for effective selfgovernance. 896 Or, in the words of Madison, “In every state,
probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in
canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every
description.” 897 As Harry Kalven explained shortly after that
decision came down in 1964: “The choice of language was
unusually apt. The Amendment has a ‘central meaning’—a
core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot
function, without which, in Madison’s phrase, ‘the censorial
power’ would be in the Government over the people and not
‘in the people over the government.’” 898
The access right as conceived by Brennan in Richmond
Newspapers and then in Globe Newspaper is, perhaps

894. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
895. Public Right of Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 94 HARV. L. REV. 149, 154 (1980).
896. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
897. Id. at 270; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)
(“Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on
the administration of government generally.”).
898. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208 (1964).
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unsurprisingly, a perfect complement to this “central
meaning.” It was also a long time coming. In fact, in 1979,
before Brennan ever drafted his opinion in Richmond
Newspapers or the opinion for the Court in Globe Newspaper,
he gave a speech at Rutgers Law School that foreshadowed
how republican principles laid down in Sullivan might
inform a First Amendment right of access.
In that speech, Brennan pointed the audience’s attention
to recent “decisions of the Court circumscribing the
protections the First Amendment.” 899 Brennan blamed
criticism of these cases on “the confusion of two distinct
models of the role of the press in our society that claim the
protection of the First Amendment.” 900 One was the speech
model, which stated that “the primary purpose of the First
Amendment is more or less absolutely to prohibit any
interference with freedom of expression.” 901 The other was
the structural model, which “is that the First Amendment
protects the structure of communications necessary for the
existence of our democracy.” 902 While the first was absolutist
in its application, its scope was limited, protecting only
speech. The second, however, had “several important
implications” because it “significantly extend[ed] the
umbrella of the press’ constitutional protections” beyond
speech. 903 As Brennan explained, “The press is not only
shielded when it speaks out, but when it performs all the
myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and disseminate the
news.” 904
While not strictly a First Amendment case, Gannett Co.,
Inc. v. DePasquale, Brennan said, was “at its heart” an
899. William J. Brennan, Jr., Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS
L. REV. 173, 175 (1979).
900. Id.
901. Id. at 176.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 177.
904. Id.
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“interpretation of the kind of government we have set for
ourselves in our Constitution.” 905 As Brennan explained, the
ultimate question in such cases was “whether that
government will be visible to the people, who are its
authors.” 906 The Court held that “judges, as officers of that
government, may in certain circumstances remove
themselves from public view.” 907 This was foreign to
Brennan: “I believe that the Framers did not conceive such a
government, and that they had in mind the truth precisely
captured several generations later by Lord Acton:
‘Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of
justice.’” 908 It was precisely this kind of structural
argument—“I believe that the First Amendment . . . fosters
the values of democratic self-government”—that animated
Brennan’s opinions in Sullivan and later his opinion for the
Court in Globe Newspaper. 909
The Houchins plurality represented an adherence to
speech model. It recognized that the First Amendment
provided protections for speech but no protection for the
preconditions of meaningful speech. 910 Protections for such
905. Id.
906. Id. at 182.
907. Id.
908. Id.
909. The Richmond Newspapers line of cases is also consistent with the Court’s
right to receive case law. The Court has recognized that “the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); see also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(“freedom of speech and press . . . necessarily protects the right to receive it.”). In
Pell v. Procunier, the Court observed that the same freedom from prior restraints
embodied in the First Amendment “[c]orrelatively, . . . protect[s] the right of the
public to receive such information and ideas as are published.” 417 U.S. 817, 832
(1974). The Richmond Newspapers line of cases provide “powerful support for the
Court’s decisions articulating a first amendment right to receive information
independent of speech rights held by those who seek to convey it.” Public Right
of Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 155 (1980).
910. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (distinguishing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), on
the grounds that they dealt with “the freedom of the media to communicate

1478

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

preconditions, it explained, must come from the political
process, not the Constitution. 911 As such, the rationale for
the Houchins plurality’s opinion expressly disclaims a
republican or structural theory of the First Amendment:
“There is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to
disclose, or for standards governing disclosure of or access to
information.” 912 In so concluding, Houchins placed itself at
odds with the First Amendment theory adopted by the Court
in Sullivan and quickly came to be at odds with Globe
Newspaper.
4. Globe Newspaper Addresses the Concerns of the
Houchins Plurality
Globe Newspaper also addresses the concerns of the
Houchins plurality. According to the plurality, one reason
against recognizing a right of access was that there were “few
restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow.” 913 Another was
that there was “no discernable basis . . . for standards
governing disclosure of or access to information.” 914 These
had long concerned the Court. The Houchins plurality relied
on language of the Court in Zemel v. Rusk, where the issue
was whether the Secretary of State could refuse to issue
passports to travel to Cuba, to make its point. 915 As the Court
explained in Zemel, “the prohibition of unauthorized entry
into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities
to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion
of the way the country is being run, but that does not make
entry into the White House a First Amendment right.” 916

information”).
911. Id. at 13–15.
912. Id. at 14.
913. Id. at 12.
914. Id.
915. 381 U.S. 1, 3 (1965).
916. Id. at 16–17.
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Neither Houchins nor Zemel were mistaken in their
concern over the potential reach of a First Amendment right
of access. Brennan too recognized the “theoretically endless”
right of access under a republican theory of the First
Amendment. 917 Again, an analogy to Sullivan is useful: born
of the same theory, it too was questioned for its potentially
limitless application, reaching beyond public officials to
matters of public concern generally, swallowing most all of
the common law of defamation. 918 As Harry Kalven wrote,
summarizing the logic of the Court’s ruling that increased
the burdens on public officials bringing defamation lawsuits
to protect democratic debate, “[t]he invitation to follow a
dialectic progression from public official to government
policy to public policy to matters in the public domain, like
art, seems to me to be overwhelming.” 919 Similarly, the
dialectic progression of the Richmond Newspapers line of
cases is overwhelming—from criminal trial to civil trials to
government proceedings and information generally as some
courts have held.
One can question whether there is anything necessarily
problematic about this. But nevertheless, while the reach of
the theory is broad it is constrained by the two-part test of
history and logic. 920 These “two helpful principles,” as
Brennan called them, prevent, as the Houchins plurality
feared, an ever-expanding right of access. 921 Second, the
right of access recognized in the Richmond Newspapers line
of cases does not deal in absolutes. Even if it applies, it is still
qualified and may be overcome by countervailing interests:
“Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of access in
order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it

917. Brennan, supra note 899, at 177.
918. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
919. Kalven, supra note 898, at 221.
920. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
921. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.” 922 These limitations cabin the
implications of recognizing a generally applicable access
right, and, in doing so, address the concerns of the Houchins
plurality. 923
D. The Practical Effect of Houchins is Anti-Democratic
While the prior discussions have focused on the facts of
Houchins, the precedential weight of that opinion, and that
opinion in light of subsequent case law, this Section takes a
different approach. Rather than ask whether Houchins does
matter, it asks whether Houchins should matter. It
concludes that it should not. First, the Houchins dicta is
wildly undemocratic. It permits the government to conceal
wrongdoing and misconduct, and gives the public no
recourse—except, potentially, political solutions. But, of
course, if the public does not know about such misconduct,
the availability of political solutions does nothing. Case law
proves up these concerns as some have recently attempted
the intellectually impossible: honoring Houchins while
avoiding its anti-democratic results.
1. Houchins is Remarkably Anti-Democratic
In July 2020, as Black Lives Matter protests in Portland,
Oregon stretched into their third month, federal officers
descended on the city. One night dozens of those officers
deployed from the federal courthouse, blanketed the streets
with tear gas, and started pushing out into the streets. 924 As
922. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
923. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“The Richmond Newspapers’ two-part ‘experience and logic’ test sufficiently
addresses all of the Houchins Court’s concerns for the implications of a
constitutionally mandated general right of access to government information.”).
924. Mike Baker, Thomas Fuller and Sergio Olmos, Federal Agents Push Into
Portland Streets, Stretching Limits of Their Authority, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/us/portland-federal-legal-jurisdiction-
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they pressed forward, they fired “flash grenades and weltinducing marble-size balls filled with caustic chemicals.” 925
Then they “moved down Main Street and continued up the
hill, where one of the agents announced over a loudspeaker:
‘This is an unlawful assembly.’” 926 By late July, sixty
protesters were arrested. 927 Federal agents shot journalists
with “less than lethal” projectiles, others teargassed them,
and another hit a journalist over the head. 928 Debates over
the lawfulness of this conduct raged. 929
That summer, several journalists and legal observers
sued. They sought to stop the assaults on “neutrals who
[were] documenting the police’s violent response to protests
over the murder of George Floyd.” 930 The assaults, they
alleged, were especially invidious as they were intended to
“intimidate the press and suppress reporting on the police’s
own
misconduct,”
which
offended
“fundamental
constitutional protections” and struck “at the core of our
democracy.” 931 They asserted claims for violations of the
First and Fourth Amendments and the Oregon
Constitution. 932 As to their First Amendment claim, they
argued the journalists’ presence on the streets for
newsgathering constituted “constitutionally protected acts of
speech and expressive conduct” and that law enforcement
had “retaliated against” them for that activity by targeting

courts.html.
925. Id.
926. Id.
927. Id.
928. See
generally
Portland,
U.S.
PRESS
FREEDOM
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/?city=Portland.

TRACKER,

929. See generally id.
930. Class Action Allegation Second Amended Complaint at 2, Index
Newspapers L.L.C. v. City of Portland, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Or. 2020) (No.
3:20-cv-1035-SI).
931. Id.
932. See id. at 45, 47, 48.
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them “for arrests, threats of arrests, and use of force.” 933
At a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order that month, the government disagreed.
True enough, it said, there was no dispute “that the press
and public have the right to exercise their First Amendment
right to public spaces.” 934 But, it argued, “[T]here can be no
dispute that the Government can disperse demonstrations
that have become violent or obstructive.” 935 It added, “The
Supreme Court has emphasized that the media have no
special rights of access above and beyond the public . . . . If
the public can be excluded from these violent areas to
preserve public safety consistent with the First Amendment,
then the media . . . can be as well.” 936
Nevertheless, the district court granted the plaintiffs’
motion for a temporary restraining order. 937 Because the
First Amendment retaliation claim was based on the
plaintiffs exercising their alleged constitutional right of
access to streets and sidewalks, the court first dealt with
whether the access right existed. Contrary to the
government’s arguments that the Richmond Newspapers
line of cases applied only to judicial proceedings, the court
found the access right extended to the government’s
execution of a dispersal on public streets. 938 Applying the
history-and-logic test, it wrote, “The public streets,
sidewalks, and parks historically have been open to the press
and general public, and public observation of law
enforcement activities in these public fora plays a significant
positive role in ensuring conduct remains consistent with the

933. Id. at 45.
934. Transcript of Proceedings at 18, Index Newspapers L.L.C., 474 F. Supp.
3d 1113 (No. 3:20-cv-1035-SI).
935. Id.
936. Id.
937. See Index Newspapers L.L.C., 474 F. Supp. 3d at 1126.
938. See id. at 1123–25.

2022]

DOES HOUCHINS MATTER?

1483

Constitution.” 939 Later, the court entered a preliminary
injunction, adhering to this reasoning. 940
The federal government appealed, but the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. It began by observing that “the Supreme Court
articulated a two-part test to determine whether a member
of the public has a First Amendment right to access a
particular place and process.” 941 Rejecting the idea that the
Richmond Newspapers line of cases did not apply, it found,
invoking Burger’s public fora analysis, “that the place—
Portland’s streets and sidewalks—and the process—public
protests and law enforcement’s response to them—have
historically been open to the public.” 942 Nor, the panel
observed, did the government “deny that public access plays
a significant positive role in the functioning of our
democracy,” because “the press has long been understood to
play a vitally important role in holding the government
accountable.” 943 True enough, it admitted, the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases involved “access to criminal judicial
proceedings,” but “by its terms the test is not limited to any
particular type of plaintiff or any particular type of forum.” 944
Thus, it and other courts had applied that “analytical
framework to other settings, including planning commission
meetings, student disciplinary records, state environmental
agency records, settlement records, transcripts of state
utility commission meetings, resumes of candidates for
school superintendents, and legislator’s telephone records,
among others.” 945

939. Id. at 1124.
940. See Index Newspapers L.L.C. v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120,
1155 (D. Or. 2020).
941. Index Newspapers L.L.C. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 829 (9th
Cir. 2020).
942. Id. at 830.
943. Id. at 830–31.
944. Id. at 830 n.8.
945. Id.
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While the Ninth Circuit’s approach vindicates
democratic self-governance by enforcing a right of access for
journalists to witness government conduct against the
public, an overreliance on Houchins frustrates selfgovernance. For example, during the summer of 2019, an
influx of migrants at the southern border resulted in a
humanitarian crisis in Texas. Chain-link cages were
constructed; some were standing room only; there was a
constant “stench” and outbreaks “of scabies, shingles and
chickenpox”; “children cried constantly.” 946 Many of these
stories, especially early on were based on secondhand
accounts because the government barred press access to the
detention centers. As a reporter explained, “The blackout on
press access has left Americans largely in the dark about
conditions in government facilities designed to handle
migrants who have crossed the border. Photographs and TV
images are rare and often dated. Rarer still are interviews
with federal agency managers and employees or with the
children.” 947
The blackout was never challenged in court—for good
reason. Had it been, the Fifth Circuit would have almost
certainly dismissed it. That court has taken the view that
Houchins supplies the general rule. It has distinguished
between judicial proceedings to which a right of access exists
under Richmond Newspapers and other “government
information or sources of information within the
government’s control” to which no such right exists—like

946. Simon Romero, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Manny Fernandez, Daniel Borunda,
Aaron Montes & Caitlin Dickerson, Hungry, Scared and Sick: Inside the Migrant
Detention Center in Clint, Tex., N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019),
https://nnirr.org/hungry-scared-and-sick-inside-the-migrant-detention-centerin-clint-tex/; see generally Paul Farhi, Migrant children are suffering at the
border. But reporters are kept away from the story, Wash. Post (June 25, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/migrant-children-aresuffering-at-the-border-but-reporters-are-kept-away-from-thestory/2019/06/24/500313a2-9693-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html.
947. Farhi, supra note 946.
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detention centers. 948 As one commentator explained in the
somewhat analogous context of prison access, “[T]he
unfriendly trio of Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins is the controlling
First Amendment authority that we apply today, making
prisons inaccessible to many journalists.” 949 As a result,
news organizations were left to beg, barter, and plead for
access to the detention centers to inform the public about the
humanitarian crisis inside. 950
If the Fifth Circuit’s approach were applied to the Index
Newspapers case, the journalists would have had no First
Amendment claim. Under Houchins, there would be no
constitutional right of access to public streets. As a result,
despite allegations of misconduct on the streets of Portland,
including the literal abduction of individuals under the cover
of darkness, the press could be summarily excluded. 951 And,
there would be nothing that the Constitution—or the
courts—could say about it. But as the district court judge in
Index Newspapers put it, stating what is perhaps obvious,
“When the government announces it is excluding the press
for reasons such as administrative convenience, preservation
of evidence, or protection of reporters’ safety, its real motive
may be to prevent the gathering of information about
government abuses or incompetence.” 952
Houchins, carried to its logical extreme, allows even
gross misconduct or unlawful conduct to continue—whether
948. Sullo & Bobbitt, P.L.L.C. v. Milner, 765 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
949. Jonathan Peters, For Journalists Covering Prisons, the First Amendment
Is
Little
Help,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.
(July
3,
2018),
https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/first-amendment-reporters-jail.php.
950. See Farhi, supra note 946.
951. See Shawn Boburg, Meg Kelly & Joyce Sohyun Lee, Swept Up in the
Federal Response to Portland Protests: ‘I Didn’t Know if I Was Going to Be Seen
Again’, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.adn.com/nationworld/2020/09/10/swept-up-in-the-federal-response-to-portland-protests-i-didntknow-if-i-was-going-to-be-seen-again/.
952. Index Newspapers L.L.C. v. City of Portland, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1123
(D. Or. 2020) (citation omitted).
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under darkness or behind tall walls—out of the sight of the
public. Under a boundless reading of Houchins, the role of
the First Amendment as “a part of the working of the
national government; . . . a part of the flow of communication
which is its lifeblood” is simply irrelevant. 953 It provides no
outlet for courts to remedy denials of access based not on
colorable claims of a need for confidentiality but simply to
conceal misconduct. To borrow a phrase, an unbridled
reading of Houchins does not chill the process of
accountability, it freezes it. 954 So while Richmond
Newspapers’ critics have argued that Richmond Newspapers
is difficult to constrain in theory, Houchins is too.
Richmond Newspapers recognizes that “[i]f a
government agency restricts public access, the media’s only
recourse is the court system,” that “[t]he free press is the
guardian of the public interest, and the independent
judiciary is the guardian of the free press.” 955 As such, courts
“have a duty to conduct a thorough and searching review of
any attempt to restrict public access.” 956 This approach
makes good sense because it is impossible for the public to
know what is hidden. It also shows why the Houchins
plurality’s appeal to political fixes is far from perfect: the
public cannot exercise its political power to correct abuses
unknown to it. 957 Brennan recognized as much in Richmond
Newspapers where he pointed to Footnote 4 of United States
953. CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41
(1969).
954. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1977); see also
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 112–13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (“The
record shows that the closure order under review was entered specifically to
prevent petitioner from disseminating the inherently prejudicial disclosures that
inevitably follow from a Huntley hearing . . . . In this respect the order
constituted a prior restraint on petitioner’s freedom to publish what transpired
during the Huntley hearing.”).
955. Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012).
956. Id.
957. See Matthew L. Schafer, National Security and Access, a Structural
Perspective, 11 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 689, 728 (2021).
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v. Carolene Products Co. and “implied that recognition of
[access] rights was especially important when government
conduct undermined the Constitution’s democratic processes
that would normally ‘be expected to bring about’
accountability.” 958
2. Workarounds to Houchins are Unconvincing and
Ineffectual
Houchins is further undercut by the splintered
development of access jurisprudence in those courts of
appeals that have adopted as controlling Houchins’ rule that
no constitutional right of access exists. Indeed, even in these
circuits, panels have been forced to develop workarounds in
some access cases to avoid Houchins’ more obvious antidemocratic tendencies. The need for such workarounds in the
first place, of course, suggests that Houchins’ absolutist rule
is unworkable in practice. At any rate, the reasoning behind
these workarounds is unconvincing at best and, as a practical
matter, the workarounds themselves are ineffectual.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Fusaro v. Cogan is the best
example of such a workaround. In Fusaro, the plaintiff, a
Virginia resident, challenged a portion of Maryland’s election
law that prohibited anyone but registered Maryland voters
from accessing a list of registered voters in the state. 959 It
also limited the use of the list to the electoral process. 960 The
panel in Fusaro found that Houchins controlled—not
Richmond Newspapers, which it said provided only a “limited
exception” to Houchins. 961 On its face, therefore “Fusaro’s
request for a copy of the List falls under the general rule of
Houchins.” 962
But the panel did not stop there. Instead, it went on to
958. Id.
959. See Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 2019).
960. See id.
961. See id. at 250.
962. Id.
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explain “three important considerations” relating to the law
that “implicates interests that are protected by the First
Amendment” that may, despite Houchins, require Maryland
to provide access to the list. 963 First, it found that the voter
list was “closely tied to political speech, which generally
receives the strongest First Amendment protection.” 964
Unlike in Houchins and United Reporting, where the
information sought related to prisons and arrest records, the
voter list had a “direct relationship to political speech” and
“an explicit connection to ‘the electoral process.’” 965 That the
list was “sufficiently intertwined with political speech”
meant that laws “concerning its distribution are not immune
to constitutional scrutiny.” 966
Second, the law was both content-based and speakerbased because it limited the use of the list for the “electoral
process” and also limited the distribution of the list to
Maryland voters. 967 “[S]uch restrictions,” the panel said, “are
typically subject to heightened scrutiny.” 968 The court
admitted that it knew of no case where such restrictions were
found to be onerous enough to “overcome the general
principle that there is no First Amendment right to such
information,” but “neither the Supreme Court in Houchins
nor any appellate court applying that decision has been faced
with a situation where the government provided information
only to a discrete group for limited purposes, let alone in an
overtly political context.” 969
Finally, it found that “Supreme Court precedent
indicates that suspect conditions on access to government

963. Id.
964. Id.
965. Id. at 251.
966. Id. at 252.
967. See id. at 252–53.
968. Id. at 250.
969. Id. at 253.
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information may be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.” 970
Relying on the concurring and dissenting opinions in United
Reporting, the panel explained that “eight justices in United
Reporting ‘recognized that restrictions on the disclosure of
government-held information can facilitate or burden the
expression of potential recipients and so transgress the First
Amendment.’” 971 Thus, “a First Amendment claim that
challenges suspect conditions on access to government
information must be available.” 972 As such, the court found
that the plaintiff had stated a First Amendment right of
access claim: “We conclude . . . that the List is a means of
political communication, and the combined effect of the
content- and speaker-based restrictions contained in [the
law] present a sufficient risk of improper government
interference with protected speech that Fusaro may
challenge [the law] in federal court.” 973
Perhaps uncomfortable with its conclusion in light of its
contrary conclusion that Houchins controlled, the panel
emphasized that it was not ruling that “a First Amendment
right to government information exists as a general
proposition.” 974 It adhered to Houchins on that point and
added that “granting access to such information is a decision
for the political branches.” 975 As the Court had explained in
United Reporting, the panel said, Maryland “could have
decided not to release its voter registration list ‘without
violating the First Amendment.’” 976 Yet, since Maryland
chose to release the information, “it could not condition
access to the List on any basis whatsoever.” 977
970. Id. at 250.
971. Id. at 254 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 569 (2011)).
972. Id. at 255.
973. Id. at 256.
974. Id. at 255.
975. Id.
976. Id. (citation omitted).
977. Id.
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Fusaro is not the only example of courts attempting to
limit the anti-democratic effects of Houchins. In Boardman
v. Inslee, the Ninth Circuit confronted a Washington law that
prohibited “public access to certain government-controlled
information, including the personal information of in-home
care providers.” 978 Prior to the enactment of the law, various
unions had used the Washington Public Records Act to
obtain contact information for the in-home care providers for
union organizing efforts. 979 The new law included exceptions
that allowed unions to continue to obtain the information
after its adoption. 980 Opponents of the unions thereafter
requested in-home care provider information for anti-union
campaigning and were denied. 981 They then filed suit.
Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit,
contrary to its prior precedents, asserted that “Houchins first
announced the well-settled principle that the First
Amendment does not guarantee a general ‘right of access to
government information or sources of information within the
government’s control.’” 982 Following the same trajectory as
the Fusaro panel, it explained that the plaintiffs
acknowledged “as they must” that they had no First
Amendment right of access to the in-home care provider
data. 983 Still, the various concurring and dissenting opinions
in United Reporting “illustrate the limited scope of
978. Boardman v. Inslee, 978 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2020).
979. See id. at 1100.
980. See id. at 1102.
981. See id.
982. Id. at 1104 (citation omitted). In a footnote, the panel added that when it
came to judicial proceedings, the Ninth Circuit had applied the Richmond
Newspapers rule. See id. at 1104 n.6. But that same month the Ninth Circuit,
consistent with its long history of applying that test outside of the judicial
context, applied Richmond Newspapers to public streets. See Index Newspapers
L.L.C. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2020). At any rate, the
appellants in Boardman had abandoned their argument under Richmond
Newspapers, and the panel’s discussion of Richmond Newspapers, in that case, is
dicta.
983. Boardman, 978 F.3d at 1105.
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Houchins.” 984 As the panel put it, “Although the decision
whether to disclose government-controlled information ‘at
all’ is well within the prerogatives of the political branches,
when the government selectively discloses information
within its control, a First Amendment claim will lie if the
government denies access to information ‘based on an
illegitimate criterion such as viewpoint.’” 985
There is reason to question these approaches. First,
while purporting to find Houchins controlling, they are
contrary to it and thus are unpersuasive on their own terms.
For example, Fusaro emphasized the importance of the
information as a reason supporting access. But the Houchins
plurality disclaimed that the “public importance” of the
information affected the analysis: “The public importance of
conditions in penal facilities and the media’s role of providing
information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution
a right of the public or the media to enter these
institutions.” 986 Fusaro also emphasized that the
information lied close to political speech unlike in Houchins.
But the Houchins plurality recognized that the information
sought in that case had political valence: it was “true that
with greater information, the public can more intelligently
form opinions about prison conditions.” 987 These attributes
were not thus exclusive to Fusaro; they were present in
Houchins itself.
Second, these decisions are unpersuasive insofar as they
treat the Houchins plurality and a collection of concurring

984. Id. at 1107; see also Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508 (10th
Cir. 1994) (law denying access to information to commercial speakers implicated
First Amendment).
985. Boardman, 978 F.3d at 1107 (citations omitted); see also id. (“As in other
areas where the legislature enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether and how
to confer a benefit or subsidy, the government is not insulated from First
Amendment scrutiny when it discriminates invidiously in the provision of
government-controlled information.”).
986. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion).
987. Id. at 8.
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and dissenting opinions in United Reporting to the exclusion
of the majority position in Globe Newspaper. What is worse,
they do so despite subsequent Supreme Court precedent
making clear that United Reporting is “a case about the
availability of facial challenges,” not “the merits of any First
Amendment claim.” 988 Thus, not only is Houchins elevated
to precedential status, but so too is dicta from United
Reporting’s lead opinion and, also, the concurring and
dissenting opinions in that case. Meanwhile, the Globe
Newspaper majority’s two-part history-and-logic test is cast
aside.
Frustratingly, as well, there is nothing in these opinions
that the Richmond Newspapers line of cases cannot address.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit has applied the history-and-logic
test to voter lists like that at issue in Fusaro. In Cal-Almond,
Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the question was
whether a company involved in the almond business had a
First Amendment right of access to a list of almond growers
eligible to vote in a referendum on a long-standing marketing
order issued by the Department of Agriculture. 989 First, it
dealt with the government’s misplaced reliance on
Houchins. 990 True, the court explained, Houchins recognized
“that there is no general right of access to government
information.” 991 But, it added, “the line of cases from
Richmond Newspapers to Press-Enterprise II recognizes that
there is a limited constitutional right to some government
information.” 992 It then suggested for remand that the twopart test to determine whether the voter lists were subject to
the access right would be satisfied. 993
There is also something unsettling about the conclusions
988. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011).
989. See 960 F.2d 105, 106–07 (9th Cir. 1992).
990. See id. at 109 n.2.
991. Id.
992. Id.
993. Id. at 109–10.
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in cases attempting to end-run Houchins absolutist dicta.
Both seem to recognize that there would be no issue in simply
refusing all access to the information sought. Yet, at the
same time, Fusaro spills much ink explaining how the
information at issue in that case “is a valuable tool for
political speech” and how “circulation of political ideas
typically receives ‘the broadest protection’ afforded by the
First Amendment.” 994 This kind of information, the court
belabors, has a “direct relationship to political speech.” 995
There is thus some friction between the idea that the
government could simply lock information away altogether
and the idea that such information is an extremely valuable
tool for political speech and thus be disclosed on equal terms.
Certainly, there may well be cases where the contentbased and speaker-based restrictions on access to
information will be the lynchpin of the analysis. Perhaps, for
example, the in-home care provider information in
Boardman does not pass the two-part test adopted in Globe
Newspaper. In that case, Globe Newspaper would not require
access as a constitutional matter. But, perhaps, the plaintiff
would still have an argument that the distinctions made in
providing access are themselves unconstitutional. But to
begin from the premise that there is simply no right of access
at all is not only inconsistent with the Court’s access
jurisprudence it risks that, in response to such claims of
access, governments will in the future simply deny access
altogether. That approach under Houchins would be entirely
proper—but as a matter of republican principles imprudent.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Court’s decision in Gannett, TIME
noted that the confusion surrounding it stemmed from the

994. Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
995. Id.
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Court’s broad dicta. 996 It observed, “after a time, the precise
limits on a high court decision have a way of getting
obscured, especially if lower court judges or indeed high court
Justices seize on sweeping statements in the majority
opinion.” And so is the story of Houchins. Its precise limits
have become obscured. Lower courts and Justices have
seized on the simplistic beauty of its sweeping language. It
has overtaken the Court’s own contrary opinions.
This Article began by asking, Does Houchins matter?
That question was easy to answer: Yes. It provides the
prevailing rule in half of the federal appellate courts. The
question that this Article ended up answering is a different
one: Should Houchins matter? That question was more
difficult to answer but just as clear: No. As this Article has
demonstrated, Houchins’ premises were extremely narrow.
Houchins lacks precedential weight standing alone and,
especially, in the context of the access jurisprudence that
came after it. And, above all, it is highly anti-democratic as
it frustrates meaningful public debate and interferes with
democratic self-governance. Alone, each is a reason to
question Houchins’ continuing vitality. Together, they are
definitive: Houchins must not matter.

996. See Law: Confusion in the Courts, supra note 321.

